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Preface
This thesis marks the end of my Ph.D studies at the Copenhagen Business School and
the Central Bank of Denmark. The thesis contains three empirical articles on bank and
sovereign credit risk. Each article is self-contained and can be read independently.
Structure of the thesis
The ﬁrst article deals with the importance of bank fundamentals for the dynamics of
sovereign credit risk. The second article (co-authored with David Lando and Agatha
Murgoci) takes a closer look at ﬁnancial sector linkages and the dynamics of bank and
sovereign credit spreads. Finally, the third article (co-authored with David Lando) is a
case study on the collapse of the Icelandic banking system.
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ish Social Science Research Council and PIMCO. A special thank to David Lando and
Mads Stenbo Nielsen at the Copenhagen Business School for the excellent feedback on
my ongoing work. Further acknowledgements are found in each article.
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Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis which started in 2007 is a deﬁning economic event of our life-
time. Recessions and public bailouts of banking systems have resulted in concerns about
the solvency of sovereigns in recent years as many Eurozone countries face substantial
ﬁscal pressures. The exact causes of the Global Financial Crisis are still debated but it is
unlikely to be the outcome of one single event. In a review of the Global Financial Crisis
based on 21 books on the topic, Lo (2011) summarises the underlying causes and policy
prescriptions: ”there is still signiﬁcant disagreement as to what the underlying causes of
the crisis were, and even less agreement as to what to do about it ... Like World War
II, no single account of this vast and complicated calamity is suﬃcient to describe it.”
The listed causes range from global capital ﬂows, poor regulation, regulatory capture,
inequality, high leverage, skewed economic incentives of borrowers and lenders, etc. Gor-
ton and Metrick (2012) also contain an interesting summary of the literature written in
recent years and in ”Lessons from the Financial Crisis” edited by Berd (2010) several
chapters from academic researchers analyse the ongoing crisis. Article III is a chapter
from this book.
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009), Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2011), and Schularick and Taylor
(2012) provide comprehensive historical data which can be used for understanding the
context of the Global Financial Crisis. It is evident that the ongoing crisis is wide-ranging
in scale but most of the banking crises witnessed in recent years are neither unprecedented
nor extraordinary to historical patterns. The authors ﬁnd macro-ﬁnancial variables that
contain valuable information about the likelihood of future ﬁnancial crises. For example
they ﬁnd a large increase in debt in advance of ﬁnancial crises. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
analyse public and private debt whereas Schularick and Taylor focus on aggregate bank
loans and the total balance sheet size of the banking sector. In order to respond to the
current crisis, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) suggest further research into ”early warning”
indicators and detailed monitoring of national macro-ﬁnancial data. This thesis takes
a closer at the importance of some of these indicators for the dynamics of bank and
sovereign credit risk. In fact, the Global Financial Crisis was not entirely unexpected. In
the words of Rajan (2010): ”It is incorrect to say that no one saw this crisis coming. Some
hedge fund managers and traders in investment banks put their money instead of their
mouths to work. A few government and Federal Reserve oﬃcials expressed deep concern.
A number of economists, such as Kenneth Rogoﬀ, Nouriel Roubini, Robert Shiller, and
William White, repeatedly sounded warnings about the levels of U.S. house prices and
household indebtedness. Niall Ferguson, a historian, drew parallels to past booms that
ended poorly. The problem was not that no one warned about the dangers; it was that
those who beneﬁted from an overheated economy - which included a lot of people - had
little incentive to listen. Critics were often written oﬀ as Cassandras or ”permabears”:
predict a downturn long enough, the thinking went, and you would eventually be proved
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right, much as a broken clock is correct twice a day. I know, because I was one of those
Cassandras”.
Johnson and Kwak (2010) and Stiglitz (2010) ﬁnd that the largest misaligned incen-
tives were found among ”too big to fail” U.S. ﬁnancial institutions - like the six megabanks
Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Mor-
gan Stanley - which are large and essential to the functioning of the ﬁnancial system and
the economy. In fact, ”too big to fail” appears to have been a global phenomenon. The
managements of these ﬁnancial institutions took excessive risk with implicit government
guarantees, knowing that if the worst were to happen they would be rescued by govern-
ments.1 Especially in countries where the banking system is large relative to the size of
the economy, bank and sovereign credit risk are tightly related.
Article I addresses the importance of bank fundamentals for sovereign credit risk.
Market participants tend to use credit default swaps (CDS) - which are similar to in-
surance contracts that compensates the buyer for losses in the event of a default - to
express opinions on the credit risk of speciﬁc reference entities. We argue that the dy-
namics of sovereign CDS spreads in advanced economies is diﬃcult to understand without
modelling fragility in the banking and corporate sector. Fragility in the banking sector
has been an important driver of sovereign credit risk in recent years through at least
two diﬀerent channels. First, governments injected capital into or guaranteed liabilities
of the banking systems because some individual banks are too-important-to-fail or too-
interconnected-to-fail. Second, systemic banking crises often result in recessions which
in turn cause lower government revenues, large ﬁscal deﬁcits and potentially sovereign
defaults. In order to separate these factors we need to undertake an econometric analysis
of fundamental data such as balance sheet and economic variables since sovereign and
bank CDS spreads are likely to be simultaneously determined.
The paper contributes to the extensive empirical literature on the relationship be-
tween sovereign credit spreads and macroeconomic variables, ﬁscal indicators as well as
risk indicators in international ﬁnancial markets by using a comprehensive dataset. For
example, Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) ﬁnd that sovereign risk is pri-
marily driven by global risk premium factors but their econometric analysis excludes
bank fundamentals which we argue are important factors in understanding the dynamics
of sovereign credit risk. The article is also related to the extensive literature on systemic
banking and sovereign debt crises. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) show that banking crises
most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises as massive private debt is
transferred to the public balance sheet and undermine the country’s ﬁscal solvency. The
authors focus on both the direct costs of rescuing the ﬁnancial sector as well as the higher
1Lately, commisions in the United Kingdom (the Independent Commission on Banking) and in
Switzerland (the Commission of Experts) have made recommendations to address the ”too big to fail”
issue with banks in their countries.
5
public deﬁcits due to the economic slowdown following banking crises. In recent years
several papers have analysed the interaction of credit spreads on banks and sovereigns as
a result of fragility in the ﬁnancial sector. For example, Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl
(2011) show that ﬁnancial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are intimately linked.
Most existing papers base their conclusions on analyses of ﬁnancial variables over spe-
ciﬁc time periods. We complement these studies by focusing on the interactions of CDS
spreads on banks and sovereigns with balance sheet variables of national banking systems
and the public sector. By modelling credit risk as a result of changes in balance sheet
variables we are able to more precisely decompose the dynamics of sovereign CDS spreads
into bank and public sector contributions.
Our econometric results have implications for regulating systemic risk and analysing
ﬁnancial stability. First, if the banking system is large relative to GDP as in Switzerland,
Ireland, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark it is beneﬁcial to demand extra capital
buﬀers of the ﬁnancial sector to protect the public balance sheet against contingent liabil-
ities. It is also in line with the recommendations of the Financial Stabilty Board (2011)
on additional loss absorbency requirements for systemically important ﬁnancial banks. In
these countries, a rise in bank credit risk can easily cause a ’jump’ in sovereign credit risk.
Second, if the banking sector’s holding of sovereign bonds in the home country is high
relative to their capital as in Japan, Italy and Greece it is beneﬁcial to demand limits on
their sovereign exposures. In these countries, ﬁscal problems can easily cause a ’jump’ in
credit risk for banks headquartered in that country. The importance of bank credit risk
is varying across countries and our econometric model performs well for countries where
credit risk originates domestically.
Article II shows that ﬁnancial linkages across borders are priced in the CDS markets
beyond what can be explained by exposure to both global and country-speciﬁc factors.
Financial linkages are measured using Bank for International Settlements (BIS) consoli-
dated banking statistics and these statistics are combined with CDS spreads to construct
a risk-weighted foreign exposure measure for banking systems in 17 countries. We also
construct another measure which takes into account the entire asset side of banking sys-
tems by combining the information on foreign exposures with information on the relative
size and riskiness of exposures to domestic government bonds and to other domestic res-
idents. This measure also helps explaining bank CDS premia. While the ﬁrst measure is
relevant for proving that banks’ foreign ﬁnancial exposures are reﬂected in CDS spreads,
the second measure is a better candidate for detecting riskiness of a banking system when
the risk arises both from exposure to foreign and to domestic factors.
This paper also supplements Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011) in several as-
pects. They focus on the two-way feedback eﬀect between sovereign and bank credit
risk which we strongly conﬁrm but with several important diﬀerences in the empirical
analysis. While we also consider sovereign risk factors in our explanation of bank CDS
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spreads, we in addition include private exposures - both foreign and domestic - in our
bank fundamentals. This is important since the bulk of banks’ foreign exposures are to
the private sector and not sovereigns. The decomposition of bank exposures to which we
have access to gives a clear picture of the role of ﬁnancial linkages in the determination of
bank credit risk and the Expected Default Frequency (EDF) measures also add informa-
tion on the risk of bank assets. In this sense our explanatory variables are closer to true
bank fundamentals than bank equity returns used in Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl
(2011). Furthermore, for the purpose of analysing the role of banking risk for sovereign
credit risk, we extend the modelling of government guarantees.
The fact that interlinkages are priced in CDS markets throughout the entire sample
may have several explanations. A common practice among hedge funds and risk man-
agers is to hedge exposures through ’proxy hedging’. For example, a bank may wish
to hedge emerging market credit risk in Eastern Europe, either because it has expo-
sure to sovereigns itself (as a direct exposure or as counterparty risk in large derivatives
contracts) or because it wishes to hedge a large loan exposure in such countries using a
’macro’ hedge. A cheaper solution may be to buy protection on Austrian banks which are
known to have large exposures in these countries. This would explain the co-movement
of bank CDS spreads across countries and why market participants seem to follow these
interlinkages carefully.
The De Larosiere Report (2009) advocates the establishment of a common data base
containing relevant information on risk exposures of ﬁnancial institutions and markets,
both at the national and international level. The analysis here shows that markets seem
to have taken such exposures into account in the pricing of CDS contracts and to the
extent that CDS premia do reﬂect default risk, this is evidence in support of the idea,
that such information could help building early warning systems. The insights from the
two above articles should be combined to get a better understanding of the dynamics of
bank and sovereign CDS spreads. The work was inspired by the systemic banking crisis
in Iceland.
Article III is a detailed case study of which culminated in a systemic banking crisis,
currency crisis and public debt crisis in late 2008. Strangely, a month before the crisis
the IMF (2008) issued a Financial Sector Assessment Program Update claiming that:
”[T]he banking system’s reported ﬁnancial indicators are above minimum regulatory re-
quirements and stress tests suggest that the system is resilient.” We examine the collapse
of the Icelandic banking system as an almost perfect example of how a dysfunctional and
overstretched ﬁnancial system can sink a country into a deep systemic crisis. We follow
step by step the growth of the bubble of banking in Iceland, analyse the ﬂawed policies
and procedures that misled the international creditors, rating agencies and regulators
into believing that these banks were indeed worthy of an investment grade (and even
triple A) ratings, and sort through the aftermath of their collapse to gather lessons for
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others on how to avoid the fate of the Icelandic banking system. Our analysis is based
on a wide range of publicly available statistics and information.
There are many features of the Icelandic banking system leading up to the collapse
that are very similar to previous banking crises. The warning signals that have preceded
banking crises in the past - as seen in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) and Schularick and
Taylor (2012) - were present in Iceland as well. Some were more extreme than in any
other previous banking crises when measured against the size of the Icelandic economy.
It is, however, astonishing that the build-up of the banking system could reach such
proportions given the fact that in 2006 the system was already under heavy pressure
from markets. Some investors had already then questioned both the business models of
Icelandic banks and the huge imbalances in the Icelandic economy. There were several
factors that made the continued build-up possible. First, sovereign support, in terms of
both promised government support and central bank liquidity provision against dubious
collateral, played a key role. Second, the supervision of banks in Iceland was extremely
weak and did not react to questionable business practices that authorities could have
detected at the time. These practices, for example, meant that real leverage was much
higher than reported. Third, credit ratings were too high, in part because the agencies
overestimated the value of the sovereign support and because they relied on accounting
reports, in which assets and proﬁtability were inﬂated because of inadequate loan loss
provisioning.
Brieﬂy summing up, the overall purpose of this thesis is to gain further understanding
of bank and sovereign credit risk. The ﬁrst article is about the importance of domestic
bank fundamentals for the dynamics of sovereign credit risk. The second article takes
a closer look at ﬁnancial sector linkages and the dynamics of bank and sovereign credit
spreads. Finally, the third article is a case study on the collapse of the Icelandic banking
system. The three articles provide new insights into understanding interesting bank and
sovereign aspects of the Global Financial Crisis.
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Summary
This section contains English and Danish summaries of the three articles that comprise
the thesis.
ENGLISH SUMMARY
Article I: The Importance of Bank Fundamentals for Sovereign Credit Risk
The ﬁrst article challenges the general view on sovereign credit risk which traditionally
has been analysed through the lens of macroeconomic and public debt variables. We
argue that the dynamics of sovereign credit risk depends critically on fragility in the
banking sector. This paper decomposes sovereign and bank credit risk into bank and
public sector contributions based on an econometric analysis of balance sheet variables.
In recent years, we ﬁnd that fragility in the banking sector has been an important driver
of sovereign risk. Furthermore, bank credit risk has been inﬂuenced by sovereign risk.
The paper also discusses implications for detecting systemic risk across countries and
over time.
Article II: Financial Sector Linkages and the Dynamics of Bank and Sovereign
Credit Spreads
(co-authored with David Lando and Agatha Murgoci)
The second article shows that ﬁnancial linkages across borders are priced in the CDS
markets beyond what can be explained by exposure to common factors. Information on
the relative size and riskiness of aggregate exposures of banks in one country to countries
abroad is used to construct a dynamic measure of the risk arising from banks’ foreign
exposures. We also construct a new measure which in addition takes into account the
relative size and riskiness of bank exposures to domestic government bonds and other
domestic residents. The two measures help explaining the dynamics of bank CDS premia
after controlling for country speciﬁc and global risk factors. Finally, a dynamic measure
of the size of the implicit guarantee, that the sovereign may be assumed to extend for
the domestic banking system, strongly impacts sovereign CDS premia.
Article III: The Collapse of the Icelandic Banking System
(co-authored with David Lando)
The third article analyses the collapse of Iceland’s three largest banks in the Autumn
2008 which is the biggest banking failure relative to the size of an economy in modern
history. We show that commonly used early warning indicators of banking crises were
very strong in the case of Iceland and document how the Icelandic banks managed to
continue their aggressive growth despite a funding crisis in early 2006. Strong reported
ﬁnancial key ﬁgures masked the true riskiness of the Icelandic business model and the
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extreme concentration risk in the ﬁnancial system. In addition, investors and rating
agencies overestimated the value of potential sovereign support from a country whose
ﬁscal capacity was limited compared to the size of the banks’ assets. Helped by strong
credit ratings and an implicit sovereign guarantee, the banks were able to fund their
risky business model through foreign deposits and by accessing bond markets outside of
Europe. While central bank liquidity facilities have been critical in saving the global
banking system, the Icelandic case study also reveals how such facilities may prolong a
crisis, make it deeper and ultimately contribute to a crash of a ﬂoating exchange rate.
DANSK RESUME´
Artikel I: Vigtigheden af Fundamentale Bank Variable for Kreditrisikoen p˚a
Stater
Den første artikel udfordrer det traditionelle syn p˚a staters kreditrisiko, som typisk er
blevet analyseret ved hjælp af makro og gældsrelaterede variable for den oﬀentlige sek-
tor. Vi viser, at dynamikken i staters kreditrisiko afhænger af banksektorens ﬁnansielle
s˚arbarhed. Dette papir dekomponerer kreditrisikoen for stater og banker i en del fra
banksektoren og den oﬀentlige sektor baseret p˚a en økonometrisk analyse af balancevari-
able. I de senere a˚r har banksektorens s˚arbarhed været en vigtig drivkraft bag kred-
itrisikoen for stater. Endvidere har kreditrisikoen for banker været p˚avirket af gæld-
srelaterede variable i den oﬀentlige sektor. Papiret diskuterer ogs˚a implikationer for at
opfange systemisk risiko p˚a tværs af lande og over tid.
Artikel II: Bankers Eksponeringer og den Dynamiske Kreditrisiko for Banker
og Stater
(medforfattere: David Lando and Agatha Murgoci)
Den anden artikel viser, at bankers eksponeringer p˚a tværs af grænserne er indpriset i
CDS markedet udover hvad kan forklares af fælles faktorer. Oplysninger om den relative
størrelse og risikoen p˚a den samlede eksponering af banker i et land mod andre lande kan
bruges til at konstruere et dynamisk ma˚l for den risiko, som opst˚ar som følge af bankers
udenlandske engagementer. Vi konstruerer ogs˚a et ma˚l, der ydermere tager hensyn til
den relative størrelse og risiko p˚a bankers eksponeringer mod indenlandske statsobliga-
tioner samt indenlandske private kunder. Begge ma˚l hjælper med at forklare dynamikken
i bankernes CDS præmier efter der er kontrolleret for landespeciﬁkke og globale risiko-
faktorer. Ydermere viser vi at et dynamisk ma˚l for størrelsen af den implicitte garanti,
som staten ma˚ antages at give til det indenlandske banksystem, p˚avirker CDS præmien
for stater.
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Artikel III: Den Systemiske Bankkrise i Island
(medforfatter: David Lando)
Den sidste artikel analyserer sammenbruddet af Islands tre største banker i efter˚aret
2008, som er det største bankkollaps i forhold til størrelsen af en økonomi i nyere tid.
Vi viser, at almindeligt anvendte tidlig ”varslingsindikatorer” for bankkriser var meget
tydelige i Island, og vi dokumenterer, hvordan de islandske banker forma˚ede at fort-
sætte deres aggressive vækst p˚a trods af en mindre ﬁnansieringskrise i begyndelsen af
2006. Stærke økonomiske nøgletal tilslørede den sande risiko ved den islandske forret-
ningsmodel og den ekstreme koncentration af risiko i det ﬁnansielle system. Ydermere
overvurderede investorer og kreditvurderingsbureauer værdien af eventuel støtte fra en
stat, hvis skattemæssige kapacitet var begrænset i forhold til størrelsen af bankernes ak-
tiver. Hjulpet af gode kreditvurderinger og en implicit statsgaranti, s˚a var bankerne i
stand til at ﬁnansiere deres risikable forretningsmodel via udenlandske indskud og adgang
til obligationsmarkeder uden for Europa. Mens centralbankers likviditetsfaciliteter har
været kritiske for at redde det globale banksystem, s˚a viser det islandske ”case study”
ogs˚a hvordan s˚adanne faciliteter kan forlænge en krise, gøre den dybere og i sidste ende
bidrage til et sammenbrud af en ﬂydende valutakurs.
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The Importance of Bank Fundamentals
for Sovereign Credit Risk
Rene´ Kallestrup ∗
January 2012
Abstract
Traditionally, sovereign credit risk has been analysed through the lens of macroe-
conomic and public debt variables. We argue that the dynamics of sovereign credit
risk depends critically on fragility in the banking sector. This paper decomposes
sovereign and bank credit risk into bank and public sector contributions based on a
statistical analysis of balance sheet variables. In recent years, fragility in the bank-
ing sector has been an important driver of sovereign risk. Furthermore, bank credit
risk has been inﬂuenced by sovereign risk. This paper also discusses implications
for detecting systemic risk across countries and over time.
Credit risk, banks, sovereign risk; JEL: G01; G15; G21
∗ The author is at the Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, DK-
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Stenbo Nielsen, David Lando, Lasse Heje Pedersen, Allan Timmermann, Jesper Lund, Malene Kallestrup
Lamb, Jesper Rangvid, Patrick Augustin, and Rune Mølgaard.
1 Introduction
Sovereign credit risk has typically been associated with emerging markets. In the after-
math of the Global Financial Crisis, however, credit spreads on sovereign indices have
been similar in advanced and emerging market economies as seen in Figure 1. It has
happened as public debt to GDP in advanced economies has risen substantially whereas
it has remained fairly stable in emerging markets.1
Figure 1: Sovereign Credit Risk in Emerging Market vs Advanced Economies
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The diﬀerence between the CDX Emerging Market Index and SovX Western Europe
Index has narrowed in 2010 (left-hand panel). A negative number implies sovereign CDS
spreads in advanced economies are higher than in emerging markets. It partly reﬂects
diverging trends in public debt to GDP in emerging markets and advanced economies
(right-hand panel). Source: JP Morgan DataQuery and IMF World Economic Outlook.
Before the launch of the SovX in Q3 2009 we use a theoretical index reported by JP
Morgan.
The literature on sovereign credit risk is extensive but there have been few studies on
the determinants of the dynamics of sovereign credit risk in advanced economies. Tra-
ditionally, sovereign credit risk has been analysed through the lens of ﬁscal and macroe-
conomic variables. The story ﬁts well in the case of Greece as seen in Figure 2 where
credit spreads and public debt to GDP seem to be positively related. Figure 3, how-
ever, indicates that in order to ﬁnd determinants of the dynamics of sovereign credit
default swap (CDS) spreads it it is not suﬃcient to focus on debt to GDP ratios of the
public sector. For example, public debt to GDP barely rises in Austria and Denmark
whereas sovereign CDS spreads in these countries widen sharply. Furthermore, the ﬁg-
ure shows how sovereign credit risk in advanced economies is correlated with the health
of the banking sector. This paper analyses bank fundamentals and argue that the dy-
namics of sovereign credit risk depends critically on fragility in the banking sector. We
add additional insights to the conclusions in Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton
(2011) who argue that sovereign risk is primarily driven by global risk premium factors.2
1World public debt market has increased from USD 25.6 trillion in 2006 to USD 41.4 trillion in 2010
and it is an important asset class that accounts for 66 percent of world GDP as shown in Appendix A.
The public sector refers to the ’general government’ and the private sector to ’non-ﬁnancial corporations’
and ’households’.
2The authors ﬁnd that the majority of the variation in sovereign credit spreads is linked to global
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Their econometric analysis excludes bank fundamentals which are important factors in
understanding the dynamics of sovereign credit risk.
Figure 2: Sovereign Debt and Credit Spreads in Greece and Ireland
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The Greek general government debt to GDP as well as CDS spreads for the Greek govern-
ment and the average of two largest banks. In April and October 2010, Greek authorities
made substantial revisions to the historical government deﬁcit and debt ﬁgures as shown
by the European Commission (2010). See Figure 4 for a comment on Ireland.
Figure 3: Sovereign Debt and Credit Spreads in Advanced Economies
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Data is shown for two advanced economies: Austria and Denmark. We see that sovereign
and bank CDS spreads are co-moving. Furthermore, in order to ﬁnd determinants of the
dynamics of sovereign CDS spreads it is not suﬃcient to focus on debt to GDP ratios of
the public sector.
Fragility in the banking sector has been an important driver of sovereign credit risk in
recent years through at least two diﬀerent channels. First, governments injected capital
or guaranteed liabilities on the banking systems because some individual banks are too-
important-to-fail or too-interconnected-to-fail. For example, the governments in Ireland
and Iceland ran substantial ﬁscal deﬁcits and witnessed a sharp rise in public debt on
the back of assistance to help their banking systems. The deﬁcit-increasing (and debt-
increasing) impact of banking sector capital injections in Ireland is seen on the left hand
side in Figure 4.3 In addition, it is important to focus on the public sector’s oﬀ-balance
factors such as the return on the US stock market and a US high-yield index.
3Capital injections into the ﬁnancial sector are considered government expenditures and not acqui-
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sheet liabilities. In public accounts, government guarantees of the banking system are
treated as contingent liabilities and are not recorded on the balance sheets unless they are
absolutely certain to be called upon. For example, the Irish public sector’s contingent
liabilities relative to GDP peaked at almost 196% of GDP in 2008 as the government
guaranteed the liabilities of the domestic banks.4
Figure 4: The Health of the Banking System inﬂuences the Public Sector
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In Ireland, massive capital injections into the ﬁnancial sector were deﬁcit-increasing for
the general government. It indicates that the health of the banking system has inﬂuenced
the public sector (left-hand panel). Public revenues decreased during the Global Finan-
cial Crisis in all advanced economies and expenditures were diﬃcult to cut back in the
economic downturn (right-hand panel). The median is based on a sample of 19 advanced
economies as explained in section 3.
Second, in a comprehensive historical study Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) present evi-
dence that systemic banking crises often result in recessions which in turn result in lower
government revenues, large ﬁscal deﬁcits and potentially sovereign defaults. In fact, they
ﬁnd that the slower growth after a ﬁnancial crisis is a more important driver of the rise
in public debt than the rescuing of the ﬁnancial sector. Furthermore, Cecchetti, Kohler,
and Upper (2009) ﬁnd that banking crises coincide with a sharp contraction in economic
activity on the back of lower credit availability and a fall in conﬁdence indicators. Both
studies point to compelling evidence of a causal link between the banking crises starting
in 2007 and the associated economic crises. In Figure 4 on the right, we show that a fall
in nominal GDP in advanced economies is co-moving with lower public revenues whereas
public expenditures are diﬃcult to cut back to balance the public budget in a recession
(as they act as ﬁscal stabilisers).5
The paper is also related to an important paper by Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl
sition of equity by Eurostat accounting rules if they do not yield a suﬃcient rate of return according
to EU ’state aid rules’. In 2009 to 2010, Irish public capital injections amounted to 29.8% of GDP, the
impact on debt was 25.8% of GDP and on the deﬁcit 22.5% of GDP according to the Central Bank of
Ireland (2011).
4Guarantees on bank deposits are not included in the 196%. Other types of ﬁnancial support schemes
include purchases of bank assets, liquidity provisions, etc.
5From 2008 to 2009, the decline is government revenues is sharper than the fall in nominal GDP. Eu-
rostat (2011b) suggests that the sharper fall in government revenues compared to GDP is not necessarily
the result of a change in ﬁscal policy but can be due to ’automatic stabilisers’ in the taxing system.
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(2011) who provide empirical evidence of a two-way feedback between bank and sovereign
credit risk using data on CDS spreads before and after the explicit bailouts of the banking
sectors across countries around Q4 2008. For example, the authors ﬁnd that sovereign
CDS spreads after public bailouts of banking systems can be explained by pre-bailout
public debt to GDP as well as pre-bailout CDS spreads on domestic banks. Our pa-
per adds additional insights into their analysis as we show a dynamic decomposition of
sovereign CDS spreads into bank and public sector contributions. In order to separate
these eﬀects we need to undertake an econometric analysis of fundamental data such as
balance sheet and economic variables since sovereign and bank CDS spreads are likely to
be simultaneously determined. We argue that a banking system’s assets pledged as col-
lateral in short-term repo transactions with central banks can be seen as a time-varying
measure of public bailouts.6 If commercial banks obtain most of their short-term funding
from central banks - for instance using domestic bonds as collateral - it tends to signal
that banks have funding liquidity diﬃculties.
Likewise CDS spreads are decomposed into bank and public sector contributions based
on a panel econometric analysis of balance sheet variables. These results are broadly
similar to Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011) who base their econometric analysis
on market-based indicators. There are several reasons why a rise in sovereign credit risk
may spill-over into bank credit risk in the country where the bank is headquartered.
First, banks can experience a direct loss on their holdings of government bonds. Second,
banks may see a reduction in systemic support uplifts from existing explicit or implicit
government guarantees. Third, few banks have a credit rating above the home government
and they thus beneﬁt from systemic support from the government in the case of problems.
Hence, a rise in sovereign credit risk can directly be transferred to the banking system.
Nevertheless, a strong link is often the result of banks’ poor credit risk assessments of the
domestic government. Domestic banks can relatively easily protect themselves against
sovereign credit risk by reducing their reliance on the public sector in the ﬁrst place
(or buy credit protection on the domestic government). Furthermore, systemic support
uplifts of the banking systems by the rating agencies are often related to problems in the
banking sector in the ﬁrst place.
Our econometric results have implications for regulating systemic risk and analysing
ﬁnancial stability. First, if the banking system is large relative to GDP as in Switzerland,
Ireland, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark it is beneﬁcial to demand extra capital
buﬀers of the ﬁnancial sector to protect the public balance sheet against contingent
liabilities. In these countries, a rise in bank credit risk can easily cause a ’jump’ in
sovereign credit risk. The Basel II or Basel III accords on minimum bank capital do not
act as an eﬀective defense against systemic banking crises. Second, if the banking sector’s
holding of sovereign bonds in the home country is high relative to their capital as in Japan,
6Central bank seigniorage revenue is transferred to the general government through proﬁts and the
government normally recapitalises the central bank in the case of losses.
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Italy and Greece it is beneﬁcial to demand limits on their sovereign exposures. In these
countries, ﬁscal problems can easily cause a ’jump’ in credit risk for banks headquartered
in the that country.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 comments on the related
literature. Section 3 presents the data and explains why our dataset is important for
ﬁnding determinants bank and sovereign CDS spreads. Section 4 analyses the empirical
relationship between balance sheet variables and bank as well as sovereign CDS spreads.
Section 5 ﬁnds that the signiﬁcant variables identiﬁed in section 4 also explain distressed
sovereign events. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to several strands of the existing literature: (i) the empirical liter-
ature on the determinants of sovereign credit risk and (ii) recent empirical studies of the
interaction of systemic banking and sovereign debt crises. First, the paper contributes
to the extensive empirical literature on the relationship between sovereign credit spreads
and macroeconomic variables, ﬁscal indicators as well as risk indicators in international
ﬁnancial markets. The dataset in this paper, however, is more comprehensive than in re-
cent papers on the determinants of sovereign credit spreads such as Alexopoulou, Bunda,
and Ferrando (2009), Bellas, Papaioannou, and Petrova (2010), Baldacci, Gupta, and
Mati (2008), Barbosa and Costa (2010), and Haugh, Ollivaud, and Turner (2009). These
studies ﬁnd important determinants of credit spreads in speciﬁc countries and for certain
time horizons - either in emerging markets or a few Euro Area countries - but they do
not agree on stable and signiﬁcant determinants of sovereign credit spreads. Longstaﬀ,
Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) ﬁnd that sovereign risk is primarily driven by global
risk premium factors but their econometric analysis exclude bank fundamentals which
we argue are important factors for understanding the dynamics of sovereign credit risk
in most countries.7
Second, the article is related to the extensive literature on systemic banking and
sovereign debt crises. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) as well as Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2011)
show that banking crises most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises
as massive private debt is transferred to the public balance sheet and undermine the
country’s ﬁscal solvency. The authors focus on both the direct costs of rescuing the
ﬁnancial sector as well as the higher public deﬁcits due to the economic slowdown fol-
lowing banking crises. In recent years several papers have analysed the interaction of
7Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer (2009) survey the sovereign debt literature and focus on
how sovereign debt can exist in spite of the lack of a straightforward legal enforcement. Interestingly,
Acharya and Rajan (2011) show in theoretical model that the direct cost of sovereign default is large,
and default is only an option when the country simply does not have the political and economic ability
to raise the revenues needed to repay debt. For example, governments issuing debt in own currency face
’collateral damage’ to their banks if they default on their debt.
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credit spreads on banks and sovereigns as a result of fragility in the ﬁnancial sector.8
Dieckmann and Plank (2010) show that global and domestic equity markets have high
explanatory power for the behaviour of sovereign CDS spreads. Mody (2009) and Sgherri
and Zoli (2009) argue that the diﬀerentiation in sovereign credit spreads across countries
was caused mainly by diﬀerences in the health of the domestic ﬁnancial sector follow-
ing the rescue of Bear Stearns and the failure of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Attinasi,
Checherita, and Nickel (2009) link wider sovereign spreads to the announcements of bank
rescue packages. Ejsing and Lemke (2011) ﬁnd that sovereign and bank CDS spreads
have become increasingly integrated since the rescue packages in 2008. Acharya, Drech-
sler, and Schnabl (2011) show that ﬁnancial sector bailouts and sovereign credit risk are
intimately linked. Our paper complements and extends the econometric results in these
studies which primarily base their conclusions on analyses of ﬁnancial variables over spe-
ciﬁc time periods. We diﬀer from these studies by focusing on the interactions of CDS
spreads on banks and sovereigns with balance sheet variables of national banking systems
and the public sector since 2004. By focusing on credit risk as a result of changes in bal-
ance sheet variables we are able to more precisely decompose the dynamics of sovereign
CDS spreads into bank and public sector contributions. Finally, Kallestrup, Lando, and
Murgoci (2011) address the co-movement of credit default swaps on banks and sovereigns
across countries based on banks’ ﬁnancial exposures using CDS spreads and Moody’s
expected default frequencies (EDFs) as measures of credit risk. This paper models bank
credit risk directly as a function of balance sheet variables and supplements the latter
analysis.9
3 Data Description
Our sample covers 19 advanced economies over the period Q1 2004 to Q4 2010 where
we have both bank and sovereign CDS spreads as well as quarterly bank and sovereign
balance sheet data. The data is quarterly since balance sheet variables are scarcely avail-
able on a monthly frequency. The countries included are Austria, Australia, Belgium,
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Ice-
land, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and United States.10
8Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007a), Gray, Merton, and Bodie (2007b), and Gray and Malone (2008)
provide a structural framework for analysing risk transfers from the corporate sector via the banking
sector and to the government.
9This paper has not attempted to predict credit risk ahead of time as done in the literature on
early warning indicators of ﬁnancial fragility. Frankel and Saravelos (2010) ﬁnd that crisis incidence
indicators have performed well in predicting vulnerabilities in 2008-09 based on macro-ﬁnancial variables
identiﬁed as successful in the past. A classical article worth mentioning that focuses on generating
early-warning signals before changes in credit risk include Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) who
propose monitoring several indicators that tend to exhibit unusual behaviour prior to crises. Goldstein,
Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000) also conduct a lot of empirical tests of early warning indicators and
conclude that many in-sample leading indicators are eﬀective out-of-sample.
10For Iceland, we include the CDS for the sovereign after the domestic operations of the banks were
taken by the Icelandic government in Q3 2008. Norway is not included since bank balance sheet data is
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The extended sample includes 38 countries where we have balance sheet data but not
necessarily bank and sovereign CDS data.11 Initially, we take a look at the credit spreads
for the banking and sovereign sector.
3.1 Credit Spreads
A CDS contract is similar to an insurance contract that compensates the buyer for losses
in the event that a bank or sovereign for example does not repay its debt.12 The contract
is explained in more details in Duﬃe (1999) and Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005). If
the 5-year CDS spread on Greece is 1000 basis points the party buying credit protection
pays the seller a ﬁxed spread of 1000 basis points per year until either a credit event
occurs on the reference entity or for a term of ﬁve years. In the case Greece pays back its
debt, the protection seller does not make a payment to the protection buyer. If Greece
does not pay back its debt, the protection seller pays the buyer the diﬀerence between
the par value of the bond and post-default value of a speciﬁc bond (determined in an
auction speciﬁed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ISDA). Hence,
the protection buyer is sure to get the par value back on the bond (in absence of a basis
risk).
In this paper, the CDS spread is the object of study, a premium that may reﬂect both
fundamental credit risk, traders risk aversions and liquidity conditions in the CDS mar-
ket.13 Counterparty value adjustment (CVA) desks of investment banks are main players
in the CDS markets since they are natural buyers of credit protection on sovereign and
banks across countries in order to hedge exposures from mark-to-market ﬂuctuations.14
We prefer CDS spreads rather than country-speciﬁc bond spreads since it is diﬃcult to
ﬁnd a risk-free interest rate to subtract from the sovereign yield. In addition, bond yields
may be substantially inﬂuenced by liquidity factors. One can also analyse credit ratings
as an alternative to credit spreads. However, CDS spreads incorporate information signif-
icantly faster than credit ratings as for example documented in Flannery, Houston, and
Partnoy (2010).15 Since CDS spreads may be driven by other factors than direct default
protection, we also analyse the initiation of IMF-supported programs as a binary indica-
tor of distressed sovereign risk in section 5 in order to make sure that our econometric
not updated in the IMF International Financial Statistics database.
11The additional 19 countries are Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
Hungary, Israel, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey and
South Africa.
12Credit events for Western European sovereign CDS are restructuring, failure to pay and repudia-
tion/moratorium. See Morgan Stanley (2011) for further details.
13See Longstaﬀ, Mithal, and Neis (2005) for arguments that the contractual nature of credit default
swaps makes them far less sensitive to liquidity. Fitch Solutions (2011) provides a liquidity score for
individual CDS spreads. Gandhi, Longstaﬀ, and Arora (2011) show that counterparty credit risk is a
very small component of the CDS spread due to collateralisation of swap liabilities.
14See also the Bank of England (2010) and the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (2010).
15Credit ratings are designed to be more stable over time based on an assessment of default risk over
long time horizons. IMF (2010) and Jaramillo (2010) survey the literature on the determinants of credit
ratings.
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results primarily are driven by expected loss considerations and not risk premia.
The pricing data for credit default swaps are obtained from CMA which sources their
information on executable and indicative prices directly from the largest and most active
credit investors in the OTC market. There are some holes in the data sample in the early
period and they are ﬁlled with the Fitch CDS Pricing source. Table 2 and table 3 in
Appendix B contain summary statistics of sovereign and bank CDS spreads for the core
sample. The measure of sovereign risk is quarter-end midmarket 5-year sovereign credit
spread. Our paper investigates determinants of the sovereign credit spread beyond what
can be explained by global factors or risk premia.16 We focus on explaining observed
values of sovereign CDS spreads against a benchmark inspired by traditional tests of
capital asset pricing models. Initially, we considered the 5-year iTraxx SovX Western
Europe index - which comprises 15 equally weighted midmarket sovereign constituents
from the Eurozone region plus Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom - as a
benchmark. However, sovereign spreads in a low risk country will be distorted by looking
at this measure as seen in Figure 5. For example, the excess spread is tightening in Austria
even though sovereign fundamentals are not improving. Hence, our preferred benchmark
is the sovereign CDS spread on Norway where the public debt is more than minus 150
percent of GDP in 2010 (that is public assets are much higher than the outstanding gross
debt of 55 percent of GDP). As a robustness check in section 5 we include time ﬁxed
eﬀects in the estimation instead of measuring the CDS spreads against a benchmark. It
turns out that the chosen benchmark is highly correlated with time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Figure 5: The Explanatory Variable
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This paper focuses on ﬁnding determinants of the excess credit spreads which are not
driven by global risk premia. For Austria we plot the 5-year CDS spreads of the sovereign
against the 5-year iTraxx SovX Western Europe index and against the sovereign CDS on
the large creditor nation Norway (left-hand panel). Furthermore, for Austria we plot the
average 5-year CDS spreads of the two largest banks against the 5-year iTraxx Senior
Financial Index and against the Norwegian government (right-hand panel).
The measure of credit risk in the banking sector is the average 5-year CDS spreads for
16Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) argue that sovereign risk is primarily driven by global
risk premium factors.
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two largest banking groups measured by the book value of assets in the country.17 Again,
we also want to ﬁnd determinants of bank credit spreads minus a benchmark. A reason-
able benchmark is the iTraxx Senior Financial Index which comprises 25 equally-weighted
ﬁnancial entities in Europe and includes banking groups in Switzerland, Germany, Spain,
France, United Kingdom, Italy and Portugal. Time ﬁxed eﬀects turn out to be highly
correlated with the chosen benchmark as seen in section 5 on robustness checks.
Table 4 contains a list with the banks included and Table 5 reports net notional of CDS
contracts outstanding on the respective governments and banking groups headquartered
in the given country. It is noteworthy that the CDS notional on a sovereign tends to be
substantially larger than on the banks in the country. It is the case even for countries
with low amount of public debt to GDP (gross and net) and where the banking sector
is much larger than the size of the economy (for example in Denmark, Sweden and
the Netherlands, public debt is low but the largest bank headquartered in the country
accounts for close to 200% of GDP). In countries where the sovereign CDS spread is
lower than bank CDS spread, data for the notional CDS outstanding suggests that proxy
hedging of credit risk - i.e. hedging through correlated but ’cheaper’ hedging vehicles -
via the sovereign CDS spread is a common practice as argued in Kallestrup, Lando, and
Murgoci (2011).18 The next sections focus on ﬁnding determinants of changes in excess
credit spreads which are not driven by global risk premia.
3.2 Bank Credit Risk Explanatory Variables
The dynamics of bank credit risk can be diﬃcult to model since banks tend to have a
complex capital structure. Fundamental credit risk in the banking sector is often linked
to various modiﬁcations of the so-called CAMELS variables based on banks’ balance
sheets and income statements: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings,
Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk (see e.g. FRBSF Economic Letter (1999)).
There is no consensus on how to combine the CAMELS variables into an overall credit
assessment, though. Furthermore, the variables have severe limitations in predicting
bank failures as documented by King, Nuxoll, and Yeager (2006) and Davis and Karim
(2008). The rating agencies have developed their own rating methodologies based on
related quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess bank stand-alone ratings and
various uplift to the ratings based on for instance systemic support from the government
17The results are robust to including more banks CDS spreads in the study but there are problems
about availability of time series going back to 2004. For Denmark we use the CDS on Danske Bank only.
18A part of the rise in sovereign CDS contracts is likely to reﬂect hedging of credit risk of sovereign
counterparties who are not posting collateral in, for example, large interest rate and currency swap
transactions with banks. Association for Financial Markets in Europe (2011) documents that expected
potential exposure (EPE) of dealers to European sovereigns may total as much as USD 70bn or around
50 percent of net notional CDS contracts outstanding on these reference entities. However, other factors
must also be at work since the net notional CDS amount on the Swedish government is still higher than
on the domestic banks despite the fact that the Swedish Debt Oﬃce uses bilateral Credit Support Annex
(CSA) agreements.
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(see Moody’s (2007) and Standard & Poor’s (2011)).
In this paper we focus on relating banks’ credit risk to macro-ﬁnancial variables such
as aggregated national bank balance sheet variables. An analysis of the components of
national banking systems’ balance sheets is likely to reveal more information than just
measuring the total size of banking systems.19 In particular, national balance sheet vari-
ables of banks are reported by Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Setser, and Roubini (2002) and
Rosenberg, Halikias, House, Keller, Nystedt, Pitt, and Setser (2005) to contain impor-
tant information before systemic crises in emerging markets. Below we go through our
data and how the macro-ﬁnancial variables are expected to be related to the dynamics of
credit spreads. The bank balance sheet variables are based on cross-country comparable
data from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and most of the balance sheet
variables are deﬂated by domestic gross domestic product at current prices.20
Assets
Domestic banking assets are split into claims on the private sector in the country, claims
on the domestic general government and the domestic central bank, as well as claims on
non-residents.
• Private sector credit includes banks’ domestic lending to households and non-
ﬁnancial corporations and holding of other debt instruments. High credit growth
may deteriorate the asset quality as this is an indicator of lower marginal asset
quality of the banks’ loan portfolios. The asset quality of the domestic banking sec-
tor’s private claims is likely to be inﬂuenced by the evolvement of macroeconomic
variables and ﬁnancial variables. As macro-ﬁnancial variables we include real GDP,
the unemployment rate, real house prices and measures of the health of the real
estate sector. The latter is measured as the median expected default frequency
(EDF) of ﬁrms associated with real estate or construction in the country.21 A main
part of banks’ assets are collateralised with some kind of residential or commercial
property.22 We do not use EDFs for the banking sector as Moody’s (2010) shows
19Gerlach, Schulz, and Wolﬀ (2010) analyse the eﬀect of banking systems on credit spreads. The
authors conclude that in normal times countries with large ﬁnancial sectors show lower credit spreads
than countries with small ﬁnancial sectors whereas sovereign risk of countries with large ﬁnancial sectors
increases at a higher pace when the risk of a banking crisis becomes imminent.
20We refer to banks corresponding to where the IMF International Financial Statistics Database use
the term ”other depository corporations” that consists of all resident ﬁnancial corporations (except the
central bank) that issue liabilities included in the national deﬁnition of broad money. Other ﬁnancial
corporations are not included in our dataset due to the lack of cross-sectional comparable data. The
IMF data is consolidated by the banking sector and net out domestic interbank ﬁnancial claims and
liabilities. It should not be confused by the consolidation principles based on the ownership of the
individual banking institutions underlying the supervisory process.
21The EDF data is borrowed from Kallestrup, Lando, and Murgoci (2011).
22IMF Financial Soundness Indicators provide data on residential and commercial real estate loans
(including collateralised by commercial real estate) to total loans for certain countries. IMF’s Financial
Soundness Indicators provide data on residential and commercial real estate loans (including collateralised
by commercial real estate) to total loans for certain countries. In advanced economies they account for
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that the level of the EDF severely underestimate the true riskiness of the banking
sector.
• Banks are for example exposed to the domestic sovereign through holdings of gov-
ernment bonds. In case the value of the government bonds falls in the secondary
market, there is a fall in mark-to-market value of the bank’s assets as shown. Banks’
claims on the government and claims on non-nationals - banks, non-banks and gov-
ernments - are examined in Kallestrup, Lando, and Murgoci (2011).
Liabilities
It is also interesting to analyse the composition of the banking system’s aggregated li-
abilities. Liabilities are split into liabilities to the domestic central bank23, liabilities to
the domestic general government, short-term and long-term external liabilities, deposits
as well as the book value of shares and other equity.
• If commercial banks obtain most of their short-term funding from central banks
- for instance using domestic bonds as collateral - it tends to signal that banks
have funding liquidity diﬃculties. Central bank funding is also interesting since
central banks book collateral at market value and banks are subject to margin calls
if there is a fall in market value. Short-term collateralised funding by central banks
reduce the risk of bank default because of funding liquidity but it often does little
to reduce the long-run probability of default considerably against the higher loss
given default. Assets pledged as collateral matters for the pricing of CDS spreads
on unsecured debt as credit spreads should reﬂect the lower recovery in the case the
bank defaults. Hence, the magnitude of short-term collateralised loans with central
banks is expected to be positively related to the dynamics of banks’ credit spreads.
These loans are usually the symptom of deterioration in asset quality rather than
the cause of the rise in credit risk. Along the same lines, Diamond and Rajan
(2001) and Benmelech and Dvir (2011) argue that short-term borrowing may be
optimal response to weak fundamentals when banks ﬁnd it hard to secure long-term
funding.
The central bank funding data is published for aggregated banking systems and
the individual banks are often not willing to disclose the amount. In our data
period central bank lending has been short-term (less than one-year) whereas three-
year reﬁnancing operations for example were introduced by the Eurosystem and
national central banks in late 2011. Outside our data period it is probable that the
introduction longer-term repo transactions with central banks may have contributed
around 40% of total loans on average.
23In United Kingdom we use reserve repos from the Bank of England’s assets and in Australia we use
total central repo assets from the Reserve Bank of Australia.
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to a fall in the probability of default more than raising the severity of loss as it
alleviates long-term funding liquidity risks.
• In countries with more total short-term external debt (in the banking, sovereign
and private sector), empirical studies tend to ﬁnd a greater likelihood of a crisis.
External debt is liabilities to non-residents, where residency is deﬁned in relation
to a geography. According to this deﬁnition it does not matter whether the debt is
denominated in foreign or domestic currency. Short-term external debt is deﬁned
as debt having an original maturity of less than one year.24 Much of the earlier
sovereign empirical research has primarily focused on total short-term external debt
and crisis incidence in emerging countries (see for example Rodrik and Velasco
(1999), Bussiere and Mulder (1999) and Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998)).
In this paper we distinguish between bank and sovereign external debt instead of
lumping them together as done in existing studies.
• As a related funding liquidity variable we include total syndicated loans provided to
a country where the nationality of at least one of the syndicate banks diﬀers from
that of the borrower. Syndicated loans are credits granted by a group of banks to a
borrower and typically act as a backstop facility to commercial paper programs for
banks and corporates. A large fall in syndicated loans may signal severe funding
problems for banks and corporates in a country.
• Total deposits are found by summing demand deposits, time and savings deposits
and foreign currency deposits. The change in outstanding amount of total deposits
is likely to be negatively related to bank credit risk. A rise in deposits may sig-
nal fewer funding liquidity problems as most deposits are protected by insurance
schemes, reﬂecting a stable source of bank funding. Likewise, a substantial with-
drawal of private deposits e.g. on the back of limited deposit insurance, expectations
of capital controls or imposition of a tax on deposits may signal severe funding liq-
uidity problems. As banks move closer to insolvency, however, a rise in deposits
may also be positively correlated with bank credit risk as seen in Iceland in 2008.
In domestic bankruptcy laws, depositors can be super senior to those of any other
creditors which should raise senior bank credit risk along with a rise in depositors
(since the loss given default is higher for ordinary senior bond creditors).
• The book value of equity may be positively or negatively related to bank credit risk
depending on the banking system’s risk proﬁle. We use data for unweighted capital
to total assets. The banking system’s equity market capitalisation is most likely
jointly determined with the CDS spreads (at least on a quarterly frequency) and
hence we did not include this measure as an explanatory variable.
24We do not expect changes in banks’ long-term external liabilities to be signiﬁcantly related to the
change in bank credit spreads. The data source for external debt is Quarterly External Debt Statistics
jointly developed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
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A description of bank variables, macro variables, and ﬁnancial variables is found in
Table 6 and Table 7 shows outlier statistics of quarterly changes. It reveals that Iceland
is an extreme observation due to build-up of a large banking system relative to GDP and
subsequent collapse. It suggests that our econometric results should be tested without
including Iceland and see whether they are robust to including the country. Kallestrup
and Lando (2010) provide a case study of the banking crisis in Iceland. A correlation
table of changes in the variables is found in Appendix C. We now turn to a description
of the sovereign explanatory variables.
3.3 Sovereign Credit Risk Explanatory Variables
In order to understand the dynamics of sovereign credit risk it is important to analyse
the public sector’s balance sheet. We analyse the sovereign’s balance sheet through the
general government sector which consists of central government, state government, local
government and social security funds but formally excludes the central bank. Below we
assess the importance of ’traditional’ ﬁscal variables, foreign currency debt, other debt
composition indicators and short-term versus long-term external debt for the dynamics
of sovereign credit spreads. The data sources for traditional ﬁscal variables are Eurostat,
OECD and IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). Other data is collected from
various statistical sources such as the BIS, IMF, World Bank and credit rating agencies.
Traditional Fiscal Variables
The dataset includes ’traditional’ quarterly ﬁscal variables such as gross or net general
government debt scaled against the domestic GDP.25 In addition, we include the primary
balance relative to GDP, i.e., total revenue less expenditure excluding gross interest pay-
ments. Higher public debt burdens or deﬁcits relative to GDP are expected to widen
sovereign credit spreads. We have also included quarterly projected future public deﬁcits
as reported in the OECD Economic Outlook and the IMFWorld Economic Outlook as the
expected future debt burden may be more important than the current debt outstanding.
Higher public expenditures and debt may be the direct result of bank bailouts, though.
In our data sample, however, the only case where bailouts have caused the government
debt to increase much more than government assets is in Ireland and Iceland. In these
two countries we have adjusted public debt for bank bail-outs as a robustness check.26
Debt in Foreign Currency
It is likely that the change in foreign currency debt is positively correlated with the
dynamics of sovereign credit risk (if the debt has not been hedged). If the central gov-
ernment has a high share of foreign currency debt relative to total debt and the country
25The assets of the general government include ﬁnancial assets and non-ﬁnancial assets.
26Interestingly, Eurostat (2011a) and IMF (2009) have collected yearly data on the impact of direct
ﬁnancial institutions support schemes on the public sector’s net and gross debt across countries.
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faces a fall in the domestic exchange rate, the debt measured in domestic currency rises
and may thus contribute to rise in sovereign credit risk. Hence, we agree with Standard
& Poor’s (2010) who views it as beneﬁcial for the sovereign’s reﬁnancing risk if debt
primarily is denominated in local currency.
Fixed and Floating Debt
In our estimation, we include the share of domestic government bonds with ﬁxed interest
rate and the average maturity of domestic central government debt outstanding. We
believe that it is prudent that Standard & Poor’s (2010) assesses it as beneﬁcial for the
sovereign’s reﬁnancing risk if government debt is predominantly ﬁxed rate and long term.
External Debt
Short-term debt combined with ﬂoating interest rates can quickly raise interest rate ex-
penditures which in turn may result in a higher probability of default and interest rates
(see also Calvo (1988)). Much of the earlier sovereign empirical research has primarily
focused on short-term external debt and crisis incidences in emerging countries. The
argument is that countries with a large amount of short-term debt are more vulnerable
to debt roll-over crises. Hence, a higher amount of external short-term debt should be
associated with wider sovereign credit spreads. However, short-term debt is likely to be
a symptom and not the cause of an impending crisis. When the perception of riskiness is
high, investors prefer to hold short-term debt and issuers ﬁnd it diﬃcult or too expensive
to borrow at longer maturities.27 In addition to short-term external debt we also test the
importance of long-term external debt. A rising share of long-term general government
debt held by non-residents may be associated with tighter sovereign credit spreads, re-
ﬂecting a stable amount of funding by the government.
Debt Aﬀordibility
We also relate the dynamics of sovereign credit risk spreads to debt aﬀordability. Debt
aﬀordability is measured as the contemporaneous general government gross or net inter-
est rate payments to revenue. It is widely used by the three large credit rating agencies;
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch. Non-linear eﬀects in explanatory variables are
likely to be present as the sovereign can be solvent as long as credit spreads are low
but close to insolvent when credit spreads rise substantially (see also Haugh, Ollivaud,
and Turner (2009)).28 External debt aﬀordability is tightly linked to the international
27See also Diamond and Rajan (2001).
28Escolano (2010) provides technical notes on deriving public primary balances compatible with a con-
stant debt ratio or that hit a given debt ratio in ﬁnite time depending on expected future variables. The
European Commission (2009) and Ostry, Ghosh, Kim, and Qureshi (2010) derive long-term sustainabil-
ity indicators in speciﬁc countries. Explicit ex-post sustainability calculations are rather straightforward
given the initial debt to GDP when you make assumptions on the diﬀerence between the nominal interest
rates and the nominal growth rate. Ex-ante sustainability computations, however, are diﬃcult to relate
to the dynamic of credit spreads since the variables are endogenous and depending on expectations.
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investment position (NIIP) and the current account balance. The NIIP is the balance
sheet of the stock of external ﬁnancial assets and liabilities and a country with a current
account deﬁcit is running down its net foreign asset position.
Recession Indicators
Public revenues are dependent on tax collection from the private sector and the state
of the economy. As a proxy for future public revenues we include the median expected
default frequency (EDF) of the non-ﬁnancial sector in the country. Alternatively, a lender
that grants credit to corporations located in a particular country may use sovereign CDS
spreads to proxy hedge the associated counterparty credit exposures. Hence, one might
expect that indicators of corporate credit risk would be signiﬁcantly related to sovereign
CDS spreads.
A description of the sovereign variables, macro variables, and ﬁnancial variables is
found in Table 8. Outlier statistics in Table 9 of quarterly changes do not suggest extreme
outliers for the main variables in any speciﬁc countries. A correlation matrix of quarterly
changes in the variables is found in Appendix C. We now turn to the regression analysis.
4 Regression Analysis
4.1 Data Analysis
Most of the variables in the dataset are deﬂated by nominal GDP in order to remove
time trends as explained in section 3. Nevertheless, this rescaling is not suﬃcient as
graphical inspections of the panel data show that most of the time series are still not
stationary but integrated of order one (diﬀerence stationary). It suggests that unit root
and cointegration tests to panel data are the way forward.29 Breitung and Pesaran (2008)
summarise four popular types of panel unit root tests: Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002), Im,
Pesaran, and Shin (2003), and two Fisher-type tests. The null hypothesis is the presence
of a unit root whereas the alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the cross-section
units in the panel is stationary. The ﬁrst test assumes a ”common root” whereas the
latter three allow for individual unit root processes so that the AR coeﬃcients may vary
across countries.30 Table 12 presents the results of the panel unit root tests for some
selected explained and explanatory variables. The results indicate the presence of a unit
29By using panel data techniques one gains statistical power and improves on the poor power of their
univariate counterparts. The traditional augmented Dickey-Fuller test of unit root has a low power in
rejecting the null hypotheses of no stationary (particularly for short time series). We also analyse partial
autocorrelations functions and Ljung-Box Q-statistic as suggested in Johnston and DiNardo (1997). The
variables in ﬁrst diﬀerences do not show problems with negative autocorrelation which typically is a sign
of overdiﬀerencing.
30The Schwarz information criteria are used to determine the appropriate length of the distributed
lag.
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root as most of tests fail to reject the null of a unit root in levels. The Hadri (2000) test
with a null hypothesis of no unit root gives the same conclusions.
It may be argued that it is not a unit root but simply a structural break. Perron
(1989) showed that in the presence of a structural break the standard unit root test
lead to a bias towards the nonrejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root. Hence,
Perron suggests modiﬁed unit root tests that account for one known structural break.
Our dataset suggests that the Global Financial Crisis in the summer of 2007 was the
culprit of several structural breaks in CDS spreads due to idiosyncratic credit risk across
countries. In the data we do not achieve diﬀerence stationarity if we just allow for one
structural break in a speciﬁc quarter.31 Consequently, we carry on with regressions in
ﬁrst diﬀerences as well as regressions in levels (using co-integration techniques).
4.2 Bank Credit Risk
First Diﬀerence Estimation
Table 13 reports the results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) panel regression where we
regress the change in bank credit default swap spreads minus the iTraxx Senior Financial
Index against the changes in macro-ﬁnancial variables listed in Table 6.32 We focus on
the excess spread since it is much less likely to be driven by global factors such as the
US stock market. The estimation is also done with the same coeﬃcients for each country
but it can easily be re-estimated as they are country speciﬁc. Below i is the index for
countries and t is the index for time (1 stands for equation number one). The estimated
model is as follows:
Δ(B CDS-B FINSNR)it = ci1 + β
′
1 ×Δ(LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it1
The explanatory power of the equation is moderate with an adjusted R-squared around
0.30. The sample covers 18 countries without the outlier Iceland over the period Q1
2004 to Q4 2010. Focus is on detecting ’stable’ linear eﬀects even though CDS spreads
are likely to be inﬂuenced by non-linear eﬀects in explanatory variables.33 The signs
on the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in Table 13 are as expected in section 3 and below we go
through the signiﬁcant explanatory variables. In equation IV and V we exclude all the
variables which are not signiﬁcant at the 10 percent conﬁdence level (after general-to-
speciﬁc modelling). The standard errors are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation in the residuals.
31For example, the government bailouts after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 can be seen as
a structural break. Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011) argue for a positive relationship between
sovereign CDS spreads and measures of public debt to GDP ratios after bank bailout even if it does not
exist beforehand.
32Banks’ liabilities to the general government is excluded in the regression due to missing values for
two countries. The variable is insigniﬁcant in sub-samples.
33Borio and Drehmann (2009) focus on ﬁnding thresholds and the risk of banking crises.
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• The change in short-term collateralised loans with central banks has a high explana-
tory power in explaining the dynamics of bank credit spreads. A rise in short-term
central bank funding by one percentage point of GDP co-moves with a rise in excess
bank credit risk by around 6 basis points. It is intuitive that CDS spreads on the
banks are related to short-term collateralised loans at the central bank. One can
argue that a banking system’s assets pledged as collateral in short-term repo trans-
actions with central banks make existing unsecured creditors worse oﬀ and does
little to reduce the long-run probability of default. Assets pledged as collateral
matters for the pricing of CDS spreads on unsecured debt as credit spreads should
reﬂect the lower recovery in the case the bank defaults.
• Furthermore, the health of the real estate sector - measured as the change in the
median expected default frequency of the real estate or construction sector - is
tightly linked to bank credit risk. A rise in the median real estate EDF by 1
percentage point increase bank credit risk by around 9 basis points. The change
in the unemployment rate, real house prices, and the growth in real GDP are
insigniﬁcant in our regression analysis.
• A rise in deposits relative to GDP tightens excess bank credit spreads. Deposits
may be seen as a stable source of funding for banks in order to avoid funding
liquidity problems. However, deposits are only signiﬁcant at the 10% conﬁdence
level.34 Hahm, Shin, and Shin (2011) document that non-retail deposits (non-core
liabilities) serve as a indicator of vulnerability to a crisis. Contrary to this study,
we use CDS spreads as measures of systemic crises and thus we do not need to
deﬁne a ﬁnancial crisis with a threshold fall in output, stock or currency markets.
• The percentage change in the domestic stock market and the change in banks’
gross short-term external debt are not signiﬁcant in explaining excess bank credit
spreads. The change in domestic private-sector credit to GDP is only a signiﬁcant
determinant of bank credit risk if we include Iceland in the data sample.35 A
high credit growth is likely to indicate a lower marginal asset quality as argued
in Kallestrup and Lando (2010) in a case study of Iceland. Syndicated loans are
signiﬁcantly related to bank CDS spreads if we include Iceland in the sample. Signed
syndicated loans to the Icelandic entities fell sharply in the year before the banking
sector collapsed.
The variables in Table 13 which are signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level and robust
if we exclude Iceland are put in bold. Central bank funding and the riskiness of the real
estate sector are two robust variables. Interestingly, the coeﬃcients in bold do not change
34When Iceland is included in the sample the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant (see the discussion in section
3).
35Similarly, Hahm, Shin, and Shin (2011) ﬁnd that credit to GDP is not signiﬁcantly related to country
vulnerabilities when liability variables are introduced.
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much if the explained variable is the change in the bank CDS spread (rather than the
excess spread) as documented in section 5.
Level Estimation
Since the variables are integrated we can use cointegration analysis to ﬁnd out whether
there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between bank CDS spreads and our
macro-ﬁnancial variables.36 Pedroni (1999) and Pedroni (2004) extend the Engle and
Granger (1987) two-step (residual-based) cointegration tests to involve panel data. Pe-
droni suggests two classes of test statistics for the null hypothesis of no cointegration that
allow for country ﬁxed eﬀects and coeﬃcients to vary across cross-sections. The tests are
based on an examination of the residuals of a spurious regression performed using I(1)
variables. Under the null hypothesis of no cointegration, the residuals will be I(1).37
Table 14 reports eleven panel cointegration statistics with varying properties. The tests
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration (often at the 1% signiﬁcance level) except
for one statistic.
In Table 15 we regress bank CDS spreads in levels on the variables reported in section
3 with OLS and use standard errors that are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation in the residuals. For simplicity we impose homogenous regression
coeﬃcients across countries. According to the Granger representation theorem, the vari-
ables cointegrate if and only if there exists an error correction. Error-correction equations
are not reported in this paper since we believe realistic models should be estimated with
country-speciﬁc parameters.
(B CDS-B FINSNR)it = ci2 + β
′
2 × (LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it2
In the bank equation we ﬁnd that short-term central bank funding is signiﬁcant at the
1% signiﬁcance level. Determinants of sovereign credit risk is the focus of the subsequent
section. Later we analyse the interaction of bank and sovereign credit risk.
4.3 Sovereign Credit Risk
First Diﬀerence Estimation
Table 16 reports the results of OLS panel regressions where we regress the change in
sovereign credit default swap spreads relative to the Norwegian sovereign CDS spread
against the change in sovereign variables. Norway is the government with the best ﬁscal
fundamentals among advanced economies. We test all the domestic sovereign variables
listed in Table 8 but exclude variables which are similar or highly correlated in order
36This paper does not focus on cointegration between bank and sovereign CDS spreads. Alter and
Schler (2011) ﬁnd cointegration between bank and sovereign credit default swaps in a sample of seven
Eurozone member states.
37Pedroni suggests panel unit root tests against the homogeneous alternatives (common AR coeﬃ-
cients) for all countries and the panel unit roots test against the heterogeneous alternatives (individual
AR coeﬃcients) for all countries.
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to avoid problems with multicollinearity. Below i is the index for countries and t is the
index for time. The estimated model is as follows:
Δ(S CDS-S NO)it = ci3 + β
′
3 ×Δ(LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it + it3
We use the sample that covers 19 countries including Iceland over the period Q1 2004 to
Q4 2010. The explanatory power of equation I in Table 16 is moderate with an adjusted
R-squared around 0.40. In equation III and IV we exclude all the variables which are
not signiﬁcant at the 10 percent conﬁdence level (after general-to-speciﬁc modeling).
Furthermore, we are reluctant to include domestic market prices like the nominal exchange
rate as explanatory variables since it is likely to be jointly determined together with credit
spreads (or subject to reverse causality).
• We split the general government’s debt into three parts. First, we ﬁnd that a rise in
the general government debt in domestic currency by one percentage of GDP widens
excess sovereign spreads by around 4 basis points. Second, a change in foreign
currency debt is signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the change in sovereign
credit risk. A one percentage point increase in the share of foreign currency debt
relative to GDP contributes to a rise in the excess sovereign credit risk spread by
around 12 basis points. The foreign currency debt variable is signiﬁcant even when
controlling for a change in the eﬀective nominal exchange rate index separately.
However, the coeﬃcient is not stable across various speciﬁcations. Third, we ﬁnd
that the change in the general government’s long-term external debt is statistically
signiﬁcant determinant of the excess sovereign credit risk. A rise in long-term
external debt by one percentage of GDP tightens excess sovereign spreads by around
8 basis points.
• We ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on the general government’s short-term external
debt. It is broadly in line with an IMF (2010) survey of the sovereign literature
noticing that most empirical studies ﬁnd that short-term (external) debt does not
appear to be a signiﬁcant factor in determining the level of the credit rating. In
addition, the ratio of ﬁxed debt to total debt is insigniﬁcant in the given econo-
metric speciﬁcation. Likewise, the maturity structure of debt is not signiﬁcant.
We have treated the maturity of debt as exogenous but the variable is likely to be
partly endogenous. Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2010) ﬁnd that emerging market
sovereigns’ endogenously choose a time-varying maturity structure of debt. When
credit spreads are low, governments issue long-term debt more heavily and when
credit spreads rise, the maturity of bond issuances shortens.38
• The current account level and the net international investment position (NIIP)
are measures of external debt sustainability. The variables are both signiﬁcant but
38Entering a sovereign debt crisis, Greece government debt had a long average maturity; much longer
than the average maturity of advanced economies (e.g. the United States).
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similar in nature. We decided to include the current account in the regressions since
the NIIP is often interpolated from yearly data. A rise in current account surplus
lowers sovereign credit spreads. The coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcant if we insert the
level of the current account.
• A rise in the median corporate EDF by 1 percentage point widens sovereign CDS
spread by around 40 basis points. In our interpretation, higher credit risk in the
corporate sector translates into lower public revenues and potentially higher public
debt. Interestingly, using the median corporate EDF instead of the local stock
market return adds explanatory power to the equation.39 We have included the
contemporaneous value of the corporate EDF in the regression but if it is exchanged
with the quarterly lagged value of the median corporate EDF is remains signiﬁcant.
The signiﬁcance of the corporate EDF for sovereign credit risk is likely to partly
reﬂect proxy hedging in cases where corporate CDS spreads are not available or
illiquid.
The regression results above add further insights into the results by Longstaﬀ, Pan,
Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) who only include three domestic variables in country-by-
country regressions: local stock market return, percentage changes in the exchange rate,
and percentage changes of the sovereign’s holdings of foreign reserves. We ﬁnd signiﬁ-
cance of several other variables as documented above. In our richer panel econometric
speciﬁcation the foreign reserves are insigniﬁcantly related to the dynamics of sovereign
credit risk. The exchange rate index remains signiﬁcant but the causality may also be the
reverse with a rise in sovereign risk contributing to depreciation of the domestic currency
as the risk-adjusted return by investing in the country is decreasing in the sovereign risk
premium.40 In Equation III and Equation IV reported in Table 16 we exclude the domes-
tic exchange rate index since we are interested in ﬁnding determinants of the dynamics
of sovereign credit risk based on fundamental balance sheet and macro-economic variables.
Level Estimation
Again we can use cointegration analysis to ﬁnd out whether there exists a long-run equi-
librium relationship between sovereign CDS spreads and our macro-ﬁnancial variables.
Table 17 reports Pedroni’s eleven panel cointegration statistics. The tests of the sovereign
residuals reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration (often at the 1% signiﬁcance level)
except for three statistics.41 In Table 18 we regress in levels sovereign CDS spreads against
a benchmark on the variables reported in section 3 with OLS (ordinary least squares).
We use standard errors that are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial
39The variable, %Δ(F STOCK), is not included in the sovereign equation since the corporate EDF
has a more natural interpretation.
40We leave this open for future research.
41Panel unit root test suggest stationarity in ﬁrst diﬀerence except for current account which seems to
be stationary in levels.
33
correlation in the residuals. Furthermore, we impose homogenous regression coeﬃcients
across countries.
(S CDS-S NO)it = ci4 + β
′
4 × (LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it + it4
In the sovereign equation we ﬁnd signiﬁcance of public debt to GDP, the median corporate
EDF as well as the current account balance. We now turn to the interaction of bank and
sovereign credit risk. Again, we do not report error-correction equations since we believe
realistic models should be estimated with country-speciﬁc parameters.
4.4 The Importance of Bank Fundamentals for Sovereign Credit
Risk
In the previous section we analysed bank and sovereign credit risk separately. Now we
want to combine the analyses. In particular, we want to decompose sovereign CDS spreads
into a bank and sovereign contribution based on an econometric analysis of balance sheet
variables. We focus on sovereign credit risk since Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011)
has separated bank CDS spreads into a bank and sovereign component based on an
analysis of CDS spreads. In Table 20 and Table 21 we combine the signiﬁcant bank and
sovereign variables found in the previous sections (in changes and levels). Cointegration
tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. In the bottom of Table 21 the results
after general-to-speciﬁc modelling of CDS spreads in levels are reported. Aggregated
balance sheet variables of a national banking system like collateralised loans can be used
to measure bank credit risk and contingent liabilities of the government. A rise in banks’
short-term collateralised loans by one percentage point of GDP give rise to 6 basis points
wider bank CDS spreads and 3 basis points wider sovereign CDS spreads.
Below we will argue that the banking system’s short-term collateralised funding at the
domestic central bank is not an endogenous variable in the sovereign regression equation.
We defend the results by arguments relying on economic theory and a number of tests.
Wooldridge (2002) as well as Roberts andWhited (2011) review the sources of endogeneity
- omitted variables, simultaneity and measurement error - and their implications for
inference.42
First, if any omitted sovereign variables are correlated with our included explanatory
variables there is an endogeneity problem which causes problem for inference. For example
one might conclude bank credit risk is important for sovereign credit when it is not the
case if the sovereign equation is missing important sovereign variables. We do not believe
it is a cause for concern as we have included practically all sovereign variables reported in
previous studies and used by the rating agencies. Furthermore, we include two sovereign
42A key assumption needed for OLS to produce consistent estimates is that the error term is uncorre-
lated with each explanatory variable. It is impossible to test directly whether a variable is uncorrelated
with the error term because the error term is unobservable.
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variables which are not directly related to sovereign credit risk such as the EDF for the
corporate sector and the current account balance.
Second, we need to exclude a simultaneity bias which occurs when the sovereign CDS
spread and bank collateralised loans are determined in equilibrium so it can plausibly be
argued either that bank collateralised loans cause sovereign CDS spreads or vice versa.
In any case, bank and sovereign CDS spreads are mostly likely to be jointly determined
(due to common risk premia, etc.). In Table 19 granger causality tests in ﬁrst diﬀerences
indicate that bank fundamentals are important for sovereign credit risk but sovereign CDS
spreads do not cause banks to increase their funding at the domestic central bank. In
econometric terms we reject that banks’ collateralised loans do not granger cause sovereign
CDS spreads but we cannot reject that sovereign credit spreads do not granger cause
central bank funding.43 P-values are adjusted for autocorrelation (and heteroskedasticity)
as one might suspect persistence in central bank funding.
It is also worthwhile taking a look at a few further tests. Statistically, banks’ col-
lateralised loans are not signiﬁcantly related to ’pure’ contemporaneous or lagged public
debt variables such as debt to GDP. The same is the case for quarterly forecast of the
future public budget as reported by the IMF or the OECD.44 It is also interesting to take
a look at a few practical examples. In countries with low amount of public gross debt
outstanding or actually negative net debt like Denmark and Sweden, banks have been
reliant on short-term collateralised loans at the central bank (accounting for around 15%
of GDP in 2008). In addition, in countries with a low amount of gross debt before the
crisis and without contemporaneous expectations of higher debt in the future - like in
Iceland and Ireland - central bank collateralised loans have also been substantial.45
Third, we do not have major problems with measurement errors. The data on col-
lateralised loans with the central bank is hardly ever revised as is often the case with
other macroeconomic data. Furthermore, there are only few problems with monthly time
lag due to the publication schedule since our macro-ﬁnancial dataset is quarterly. For
example, data for banks’ central bank funding is often reported with one or two month
time lag.
In order to illustrate the contribution of the riskiness of national banking systems to
sovereign credit risk we can use the estimated panel coeﬃcients to ﬁnd the ﬁtted value
explained by bank and sovereign factors for a particular country. In Figure 6 we see
43The tests in levels give same conclusions. However, two-way causality in levels between bank CDS
spreads and banks’ collateralised loans is a possibility.
44The results are available upon request.
45We acknowledge that when sovereign credit risk rises substantially banks headquartered in the coun-
try may switch to become dependent on central bank funding. See for example the Committee on the
Global Financial System (2011). We suggest that banks’ central bank funding should not be treated as
an exogenous variable when sovereign CDS spreads are consistently above a threshold and higher than
the average of the CDS spreads on the banks. It means caution is warranted in the so-called GIPS
countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) in 2010 and 2011. Interestingly, the main clearing house of
European bonds, LCH Clearnet, implement substantial haircuts on the sovereign bonds when sovereign
credit spreads remain consistently over 500 basis points (see also LCH Clearnet (2011)).
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that for Ireland the majority of the change in sovereign credit risk is explained by bank
credit risk. The results appear intuitive. On contrary to the results in Sgherri and Zoli
(2009) we ﬁnd a time-varying measure of the importance of Irish bank fundamentals on
sovereign credit risk and show statistical and economical signiﬁcance after 2008. It is
important to note, however, that the importance of bank credit risk is varying across
countries. The ﬁt of our model is good for countries where credit risk originates do-
mestically. The model ﬁt is worse for banking systems with large foreign exposures and
relatively low domestic credit risk (for example Austria, Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden
and the Netherlands). Our analysis has to be augmented with data for national bank-
ing systems’ exposures vis-a`-vis individual countries as shown in Kallestrup, Lando, and
Murgoci (2011). Kallestrup, Lando, and Murgoci (2011) show that credit risk in the
banking system is better understood if we model ﬁnancial linkages explicitly. Further-
more, we should model banks’ exposures on other domestic banks which are important
for understanding systemic credit risk.
Figure 6: Ireland: Decomposing the Sovereign Credit Default Swap
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The ﬁgure reports the diﬀerence between Irish and Norwegian 5-year CDS spread (Norway
has the best ﬁscal fundamentals in our sample). Norway is the country with the best
ﬁscal fundamentals among advanced economies. We use the estimated panel coeﬃcients
to calculate the the ﬁtted value explained by bank and sovereign factors in Ireland.
5 Robustness Checks
IMF-Supported Programs
Fluctuations in CDS spreads may represent both actual changes in default risk and
changes in risk aversion. If the variables which explain ﬂuctuations in CDS spreads
also help explain the initiation of IMF-supported programs then it shows that at least
part of the ﬂuctuation is due to higher default risk. We treat the initiation of IMF-
supported programs as distress events for the panel of 19 countries since there are no
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explicit sovereign credit events in our data period. Furthermore, we analyse an extended
data sample with 38 countries. An IMF-supported program is not classiﬁed as a credit
event in standard CDS agreements but IMF conditional funds tend to be seen as the
last available funding option for a government. In addition, the IMF traditionally enjoys
preferred credit status - based on convention and historical precedent - and the loans
the organisation provides are super senior to those of any other creditors. It lowers the
recovery for the remaining senior debt holders in case of debt restructuring and hence
it should widen senior credit spreads. Table 22 shows six countries with access to IMF
Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) or Extended Fund Facility (EFF) where GDP per capita
is higher than USD 5,000 in our extended sample from 2004 to 2010: Hungary (Q4 2008),
Iceland (Q4 2008), Latvia (Q4 2008), Romania (Q2 2009), Greece (Q2 2010) and Ireland
(Q4 2010).
Table 23 reports the results of a logit regression where we regress the initiation of an
IMF-supported program against the change in a few local bank and sovereign variables.
The dependent variable is SBAs or EFFs and the parameters are obtained by maximising
the log likelihood function. We want to see whether a few of the signiﬁcant variables
mentioned in section 4 are important in explaining the 6 IMF-supported programs.
Pr(IMFit = 1|(Local Variables)it) =
exp((Local Variables)it × β)
1 + exp((Local Variables)it × β)
In Table 23 we see that large increases in collateralised loans or general government debt
relative to the two-year moving average increases the likelihood of an IMF-supported pro-
gram. It supports the case that the local variables capture real probabilities of sovereign
default and not just risk premia. That said, other local or global variables may also
be important in explaining the initiation of IMF-supported programs. The results are
broadly the same if we use probit or extreme value binary estimation methods.
Time Fixed Eﬀects
As a robustness check it is useful to include time ﬁxed eﬀect to capture global risk pre-
mia instead of measuring CDS spreads against a benchmark. Table 24 and Table 25 are
similar to Table 13 and Table 15 except for a change in the explained variable. The
magnitude of estimated bank coeﬃcients are broadly similar to the results reported in
section 4. That said, the explanatory power is naturally higher with time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Furthermore, Table 26 and Table 27 are similar to Table 16 and Table 18 except for a
change in the explained variable. Again the magnitude of estimated bank coeﬃcients
appear fairly similar to the tables reported in section 4. It indicates that our econometric
results are fairly robust.
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6 Conclusion
We show that sovereign credit risk depends critically on fragility in the banking sector
in advanced economies. This has been noted previously but little empirical research has
been done on the importance of bank fundamentals on sovereign credit risk in a dynamic
setting. In our paper, sovereign CDS spreads are decomposed into bank and public sector
contributions based on a panel econometric analysis of balance sheet variables. We ﬁnd
that fragility in the banking sector has been an important driver of sovereign credit risk
especially since 2008 and add additional insights into Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl
(2011).
Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) ﬁnd that sovereign risk is primarily
driven by global risk premium factors but their econometric analysis exclude bank funda-
mentals which we argue are important factors for understanding the dynamics of sovereign
credit risk in most countries. Traditional public debt variables - such as debt-to-GDP -
also inﬂuence the dynamics of sovereign credit risk but less so than commonly thought
in the literature. There exists aggregated balance sheet variables of a national banking
system which represent determinants of bank credit risk and contingent liabilities of the
government. Interestingly, the size of short-term collateralised loans at the central bank
is reﬂected in CDS spreads on unsecured bank debt since assets pledged as collateral in
short-term repo transactions often do little to reduce the long-run probability of default
but contribute to a lower recovery in the case of default.
Our empirical results show that it is important to augment the standard structural
sovereign credit risk model with a banking sector. Initial work has been done by Gray,
Merton and Bodie (2007) but an important challenge for future research will be to develop
theoretical models that can account for the strong empirical relationship between macro-
ﬁnancial variables and the dynamics of sovereign credit risk.
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B Variables
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Average Bank CDS Spreads
ISOCODE Mean Max Min Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 93 429 10 104 28
AU 53 160 6 51 28
BE 104 390 8 116 28
CH 65 217 8 66 28
DE 58 160 10 48 28
DK 47 199 4 52 28
ES 66 259 8 73 28
FR 49 147 6 48 28
GB 73 278 6 78 28
GR 166 989 6 289 28
IE 162 1052 7 244 28
IS 344 1340 24 376 24
IT 56 176 8 54 28
JP 45 120 7 36 28
KR 125 500 15 135 25
NE 49 170 5 51 28
PT 115 851 10 187 28
SE 52 194 8 52 28
US 70 300 10 67 28
All 92 1340 4 155 525
The table shows the mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation and number of observations for
quarterly average CDS spreads on banks. 19 countries are included in the sample from Q1 2004 to Q4
2010.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Sovereign CDS Spreads
ISOCODE Mean Max Min Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 35 177 2 49 28
AU 25 131 2 34 28
BE 36 222 1 54 28
CH 55 128 35 30 8
DE 15 59 1 19 28
DK 20 115 1 28 28
ES 58 350 2 89 28
FR 22 108 1 30 28
GB 42 123 2 41 19
GR 150 1010 4 275 28
IE 93 609 2 150 28
IS 220 977 3 288 28
IT 57 240 4 70 28
JP 26 95 3 30 28
KR 83 330 17 82 28
NE 25 91 1 28 22
PT 72 501 4 126 28
SE 22 124 2 32 28
US 16 67 1 21 28
All 57 1010 1 124 497
The table shows the mean, maximum, minimum, standard deviation and number of observations for
quarterly CDS spreads on sovereigns. 19 countries are included in the sample from Q1 2004 to Q4 2010.
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Table 4: The Names of the Banks Included
Country Bank Name
AT Erste Group Bank AG
AT Raiﬀeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG
AU National Australian Bank
AU Westpac
BE Dexia Group NV
BE KBC Group NV
CH UBS AG
CH Credit Suisse Group AG
DE Deutsche Bank AG
DE Commerzbank AG
DK Danske Bank AS
ES Banco Santander SA
ES Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA
FR BNP Paribas
FR Cre´dit Agricole-Cre´dit Agricole Group
GB Royal Bank of Scotland Plc
GB Barclays Bank Plc
GR National Bank of Greece SA
GR EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA
IE Bank of Ireland Plc
IE Allied Irish Banks Plc
IS Landsbanki Islands hf.
IS Kaupthing Bank hf.
IT Unicredit SpA
IT Intesa Sanpaolo SpA
JP Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group
JP Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group
KR Kookmin Bank
KR Woori Bank Co.
NE ING Group NV
NE Rabobank
PT Banco Comercial Portugues SA
PT Banco Espirito Santo SA
SE Nordea Bank AB
SE Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB
US Bank of America Corporation
US JP Morgan Chase Co.
.
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Table 5: Net Notional CDS Contracts Outstanding in Billions of U.S. Dollars
Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTTC) reports net notional CDS contracts outstanding on
the top 1000 reference entities in the world. We report CDS data for our dataset where available. NA
denotes not available. In the last column we report gross general government debt to GDP and the size
of the banking groups relative to GDP. Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook and BankScope.
2011 2010 2009 2008 Debt or Assets
Year-end Year-end Year-end Year-end to GDP (2009)
AT: Sovereign 5.973 7.025 9.000 4.553 70
Erste Group Bank 0.521 0.709 0.521 NA 76
Raiﬀeisen Bank International AG 0.311 0.598 0.659 NA 56
AU: Sovereign 5.137 2.108 0.491 NA 17
National Australian Bank 1.753 1.327 1.352 1.168 58
Westpac 0.942 0.836 0.790 1.104 52
BE: Sovereign 5.653 5.669 5.615 3.999 96
Dexia 1.054 1.263 1.714 1.711 176
KBC Bank 0.321 0.351 0.315 NA 99
DE: Sovereign 19.43 15.14 11.93 9.694 74
Deutsche Bank AG 4.674 5.469 6.429 9.482 65
Commerzbank AG 2.048 2.256 3.059 2.878 36
DK: Sovereign 2.954 2.357 2.134 1.750 42
Danske Bank AS 0.492 0.494 0.416 0.674 193
ES: Sovereign 15.60 16.88 13.90 13.52 53
Banco Santander SA 2.720 3.030 3.020 3.263 109
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 2.472 3.077 2.474 3.054 53
FR: Sovereign 21.78 17.54 9.272 5.356 79
BNP Paribas 2.493 2.349 2.489 3.324 112
Cre´dit Agricole-Cre´dit Agricole Group 2.596 2.582 2.514 2.438 92
GB: Sovereign 12.21 11.92 3.930 2.541 68
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 1.446 1.793 2.634 2.834 126
Barclays Bank Plc 3.330 3.932 3.817 4.983 103
IE: Sovereign 3.409 4.000 6.069 4.622 65
Bank of Ireland Plc 0.226 0.580 0.577 0.797 117
IT: Sovereign 20.04 26.39 23.80 18.22 116
Unicredit SpA 3.906 4.711 3.420 2.302 63
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 1.942 2.312 3.092 3.462 42
JP: Sovereign 8.875 6.368 3.099 1.753 216
Mitsubishi Corp 0.730 0.671 0.575 0.513 38
Sumitomo Corp 0.531 0.490 0.449 0.652 23
NE: Sovereign 3.258 3.021 3.527 1.809 61
ING Bank NV 0.784 0.892 0.990 1.114 210
PT: Sovereign 5.002 7.961 8.625 NA 83
Banco Espirito Santo SA 1.362 1.596 2.481 2.886 59
Banco Comercial Portugues SA 0.794 0.794 1.175 1.162 51
SE: Sovereign 3.015 2.973 3.303 2.099 43
Nordea Bank AB 0.434 NA NA NA 180
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 0.195 0.212 0.249 NA 80
US: Sovereign 5.111 3.041 2.175 1.391 85
Bank of America Corporation 5.727 5.954 6.484 4.083 16
JP Morgan Chase Co. 5.653 5.126 5.828 4.664 14
47
T
ab
le
6:
B
a
n
k
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
n
a
m
e
F
re
q
u
en
cy
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
S
o
u
rc
e
B
C
B
A
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
cl
a
im
s
o
n
th
e
d
o
m
es
ti
c
ce
n
tr
a
l
b
a
n
k
.
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
IF
S
B
G
G
A
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
cl
a
im
s
o
n
th
e
d
o
m
es
ti
c
g
en
er
a
l
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t.
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
IF
S
B
C
R
E
D
IT
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
cl
a
im
s
o
n
ot
h
er
se
ct
o
rs
in
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y.
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
IF
S
B
E
X
T
A
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
cl
a
im
s
o
n
n
o
n
-r
es
id
en
ts
.
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
IF
S
B
D
E
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
d
ep
os
it
s.
P
er
ce
n
t
of
G
D
P
IF
S
B
B
E
X
T
S
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
sh
o
rt
-t
er
m
ex
te
rn
a
l
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s.
P
er
ce
n
t
of
G
D
P
Q
E
D
S
B
B
E
X
T
L
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
ex
te
rn
a
l
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s.
P
er
ce
n
t
of
G
D
P
Q
E
D
S
B
C
B
L
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s
to
th
e
d
o
m
es
ti
c
ce
n
tr
a
l
b
a
n
k
.
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
IF
S
a
n
d
B
a
n
k
o
f
E
n
g
la
n
d
B
G
G
L
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s
to
th
e
d
o
m
es
ti
c
g
en
er
a
l
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t.
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
IF
S
B
C
A
P
IT
A
L
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
sh
a
re
s
a
n
d
ot
h
er
eq
u
it
y
(u
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
).
P
er
ce
n
t
of
to
ta
l
a
ss
et
s
IF
S
B
G
D
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
B
a
n
k
s’
co
n
so
li
d
a
te
d
a
ss
et
s.
P
er
ce
n
t
of
G
D
P
IF
S
B
C
D
S
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
U
n
w
ei
g
h
te
d
av
er
a
g
e
o
f
5
-y
ea
r
C
D
S
on
d
o
m
es
ti
c
b
a
n
k
s
C
M
A
a
n
d
F
it
ch
B
F
IN
S
N
R
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
T
h
e
M
a
rk
it
iT
ra
x
x
S
en
io
r
F
in
a
n
ci
a
ls
In
d
ex
co
m
p
ri
se
s
2
5
eq
u
a
ll
y
-w
ei
g
h
te
d
J
.P
.M
o
rg
a
n
:
D
a
ta
Q
u
er
y
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
n
a
m
es
B
S
Y
N
G
D
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
S
ig
n
ed
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
sy
n
d
ic
a
te
d
cr
ed
it
fa
ci
li
ti
es
b
y
n
a
ti
o
n
a
li
ty
of
b
o
rr
ow
er
.
B
IS
P
er
ce
n
t
of
G
D
P
F
H
O
U
S
E
R
E
A
L
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
P
ro
p
er
ty
p
ri
ce
s
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
a
C
P
I
p
ri
ce
in
d
ex
B
IS
,
O
E
C
D
a
n
d
IF
S
F
R
E
D
F
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
T
h
e
5
-y
ea
r
m
ed
ia
n
E
D
F
fo
r
ﬁ
rm
s
a
ss
o
ci
a
te
d
w
it
h
th
e
re
a
l
es
ta
te
o
r
co
n
-
M
o
o
d
y
’s
K
M
V
st
ru
ct
io
n
se
ct
o
r.
In
Ic
el
a
n
d
w
e
u
se
th
e
E
D
F
fo
r
th
e
co
rp
o
ra
te
se
ct
o
r
F
S
T
O
C
K
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
sh
a
re
p
ri
ce
s
IF
S
M
G
D
P
R
E
A
L
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
R
ea
l
G
D
P
(s
ea
so
n
a
ll
y
a
d
ju
st
ed
)
O
E
C
D
a
n
d
E
u
ro
st
a
t
M
U
E
M
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
(s
ea
so
n
a
ll
y
a
d
ju
st
ed
)
O
E
C
D
M
E
I
a
n
d
IF
S
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
a
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
o
f
b
a
n
k
a
ss
et
s
an
d
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
m
a
cr
o
-ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
a
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
re
la
te
d
to
b
a
n
k
cr
ed
it
ri
sk
.
O
E
C
D
M
E
I:
O
E
C
D
M
a
in
E
co
n
o
m
ic
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
.
IF
S
:
IM
F
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s.
B
a
n
k
s
ar
e
d
en
o
te
d
”
O
th
er
D
ep
o
si
to
ry
C
o
rp
o
ra
ti
o
n
s”
in
th
e
IF
S
d
a
ta
b
a
se
.
Q
E
D
S
:
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
E
x
te
rn
a
l
D
eb
t
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s.
B
IS
:
B
a
n
k
fo
r
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
S
et
te
le
m
en
ts
.
48
T
ab
le
7:
S
u
m
m
a
ry
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s:
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
in
B
a
n
k
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
M
ea
n
M
a
x
im
u
m
M
a
x
im
u
m
M
in
im
u
m
M
in
im
u
m
S
td
.
D
ev
.
S
ke
w
n
es
s
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
Δ
(B
C
B
A
)
0
.0
7
8
.0
S
E
-1
0
.1
D
K
1.
6
-0
.2
5
3
2
Δ
(B
G
G
A
)
0
.1
8
1
0
.8
IT
-4
.2
C
H
1.
4
2
.5
5
3
2
%
Δ
(B
C
R
E
D
IT
,4
)
4
.9
7
5
4
.8
IS
-6
6
.0
IS
9.
5
-1
.0
5
3
2
Δ
(B
E
X
T
A
)
0
.8
8
2
2
0
.3
IS
-4
8
1
.5
IS
2
5
.7
-1
1
.3
5
3
2
Δ
(B
D
E
P
)
1
.0
2
5
0
.1
IS
-8
.9
IS
3.
4
6
.4
5
3
2
Δ
(B
B
E
X
T
S
)
0
.3
4
6
1
.8
IS
-2
7
2
.3
IS
1
5
.1
-1
1
.7
5
3
2
Δ
(B
B
E
X
T
L
)
0
.3
7
7
3
.1
IS
-3
7
3
.3
IS
1
7
.4
-1
8
.5
5
3
2
Δ
(B
C
B
L
)
0
.3
0
3
0
.6
IE
-2
9
.6
IE
3.
7
1
.9
5
3
2
Δ
(B
G
G
L
)
0
.0
2
1
2
.3
IE
-2
.7
G
B
0
.9
6
.4
4
7
6
Δ
(B
C
A
P
IT
A
L
)
0
.0
0
0
.0
IE
-0
.1
IS
0.
0
-3
.2
5
3
2
Δ
(B
G
D
P
)
2
.3
5
2
2
1
.8
IS
-7
1
2
.1
IS
3
5
.6
-1
4
.7
5
3
2
Δ
(B
S
Y
N
G
D
P
)
0
.0
1
1
8
.8
IS
-1
8
.8
IS
1.
9
0
.3
5
3
2
%
Δ
(F
H
O
U
S
E
R
E
A
L
)
0
.3
1
1
2
.0
IS
-1
1
.4
A
T
2
.3
-0
.1
5
3
2
Δ
(F
R
E
D
F
)
0
.0
4
8
.7
IS
-1
3
.8
IS
1.
1
-3
.1
5
3
2
%
Δ
(F
S
T
O
C
K
)
1
.1
6
3
1
.8
G
R
-7
8
.3
IS
1
1
.3
-1
.7
5
3
2
%
Δ
(M
G
D
P
R
E
A
L
,4
)
1
.6
0
1
1
.2
IS
-1
0
.0
J
P
3.
2
-1
.0
5
3
2
Δ
(M
U
E
M
P
)
0.
0
8
2.
6
S
E
-1
.0
IS
0
.4
2.
0
5
3
2
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
su
m
m
a
ry
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
o
f
q
u
a
rt
er
ly
ch
a
n
g
es
in
b
a
n
k
va
ri
a
b
le
s.
F
or
ea
ch
va
ri
a
b
le
w
e
re
p
o
rt
th
e
m
ea
n
,
th
e
m
a
x
im
u
m
a
n
d
th
e
n
a
m
e
o
f
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y,
th
e
m
in
im
u
m
an
d
th
e
n
a
m
e
of
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y,
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
,
th
e
sk
ew
n
es
s
a
n
d
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s.
Δ
(•
)
is
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
ov
er
th
e
q
u
a
rt
er
an
d
%
Δ
(•
,t
)
is
th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e
ov
er
t
q
u
a
rt
er
s.
F
or
U
n
it
ed
K
in
g
d
o
m
a
n
d
S
w
it
ze
rl
a
n
d
th
e
b
a
n
k
in
g
se
ct
o
r’
s
g
ro
ss
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s
to
th
e
g
en
er
a
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
ar
e
m
is
si
n
g
.
49
T
ab
le
8:
S
o
v
e
re
ig
n
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
V
ar
ia
b
le
n
a
m
e
F
re
q
u
en
cy
D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
S
o
u
rc
e
S
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
*
G
en
er
a
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
gr
o
ss
d
eb
t
to
G
D
P
.
E
u
ro
st
a
t,
O
E
C
D
a
n
d
IF
S
S
N
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
*
G
en
er
a
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
n
et
d
eb
t
to
G
D
P
E
u
ro
st
a
t,
O
E
C
D
a
n
d
IF
S
S
R
E
V
G
D
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
*
G
en
er
a
l
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t
re
ve
n
u
e
to
G
D
P
(f
o
u
r-
q
u
a
rt
er
su
m
)
E
u
ro
st
a
t,
O
E
C
D
a
n
d
IF
S
S
E
X
P
G
D
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
*
G
en
er
a
l
go
v
er
n
m
en
t
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
to
G
D
P
(f
o
u
r-
q
u
a
rt
er
su
m
)
E
u
ro
st
a
t,
O
E
C
D
a
n
d
IF
S
S
F
D
E
F
G
D
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
A
ve
ra
g
e
o
f
ye
a
r-
en
d
a
n
d
ye
a
r-
a
h
ea
d
b
u
d
g
et
p
ro
je
ct
io
n
.
%
o
f
G
D
P
O
E
C
D
E
O
a
n
d
IM
F
W
E
O
S
R
E
S
E
R
V
E
S
G
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
M
o
n
et
a
ry
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
’s
ex
te
rn
a
l
a
ss
et
.
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
IF
S
S
IR
R
E
V
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
*
G
en
er
a
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
in
te
re
st
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
to
re
ve
n
u
e
(f
o
u
r-
q
u
a
rt
er
su
m
)
S
ee
b
el
ow
S
IR
N
R
E
V
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
*
G
en
er
a
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
n
et
in
te
re
st
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
to
re
ve
n
u
e
F
it
ch
,
E
u
ro
st
a
t,
IM
F
,
(f
o
u
r-
q
u
a
rt
er
su
m
)
O
E
C
D
a
n
d
IF
S
S
F
X
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
G
en
er
a
l
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t
fo
re
ig
n
cu
rr
en
cy
d
eb
t
sh
a
re
F
it
ch
R
a
ti
n
g
s
S
F
IX
E
D
T
O
T
A
L
In
te
rp
ol
a
te
d
D
o
m
es
ti
c
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
b
o
n
d
s
w
it
h
ﬁ
x
ed
in
te
re
st
ra
te
.
%
to
ta
l
d
eb
t
B
IS
a
n
d
O
E
C
D
S
M
A
T
U
R
IT
Y
In
te
rp
o
la
te
d
M
a
tu
ri
ty
o
f
d
o
m
es
ti
c
ce
n
tr
a
l
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t
d
eb
t
o
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
B
IS
an
d
O
E
C
D
S
G
E
X
T
L
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
G
en
er
a
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t’
s
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
ex
te
rn
a
l
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s.
P
er
ce
n
t
of
G
D
P
Q
E
D
S
S
G
E
X
T
S
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
G
en
er
a
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t’
s
sh
o
rt
-t
er
m
ex
te
rn
a
l
li
a
b
il
it
ie
s.
P
er
ce
n
t
of
G
D
P
Q
E
D
S
S
C
D
S
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
T
h
e
5
-y
ea
r
so
ve
re
ig
n
C
D
S
sp
re
a
d
C
M
A
a
n
d
F
it
ch
C
D
S
S
O
V
X
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
T
h
e
5
-y
ea
r
It
ra
x
x
S
ov
X
W
es
te
rn
E
u
ro
p
e
In
d
ex
co
m
p
ri
se
s
1
5
so
ve
re
ig
n
J
.P
.M
o
rg
a
n
:
D
a
ta
Q
u
er
y
n
a
m
es
w
h
er
e
a
ll
co
n
st
it
u
en
ts
a
re
eq
u
a
ll
y
w
ei
g
h
te
d
(I
t
is
a
th
eo
re
ti
ca
l
p
ri
ce
b
ef
o
re
th
e
st
a
rt
of
tr
a
d
in
g
o
n
2
8
S
ep
te
m
b
er
2
0
0
9
)
F
N
E
E
R
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
E
ﬀ
ec
ti
ve
ex
ch
a
n
g
e
ra
te
.
N
o
m
in
a
l,
b
ro
a
d
In
d
ex
.
2
0
0
5
:
In
d
ex
1
0
0
B
IS
an
d
O
E
C
D
F
F
X
U
S
D
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
E
x
ch
a
n
g
e
ra
te
.
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
cu
rr
en
cy
p
er
U
.S
d
o
ll
a
r
IF
S
F
C
E
D
F
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
M
ed
ia
n
o
f
th
e
5-
y
ea
r
E
D
F
s’
fo
r
d
o
m
es
ti
c
co
rp
o
ra
te
se
ct
o
r
M
o
o
d
y
’s
K
M
V
M
C
A
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
C
u
rr
en
t
a
cc
o
u
n
t
(s
ea
so
n
a
ll
y
a
d
ju
st
ed
).
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
O
E
C
D
M
E
I
a
n
d
IF
S
M
F
D
I
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
*
D
ir
ec
t
in
ve
st
m
en
t
a
b
ro
a
d
m
in
u
s
d
ir
ec
t
in
ve
st
m
en
t
a
t
h
o
m
e.
IF
S
P
er
ce
n
t
of
G
D
P
M
N
II
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
*
T
h
e
n
et
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
in
ve
st
m
en
t
p
o
si
ti
o
n
.
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
IF
S
M
G
D
P
R
E
A
L
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
R
ea
l
G
D
P
(s
ea
so
n
a
ll
y
a
d
ju
st
ed
).
P
er
ce
n
t
o
f
G
D
P
O
E
C
D
a
n
d
E
u
ro
st
a
t
M
U
E
M
P
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ra
te
(s
ea
so
n
a
ll
y
a
d
ju
st
ed
)
O
E
C
D
M
E
I
a
n
d
IF
S
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
a
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
o
f
so
ve
re
ig
n
an
d
m
a
cr
o
-ﬁ
n
a
n
ci
a
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
re
la
te
d
to
so
ve
re
ig
n
cr
ed
it
ri
sk
.
*
d
en
o
te
s
q
u
a
rt
er
ly
o
r
in
te
rp
o
la
te
d
fr
o
m
ye
a
rl
y
d
a
ta
.
IF
S
:
IM
F
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s.
Q
E
D
S
:
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
E
x
te
rn
a
l
D
eb
t
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s.
M
E
I:
O
E
C
D
M
a
in
E
co
n
o
m
ic
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
.
B
IS
:
B
a
n
k
fo
r
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
S
et
te
le
m
en
ts
.
O
E
C
D
E
O
:
O
E
C
D
E
co
n
o
m
ic
O
u
tl
o
o
k
.
IM
F
W
E
O
:
IM
F
W
o
rl
d
E
co
n
o
m
ic
O
u
tl
o
o
k
.
50
T
ab
le
9:
S
u
m
m
a
ry
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s:
C
h
a
n
g
e
s
in
S
o
v
e
re
ig
n
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
M
ea
n
M
a
x
im
u
m
M
a
x
im
u
m
M
in
im
u
m
M
in
im
u
m
S
td
.
D
ev
.
S
ke
w
n
es
s
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
Δ
(S
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
)
0
.8
3
1
7
.6
G
R
-1
0
.6
A
T
2.
7
1
.5
5
3
2
Δ
(S
N
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
)
0
.3
5
1
3
.4
G
R
-1
3
.4
G
R
2.
4
0
.3
5
3
2
Δ
(S
R
E
V
G
D
P
)
-0
.0
1
7
.3
A
U
-8
.3
A
U
0
.7
-0
.7
5
2
8
Δ
(S
E
X
P
G
D
P
)
0
.1
7
1
3
.4
IS
-9
.8
IS
1.
2
1
.7
5
2
8
Δ
(S
F
D
E
F
G
D
P
)
-2
.6
2
4.
9
K
R
-2
0
.9
IE
3
.7
-0
.9
5
3
2
Δ
(S
R
E
S
E
R
V
E
S
G
)
0
.3
2
1
7
.9
C
H
-6
.7
IS
1
.6
3
.8
5
3
2
Δ
(S
R
E
S
E
R
V
E
S
N
)
-0
.0
6
2
7
.5
IE
-2
8
.3
IE
3
.6
-2
.2
5
3
2
Δ
(S
IR
R
E
V
)
0
.0
1
4
.5
G
R
-3
.8
G
R
0
.5
2
.2
5
2
8
Δ
(S
IR
N
R
E
V
)
0
.0
0
4
.5
G
R
-3
.8
G
R
0.
5
2
.3
5
2
8
Δ
(S
F
X
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
)
0
.0
3
4
.8
IS
-3
.5
IS
0.
6
3
.0
5
3
2
Δ
(S
F
IX
E
D
T
O
T
A
L
)
0
.0
0
0
.1
IS
0.
0
G
R
0
.0
4.
6
5
3
2
Δ
(S
M
A
T
U
R
IT
Y
)
0
.0
3
0
.8
IS
-1
.9
A
U
0.
2
-3
.3
5
3
2
Δ
(S
M
E
X
T
L
)
0
.0
3
7
.1
IS
-3
.3
IE
0
.4
8
.8
5
2
6
Δ
(S
M
E
X
T
S
)
0
.3
4
2
8
.1
IE
-2
7
.7
IE
3.
5
2
.8
5
3
2
Δ
(S
G
E
X
T
L
)
0
.3
5
1
2
.0
IS
-1
0
.5
G
R
1.
7
0
.8
5
3
2
Δ
(S
G
E
X
T
S
)
0
.0
9
7
.2
N
E
-5
.8
A
T
1.
1
0
.5
5
3
2
%
Δ
(F
N
E
E
R
)
-0
.0
6
2
4
.0
J
P
-2
0
.8
IS
3.
3
-0
.5
5
3
2
%
Δ
(F
F
X
U
S
D
)
-0
.0
2
2
8
.0
IS
-1
5
.3
A
U
5.
6
0
.7
5
3
2
%
Δ
(F
C
E
D
F
)
0
.0
2
4
.4
IS
-3
.1
IS
0.
4
2
.2
5
3
2
M
C
A
-0
.0
1
1
2
.1
C
H
-1
5
.2
IS
1.
3
-0
.8
5
3
2
Δ
(M
F
D
I)
0
.4
3
4
4
.7
IS
-5
5
.2
IS
4.
5
-2
.4
5
3
1
Δ
(M
N
II
P
)
-0
.1
4
1
3
3
.7
IS
-9
0
.7
IS
8.
5
4
.9
5
3
1
%
Δ
(M
G
D
P
R
E
A
L
,4
)
1
.6
0
1
1
.2
IS
-1
0
.0
J
P
3.
2
-1
.0
5
3
2
Δ
(M
U
E
M
P
)
0
.0
8
2
.6
S
E
-1
.0
IS
0
.4
2.
0
5
3
2
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
su
m
m
a
ry
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
o
f
q
u
a
rt
er
ly
ch
a
n
g
es
in
so
ve
re
ig
n
va
ri
a
b
le
s.
F
or
ea
ch
va
ri
a
b
le
w
e
re
p
o
rt
th
e
m
ea
n
,
th
e
m
a
x
im
u
m
a
n
d
th
e
n
a
m
e
o
f
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y,
th
e
m
in
im
u
m
an
d
th
e
n
a
m
e
of
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y,
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
,
th
e
sk
ew
n
es
s
a
n
d
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s.
Δ
(•
)
is
th
e
ﬁ
rs
t
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
ov
er
th
e
q
u
a
rt
er
a
n
d
%
Δ
(•
,t
)
is
th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
ch
a
n
g
e
ov
er
t
q
u
a
rt
er
s.
51
C
C
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
M
a
tr
ic
e
s
T
ab
le
1
0
:
B
a
n
k
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
B
a
n
k
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
Δ
(B
C
B
A
)
1
.0
0
Δ
(B
G
G
A
)
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
%
Δ
(B
C
R
E
D
IT
,4
)
0
.0
7
-0
.1
4
1
.0
0
Δ
(B
E
X
T
A
)
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
6
0
.3
0
1
.0
0
Δ
(B
D
E
P
)
0
.1
8
0
.1
2
0
.1
0
0
.2
3
1
.0
0
Δ
(B
B
E
X
T
S
)
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
9
0
.3
1
0
.9
1
0
.1
3
1
.0
0
Δ
(B
B
E
X
T
L
)
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
1
0
.3
7
0
.8
7
-0
.0
3
0.
8
3
1.
0
0
Δ
(B
C
B
L
)
0
.2
9
0
.1
9
0
.1
6
0
.1
4
0
.0
6
0
.0
0
0
.0
8
1
.0
0
Δ
(B
G
G
L
)
-0
.0
1
0
.1
4
-0
.0
3
-0
.1
4
0.
0
2
-0
.3
0
-0
.1
3
0.
1
7
1
.0
0
Δ
(B
C
A
P
IT
A
L
)
-0
.0
9
0.
0
3
-0
.1
0
-0
.3
7
-0
.4
6
-0
.3
1
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
0
0.
0
2
1.
0
0
Δ
(B
S
Y
N
G
D
P
)
0
.0
1
-0
.0
9
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
4
-0
.1
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
1
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
5
0
.0
5
1
.0
0
%
Δ
(F
H
O
U
S
E
R
E
A
L
)
-0
.0
6
-0
.2
2
0
.2
9
0
.1
0
-0
.0
3
0
.1
2
0
.1
3
-0
.0
8
-0
.0
2
0
.1
1
0
.0
6
1
.0
0
Δ
(F
R
E
D
F
)
0
.0
4
-0
.0
7
0
.0
4
-0
.1
3
0
.0
7
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
6
0
.0
6
0
.0
8
-0
.1
7
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
9
1
.0
0
%
Δ
(F
S
T
O
C
K
)
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
9
0
.1
7
0
.2
8
-0
.0
4
0.
2
9
0.
3
0
-0
.1
7
-0
.0
9
0
.3
3
0
.0
4
0
.2
8
-0
.4
2
1
.0
0
%
Δ
(M
G
D
P
R
E
A
L
,4
)
-0
.0
3
-0
.3
3
0
.2
6
0
.1
0
-0
.0
3
0.
1
0
0.
0
8
-0
.0
4
0
.0
1
0
.0
2
0
.0
0
0
.4
4
-0
.0
5
0.
1
7
1.
0
0
Δ
(M
U
E
M
P
)
0.
0
0
0
.2
2
-0
.0
9
-0
.1
2
0.
0
7
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
5
0.
1
9
0
.0
7
-0
.0
8
0
.0
2
-0
.3
5
0
.1
6
-0
.2
5
-0
.4
8
1.
0
0
52
T
ab
le
1
1
:
S
o
v
e
re
ig
n
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
S
ov
er
ei
g
n
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
Δ
(S
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
)
1
.0
0
Δ
(S
N
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
)
0
.6
5
1
.0
0
Δ
(S
R
E
V
G
D
P
)
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
3
1
.0
0
Δ
(S
E
X
P
G
D
P
)
0
.3
2
0
.3
0
0
.2
3
1
.0
0
Δ
(S
R
E
S
E
R
V
E
S
G
)
0
.1
5
0
.0
7
-0
.0
4
0
.0
5
1
.0
0
Δ
(S
IR
R
E
V
)
0
.1
9
0
.1
7
-0
.2
4
0.
0
0
0.
0
3
1.
0
0
Δ
(S
IR
N
R
E
V
)
0
.1
8
0
.1
6
-0
.1
5
0.
0
1
0.
0
2
0.
9
6
1.
0
0
Δ
(S
F
X
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
)
0
.3
1
0
.2
6
-0
.1
8
0.
1
1
0.
1
6
0.
1
2
0.
0
9
1.
0
0
Δ
(S
F
IX
E
D
T
O
T
A
L
)
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
2
-0
.0
2
-0
.1
2
0
.0
1
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
8
-0
.2
1
1.
0
0
Δ
(S
M
A
T
U
R
IT
Y
)
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
6
0
.1
9
-0
.0
2
0.
0
2
0.
0
3
0.
0
5
-0
.0
7
0
.0
1
1
.0
0
Δ
(S
G
E
X
T
L
)
0
.3
7
0
.3
9
-0
.0
6
0.
0
9
0.
1
3
0.
1
2
0.
1
1
0.
0
9
-0
.1
0
-0
.0
2
1
.0
0
Δ
(S
G
E
X
T
S
)
0
.3
6
0
.1
7
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
2
0
.0
8
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
2
0
.0
7
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
5
0
.0
4
1
.0
0
%
Δ
(F
N
E
E
R
)
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
3
0.
1
1
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
2
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
5
-0
.2
8
0
.0
1
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
1
0
.0
0
1
.0
0
%
Δ
(F
S
T
O
C
K
)
-0
.2
5
-0
.2
2
0
.0
8
-0
.1
9
0.
0
4
-0
.1
1
-0
.1
2
-0
.2
7
0
.1
3
-0
.0
1
0
.0
1
-0
.1
2
0
.1
5
1
.0
0
M
C
A
-0
.2
7
-0
.2
3
0
.0
8
-0
.1
6
0.
0
0
-0
.1
8
-0
.1
4
-0
.3
0
-0
.0
8
0
.0
1
-0
.1
2
-0
.0
3
0
.1
2
0
.2
0
1
.0
0
Δ
(M
N
II
P
)
0.
0
0
0.
0
1
-0
.0
8
0
.2
9
0
.0
2
0
.0
3
0
.0
2
0
.0
2
-0
.0
6
0.
0
2
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
8
-0
.0
5
-0
.1
7
-0
.0
1
1
.0
0
53
D
.
R
e
g
re
ss
io
n
R
e
su
lt
s
T
a
b
le
1
2
:
P
a
n
e
l
U
n
it
R
o
o
t
T
e
st
s
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
te
st
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
fo
u
r
ty
p
es
o
f
p
a
n
el
u
n
it
ro
ot
te
st
s
w
it
h
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
in
te
rc
ep
t:
L
ev
in
,
L
in
a
n
d
C
h
u
(2
0
0
2
),
Im
,
P
es
a
ra
n
a
n
d
S
h
in
(2
0
0
3)
,
a
n
d
F
is
h
er
-t
y
p
e
te
st
s.
T
h
e
n
u
ll
h
y
p
o
th
es
is
is
a
u
n
it
ro
ot
w
h
er
ea
s
th
e
al
te
rn
a
ti
ve
h
y
p
ot
h
es
is
is
th
a
t
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e
o
f
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
se
ri
es
in
th
e
p
a
n
el
is
st
a
ti
o
n
a
ry
.
T
h
e
ﬁ
rs
t
te
st
a
ss
u
m
es
a
”
co
m
m
o
n
ro
ot
”
(c
o
m
m
o
n
A
R
st
ru
ct
u
re
fo
r
al
l
o
f
th
e
se
ri
es
).
T
h
e
la
te
r
th
re
e
te
st
s
a
ss
u
m
e
”
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
ro
o
ts
”
(a
ll
ow
fo
r
d
iﬀ
er
en
t
A
R
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
a
cr
o
ss
cr
o
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
s)
.
O
n
e,
tw
o
or
th
re
e
st
a
rs
d
en
o
te
co
eﬃ
ci
en
ts
th
a
t
ar
e
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
t
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
o
r
1
%
le
ve
l
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
T
h
e
p
a
n
el
u
n
it
ro
o
ts
te
st
in
d
ic
a
te
th
a
t
m
o
st
o
f
th
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
in
te
g
ra
te
d
of
or
d
er
1
at
th
e
1
%
si
g
n
iﬁ
ca
n
ce
le
ve
l.
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
ie
s
fo
r
F
is
h
er
te
st
s
a
re
co
m
p
u
te
d
u
si
n
g
a
n
a
sy
m
p
to
ti
c
C
h
i-
sq
u
a
re
d
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
.
A
ll
ot
h
er
te
st
s
as
su
m
e
a
sy
m
p
to
ti
c
n
o
rm
a
li
ty
.
T
es
t
fo
r
u
n
it
ro
ot
in
le
ve
l
B
C
D
S
-B
F
IN
S
N
R
B
C
B
L
S
C
D
S
-S
N
O
S
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
N
u
ll
:
U
n
it
ro
o
t
(a
ss
u
m
es
co
m
m
o
n
u
n
it
ro
ot
p
ro
ce
ss
)
L
ev
in
,
L
in
&
C
h
u
t*
6.
37
6
0
.8
4
5
8.
7
5
3
5
.8
4
2
N
u
ll
:
U
n
it
ro
o
t
(a
ss
u
m
es
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
u
n
it
ro
ot
p
ro
ce
ss
)
Im
,
P
es
ar
an
&
S
h
in
W
-s
ta
t
2.
96
2
0
.0
0
9
6.
2
9
2
1
0
.5
5
A
D
F
-
F
is
h
er
C
h
i-
sq
u
a
re
37
.4
4
4
4
.7
0
2
3.
8
0
6.
0
0
5
P
P
-
F
is
h
er
C
h
i-
sq
u
a
re
45
.1
6
5
1
.1
7
3
1.
4
2
3.
2
9
4
T
es
t
fo
r
u
n
it
ro
ot
in
1s
t
d
iﬀ
er
en
ce
B
C
D
S
-B
F
IN
S
N
R
B
C
B
L
S
C
D
S
-S
N
O
S
D
E
B
T
G
D
P
N
u
ll
:
U
n
it
ro
o
t
(a
ss
u
m
es
co
m
m
o
n
u
n
it
ro
ot
p
ro
ce
ss
)
L
ev
in
,
L
in
&
C
h
u
t*
−6
.9
64
∗∗
∗
−9
.3
4
6
∗∗
∗
−9
.5
8
8
∗∗
∗
−1
.7
6
5
∗∗
N
u
ll
:
U
n
it
ro
o
t
(a
ss
u
m
es
in
d
iv
id
u
a
l
u
n
it
ro
ot
p
ro
ce
ss
)
Im
,
P
es
ar
an
&
S
h
in
W
-s
ta
t
−9
.7
81
∗∗
∗
−1
1.
4
7
∗∗
∗
−9
.6
5
0
∗∗
∗
−5
.4
2
7
∗∗
∗
A
D
F
-
F
is
h
er
C
h
i-
sq
u
a
re
1
8
2.
2∗
∗∗
1
9
9.
7
∗∗
∗
1
5
1.
3
∗∗
∗
1
1
3.
0∗
∗∗
P
P
-
F
is
h
er
C
h
i-
sq
u
a
re
3
3
1.
2
∗∗
∗
4
0
3.
2
∗∗
∗
2
9
3.
3
∗∗
∗
2
1
6.
7
∗∗
∗
54
Table 13: Explaining Bank Credit Default Swap Spreads in Changes
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress the change in bank credit
default swap spreads relative to the iTraxx Senior Financial Index against the change in macro-ﬁnancial
variables listed below with ordinary least squares.
Δ(B CDS-B FINSNR)it = ci1 + β
′
1 ×Δ(LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it1
Δ(•) stands for ﬁrst diﬀerence of the variable over the quarter. %Δ(•, t) stands for the percentage
change of the variable over t quarter(s). The table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel
regressions. The standard errors are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
in the residuals. One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively. 18 countries are included in the regression. Coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at the
1% signiﬁcance level when excluding Iceland in the sample.
Δ(LOCAL BANK VARIABLES) I II III IV V
INTERCEPT 1.474 0.253 −6.756 1.020 0.888
(0.800) (0.110) (-1.442) (1.643) (0.800)
Δ(B CB A) −3.287 −3.418∗ −0.006
(-1.544) (-1.679) (-0.002)
Δ(B GG A) 5.073 4.845 6.180
(1.449) (1.475) (1.475)
%Δ(B CREDIT,4) 0.246 0.555 0.774∗∗∗
(0.508) (1.378) (3.357)
Δ(B EXT A) 0.340 0.307 0.106
(0.716) (0.670) (0.211)
Δ(B DEP) −2.807∗ −2.690∗ −0.337
(-1.915) (-1.872) (-0.257)
Δ(B BEXT S) −1.139 −1.142 −0.863
(-1.127) (-1.146) (-0.887)
Δ(B BEXT L) 0.158 0.102 1.759∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.087) (3.824)
Δ(B CB L) 5.682∗∗∗ 5.801∗∗∗ 5.870∗∗∗ 5.981∗∗∗ 6.185∗∗∗
(4.521) (4.919) (5.853) (5.982) (6.569)
Δ(B CAPITAL) −0.130 −1.103 −4.024
(-0.016) (-0.147) (-0.639)
Δ(B SYN GDP) 0.671 0.665 −3.111∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.329) (-2.592)
%Δ(F HOUSE REAL) −0.040 −0.263 0.079
(-0.045) (-0.337) (0.086)
Δ(F R EDF) 9.467∗∗∗ 9.447∗∗∗ 10.03∗∗∗ 7.589∗∗∗ 7.630∗∗∗
(3.091) (3.256) (4.297) (3.166) (3.355)
%Δ(F STOCK) 0.154 0.181 −0.387
(0.393) (0.465) (-0.624)
%Δ(M GDP REAL,4) 0.370 0.278 2.075
(0.363) (0.308) (1.403)
Δ(M UEMP) 7.949 8.107 14.43∗ 9.222 10.07∗
(1.287) (1.432) (1.928) (1.636) (1.896)
Adjusted R-squared 0.2941 0.3047 0.3631 0.2513 0.2629
Time ﬁxed eﬀect N N N N N
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y N Y Y N
Iceland included N N Y N N
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Table 14: Bank Equation: Panel Cointegration Tests
The table reports panel cointegration tests by Pedroni (1999,2004) which are based on the Engle-Granger
(1987) two-step (residual-based) cointegration tests. Pedroni suggests two classes of test statistics for
the null hypothesis of no cointegration: (i) ”panel statistics” that is equivalent to unit root tests against
the homogeneous alternatives (common AR coeﬀcients) for all countries (ii) ”group statistics” that is
analogous to the panel unit roots test against the heterogeneous alternatives (individual AR coeﬀcients)
for all countries. The lag length selection is based on the Schwarz Information Criteria. The table reports
cointegration tests between excess bank credit spread (B CDS-B FINSNR) and short-term collateralised
loans at the central bank. We reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration except for one statistic. One,
two or three stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. B CDS-B FINSNR
(within-dimension)
Panel v-Statistic 2.497∗∗∗
Panel rho-Statistic −1.130
Panel PP-Statistic −1.289∗
Panel ADF-Statistic −1.317∗
Panel v-Statistic (weighted) 1.941∗∗
Panel rho-Statistic (weighted) −4.233∗∗∗
Panel PP-Statistic (weighted) −4.605∗∗∗
Panel ADF-Statistic (weighted) −5.105∗∗∗
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.
(between-dimension)
Group rho-Statistic −1.658∗∗
Group PP-Statistic −2.618∗∗∗
Group ADF-Statistic −3.308∗∗∗
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Table 15: Explaining Bank Credit Default Swap Spreads in Levels
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress bank credit default swap
spreads relative to the iTraxx Senior Financial Index against macro-ﬁnancial variables listed below with
ordinary least squares.
(B CDS-B FINSNR)it = ci2 + β
′
2 × (LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it2
%Δ(•, t) stands for the percentage change of the variable over t quarter(s). The table reports the
coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel regressions. The standard errors are robust in the presence of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals. One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients
that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 18 or 19 countries are included in the
regressions. Coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level when excluding Iceland in the
sample.
LOCAL BANK VARIABLES I II III IV
INTERCEPT 49.35 230.2∗∗ −31.44∗∗ −18.33∗∗∗
(0.902) (2.137) (-2.507) (-2.748)
B CB A −0.677 −2.620
(-0.343) (-1.349)
B GG A 1.928 −2.110
(0.860) (-0.581)
B CREDIT 0.697 −1.390
(0.743) (-1.274)
B EXT A 0.012 −0.127
(0.032) (-0.426)
B DEP −0.783 2.076
(-0.588) (1.338)
B BEXT S −1.169 −0.563
(-1.291) (-0.584)
B BEXT L 0.028 1.541
(0.027) (1.474)
B CB L 7.505∗∗∗ 8.808∗∗∗ 7.444∗∗∗ 5.444∗∗∗
(3.926) (6.026) (3.892) (4.229)
B CAPITAL −5.475 −23.08∗∗∗
(-0.897) (-2.544)
B SYN GDP −0.647 −8.069∗∗∗
(-0.185) (-3.537)
%Δ(F HOUSE REAL) −1.076 −3.219
(-0.427) (-1.282)
F R EDF −1.681 1.343
(-0.276) (0.190)
F STOCK 0.066 −0.493
(0.267) (-1.010)
%Δ(M GDP REAL,4) −1.230 2.553
(-0.420) (0.735)
M UEMP −0.100 0.846
(-0.036) (0.254)
Adjusted R-squared 0.5961 0.6417 0.5797 0.4302
Time ﬁxed eﬀect N N N N
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y Y Y N
Iceland included N Y N N
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Table 16: Explaining Sovereign Credit Default Swap Spreads in Changes
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress the change in sovereign
credit default swap spreads relative to the Norwegian CDS spread against the change in macro-ﬁnancial
variables listed below with ordinary least squares. The results are broadly the same if we use the S SOVX
index as the benchmark.
Δ(S CDS-S NO)it = ci3 + β
′
3 ×Δ(LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it + it3
Δ(•, t) stands for ﬁrst diﬀerence of the variable over t quarter(s). %Δ(•) stands for the percentage
change of the variable over the quarter. The table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel
regressions. The standard errors are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
in the residuals. One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively. 19 countries are included in the regression.
Δ(LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES) I II III IV
INTERCEPT 17.18 −2.136 4.760∗∗∗ 4.575∗∗∗
(1.592) (-0.478) (6.854) (2.191)
S REV GDP-S EXP GDP+S IRN GDP −2.409 −1.356
(-1.447) (-1.137)
S IRN REV −3.455 1.230∗∗∗
(-1.363) (3.561)
Δ(S DEBT GDP-S FXDEBT GDP) 4.204∗∗ 4.562∗∗∗ 4.143∗∗∗ 4.143∗∗∗
(2.333) (3.123) (3.358) (3.358)
Δ(S FXDEBT GDP) 10.48∗∗ 6.261 13.22∗ 11.00∗∗
(2.044) (1.344) (2.586) (2.207)
Δ(S GEXT S) −6.997∗ −7.236∗∗
(-1.773) (-2.165)
Δ(S GEXT L) −9.370∗∗ −8.995∗∗ −8.518∗∗ −7.978∗∗
(-2.553) (-2.559) (-2.320) (-2.211)
Δ(S RESERVES G) 1.297 1.453
(0.972) (1.276)
Δ(S FIXED TOTAL,4) −3.317 −3.648
(-1.139) (-1.222)
Δ(S MATURITY,4) 1.184 1.527
(0.336) (0.460)
%Δ(F NEER) −2.536∗∗∗ −2.746∗∗∗
(-3.395) (-3.520)
Δ(F C EDF) 37.89∗∗∗ 37.70∗∗∗ 41.82∗∗∗ 41.41∗∗∗
(5.854) (6.915) (7.650) (8.008)
Δ(M CA) −11.11∗∗∗ −11.21∗∗∗ −8.838∗∗∗ −9.212∗∗∗
(-7.897) (-5.886) (-3.187) (-3.672)
%Δ(M GDP REAL,4) 1.458 1.195
(1.327) (1.230)
Adjusted R-squared 0.467 0.452 0.393 0.382
without %Δ(F C EDF) 0.376 0.363
without %Δ(F C EDF) and %Δ(F NEER) 0.334 0.313 0.272 0.266
Time ﬁxed eﬀect N N N N
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y N Y N
Iceland included Y Y Y Y
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Table 17: The Sovereign Equation: Panel Cointegration Tests
The table reports panel cointegration tests by Pedroni (1999,2004) which are based on the Engle-Granger
(1987) two-step (residual-based) cointegration tests. Pedroni suggests two classes of test statistics for
the null hypothesis of no cointegration: (i) ”panel statistics” that is equivalent to unit root tests against
the homogeneous alternatives (common AR coeﬀcients) for all countries (ii) ”group statistics” that is
analogous to the panel unit roots test against the heterogeneous alternatives (individual AR coeﬀcients)
for all countries. The lag length selection is based on the Schwarz Information Criteria. The ﬁrst column
reports cointegration tests between the excess sovereign credit spread (S CDS-S NO) and sovereign
variables (debt to GDP and the median corporate EDF). Eight of the eleven statistics reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration at 5% signiﬁcance level. One, two or three stars denote coeﬃcients that
are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% or 1% level respectively.
Alternative hypothesis: common AR coefs. S CDS-S NO
(within-dimension)
Panel v-Statistic 6.064∗∗∗
Panel rho-Statistic 3.002
Panel PP-Statistic −2.221∗∗
Panel ADF-Statistic −5.288∗∗∗
Panel v-Statistic (weighted) 2.873∗∗∗
Panel rho-Statistic (weighted) 3.242
Panel PP-Statistic (weighted) −3.176∗∗∗
Panel ADF-Statistic (weighted) −7.111∗∗∗
Alternative hypothesis: individual AR coefs.
(between-dimension)
Group rho-Statistic 5.450
Group PP-Statistic −2.193∗∗
Group ADF-Statistic −6.959∗∗∗
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Table 18: Explaining Sovereign Credit Default Swap Spreads in Levels
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress the sovereign credit default
swap spreads relative to the Norwegian CDS spread against the macro-ﬁnancial variables listed below
with ordinary least squares.
S CDS-S NOit = ci4 + β
′
4 × (LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it + it4
%Δ(•) stands for the percentage change of the variable over the quarter. The table reports the co-
eﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel regression. The standard errors are robust in the presence of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals. One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients
that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 19 countries are included in the regression.
D(POST Q3 2008) is dummy variable which equals one after the collapse of Lehman Brothers
(LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES) I II III IV
INTERCEPT 31.63 −32.55 −247.9∗∗∗ −30.37∗∗∗
(0.196) (-0.437) (-4.102) (-3.375)
S REV GDP-S EXP GDP+S IRN GDP 0.334 −4.340
(0.075) (-1.069)
S IRN REV −1.531 −5.262
(-0.155) (-1.334)
S DEBT GDP 5.375∗ 0.151 3.375∗∗∗
(1.739) (0.659) (3.667)
D(POST Q3 2008)*S DEBT GDP 0.451∗
(1.806)
S FXDEBT GDP −6.493∗∗ −0.238
(-2.555) (-0.131)
S GEXT S −14.17∗∗ −1.074
(-2.509) (-0.485)
S GEXT L 0.076 1.068∗
(0.026) (1.907)
S RESERVES G 0.127 1.452∗
(0.073) (1.784)
S FIXED TOTAL −3.535 0.021
(-1.457) (0.033)
S MATURITY −6.060 −1.676
(-1.212) (-0.534)
%Δ(F NEER) −2.822∗∗∗ −3.615∗∗∗
(-3.679) (-3.447)
F C EDF 58.81∗∗∗ 48.04∗∗∗ 43.27∗∗∗ 52.59∗∗∗
(5.520) (4.085) (4.433) (10.34)
M CA −10.93∗∗∗ −2.722∗∗∗ −10.49∗∗∗ −2.867∗∗∗
(-4.378) (-2.693) (-4.141) (-2.812)
%Δ(M GDP REAL,4) 1.118 −0.772
(0.565) (-0.385)
Adjusted R-squared 0.755 0.624 0.697 0.589
Time ﬁxed eﬀect N N N N
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y N Y N
Iceland included Y Y Y Y
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Table 19: Granger Causality Tests
The table reports pairwise granger causality tests between CDS spreads and banks’ short-term collat-
eralised loans at the central bank. All p-values are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
We cannot reject that sovereign and bank credit spread does not granger cause banks’ collateralised loans
the central bank. However, we reject that banks’ collateralised loans do not granger cause sovereign and
bank CDS spreads. Δ(•, t) stands for ﬁrst diﬀerence of the variable over t quarter(s).
t-Statistic
Δ(B CB L) does not Granger Cause Δ(S CDS) 1.693∗
Δ(S CDS) does not Granger Cause Δ(B CB L) 0.090
Δ(B CB L) does not Granger Cause Δ(B CDS) 2.436∗∗
Δ(B CDS) does not Granger Cause Δ(B CB L) 1.307
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Table 20: Interaction of Sovereign and Bank Credit Risk in Changes
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress the change in sovereign
credit default swap spreads relative to the Norwegian CDS spread against the changes in macro-ﬁnancial
variables listed below with ordinary least squares.
Δ(S CDS-S NO)it = ci5 + β
′
5 ×Δ(LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it
+γ′5 ×Δ(LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it5
Δ(B CDS-B FINSNR)it = ci6 + β
′
6 ×Δ(LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it
+γ′6 ×Δ(LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it6
Δ(•, t) stands for ﬁrst diﬀerence of the variable over t quarter(s). The table reports the coeﬃcients and
t-statistics for the panel regression. The standard errors are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity
and serial correlation in the residuals. One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 18 countries are included in the regression.
Δ(S CDS-S NO) Δ(B CDS-B FINSNR)
INTERCEPT 5.962∗∗∗ 3.052
(2.676) (1.408)
Δ(B CB L) 3.139∗∗∗ 6.167∗∗∗
(5.957) (5.838)
Δ(F R EDF) 2.712∗∗ 11.40∗∗∗
(2.157) (6.719)
Δ(S DEBT GDP-S FXDEBT GDP) 3.018∗∗∗ 2.005∗
(5.300) (1.763)
Δ(S FXDEBT GDP) 26.24 23.72
(1.373) (1.290)
Δ(S GEXT L) −8.181∗∗ −8.148∗∗∗
(-2.362) (-2.591)
Δ(F C EDF) 26.44∗∗∗ −21.83
(2.709) (-1.297)
Δ(M CA) 1.302 0.105
(0.455) (0.025)
Adjusted R-squared 0.400 0.320
Time ﬁxed eﬀect N N
Country ﬁxed eﬀect N N
Iceland included N N
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Table 21: Interaction of Sovereign and Bank Credit Risk in Levels
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress bank credit default swap
spreads relative to the iTraxx Senior Financial Index against macro-ﬁnancial variables listed below with
ordinary least squares.
(S CDS-S NO)it = ci7 + β
′
7 × (LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it
+γ′7 × (LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it7
(B CDS-B FINSNR)it = ci8 + β
′
8 × (LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it
+γ′8 × (LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it8
The table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel regressions. The standard errors are
robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals. One, two and three
stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 18 countries are
included in the regression.
S CDS-S NO B CDS-B FINSNR
INTERCEPT −189.0∗∗∗ −71.25
(-3.935) (-1.615)
B CB L 3.559∗∗ 6.686∗∗
(2.414) (5.122)
S DEBT GDP-S FXDEBT GDP 2.957∗∗ 0.933
(2.444) (0.633)
S FXDEBT GDP 9.256 15.87
(0.726) (1.258)
S GEXT L −2.073 −2.325
(-0.798) (-0.842)
F C EDF 42.43∗∗∗ 21.30∗
(3.241) (1.832)
M CA −2.394 −0.469
(-0.741) (-0.203)
Adjusted R-squared 0.666 0.625
Time ﬁxed eﬀect N N
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y Y
Iceland included N N
S CDS-S NO B CDS-B FINSNR
INTERCEPT −189.0∗∗∗ −71.25
(-3.935) (-1.615)
B CB L 3.559∗∗ 6.686∗∗∗
(2.414) (5.122)
S DEBT GDP-S FXDEBT GDP 2.957∗∗
(2.444)
F C EDF 42.43∗∗∗ 21.30∗∗
(3.241) (1.832)
Adjusted R-squared 0.659 0.610
Time ﬁxed eﬀect N N
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y Y
Iceland included N N
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Table 22: IMF-supported Programs
Countries with access to IMF Stand-By Arrangements (SBA) or Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in our
sample from 2004 to 2010 as reported by the database on Monitoring of Fund Arrangement (MONA).
We exclude IMF-supported programs where GDP per capita is less than 5000 in U.S. dollars (current
prices) at the time of initiation.
Country Type Approval date
Hungary SBA 11/06/2008
Iceland SBA 11/19/2008
Latvia SBA 12/23/2008
Romania SBA 05/04/2009
Greece SBA 05/09/2010
Ireland EFF 12/16/2010
Table 23: Explaining IMF-supported Programs
Using a quarterly panel data between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress the approval of an IMF-supported
program against the macro-ﬁnancial variables listed below with a logit speciﬁcation. MOV AV (•, t)
stands for the moving average of the variable over t quarters. Coeﬃcients are reported with t-statistics
below them in parentheses. One, two or three stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10%,
5% or 1% level respectively.
Variable 19 countries 38 countries
INTERCEPT −12.19∗∗∗ −6.547∗∗∗
(-2.936) (-8.878)
B CB L-MOVAV(B CB L,8) 0.064∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(2.545) (2.182)
S DEBT GDP-MOVAV(S DEBT GDP,8) 0.399∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(2.439) (4.349)
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Table 24: Explaining Bank Credit Default Swap Spreads in Changes
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress the change in bank credit
default swap spreads against the change in macro-ﬁnancial variables listed below with ordinary least
squares.
Δ(B CDS)it = cit9 + β
′
9 ×Δ(LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it9
Δ(•) stands for ﬁrst diﬀerence of the variable over the quarter. %Δ(•, t) stands for the percentage
change of the variable over t quarter(s). The table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel
regressions. The standard errors are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
in the residuals. One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively. 18 or 19 countries are included in the regression. Coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant
at the 1% signiﬁcance level when excluding Iceland in the sample.
Δ(LOCAL BANK VARIABLES) I II III
INTERCEPT 11.78∗∗∗ 9.217∗∗∗ −2.413
(4.245) (3.223) (-0.413)
Δ(B CB A) −3.018 −3.047 0.632
(-1.452) (-1.490) (0.177)
Δ(B GG A) 5.061 4.680 7.097
(1.552) (1.563) (1.616)
%Δ(B CREDIT,4) 0.059 0.423 1.180∗∗∗
(0.143) (1.198) (3.550)
Δ(B EXT A) 0.237 0.201 0.025
(0.432) (0.397) (0.046)
Δ(B DEP) −1.399 −1.377 1.502
(-1.001) (-1.004) (1.077)
Δ(B BEXT S) −1.120 −1.136 −1.036
(-1.061) (-1.099) (-1.077)
Δ(B BEXT L) 0.330 0.200 1.940∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.183) (4.899)
Δ(B CB L) 5.264∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 6.020∗∗∗
(4.267) (4.470) (5.494)
Δ(B CAPITAL) 3.525 2.559 −1.697
(0.499) (0.387) (-0.266)
Δ(B SYN GDP) −0.664 −0.673 −2.927∗∗∗
(-0.315) (-0.330) (-3.211)
%Δ(F HOUSE REAL) 0.763 0.391 0.524
(0.944) (0.497) (0.573)
Δ(F R EDF) 9.525∗∗∗ 9.649∗∗∗ 12.51∗∗∗
(4.723) (5.272) (3.829)
%Δ(F STOCK) −1.249∗ −1.168 −1.945∗∗
(-1.736) (-1.628) (-2.172)
%Δ(M GDP REAL,4) −2.270∗∗ −1.566∗ 1.005
(-1.992) (-1.922) (0.553)
Δ(M UEMP) 8.495 9.266 12.47∗∗
(1.399) (1.641) (2.146)
Adjusted R-squared 0.5619 0.5682 0.5339
Time ﬁxed eﬀect Y Y Y
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y N Y
Iceland included N N Y
65
Table 25: Explaining Bank Credit Default Swap Spreads in Levels
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress bank credit default swap
spreads against macro-ﬁnancial variables listed below with ordinary least squares.
B CDSit = cit10 + β
′
10 × (LOCAL BANK VARIABLES)it + it10
%Δ(•, t) stands for the percentage change of the variable over t quarter(s). The table reports the
coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel regressions. The standard errors are robust in the presence of
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the residuals. One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients
that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 18 or 19 countries are included in the
regression. Coeﬃcients in bold are signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level when excluding Iceland in the
sample.
LOCAL BANK VARIABLES I II III IV
INTERCEPT 273.6 348.7∗∗ 31.74∗∗ 46.03∗∗∗
(1.431) (2.178) (2.379) (6.259)
B CB A −0.461 −2.017
(-0.215) (-1.101)
B GG A 0.860 −3.007
(0.395) (-0.877)
B CREDIT 0.579 −1.277
(0.538) (-1.218)
B EXT A 0.033 −0.216
(0.092) (-0.586)
B DEP −0.956 2.246
(-0.517) (1.101)
B BEXT S −1.271 −0.705
(-1.406) (-0.729)
B BEXT L −0.427 1.857∗
(-0.335) (1.705)
B CB L 6.775∗∗∗ 8.559∗∗∗ 7.395∗∗∗ 5.215∗∗∗
(4.436) (6.196) (3.634) (4.077)
B CAPITAL −8.230 −22.20∗∗
(-0.944) (-2.164)
B SYN GDP −3.122 −8.902∗∗∗
(-0.663) (-3.746)
%Δ(F HOUSE REAL) −0.307 −2.714
(-0.135) (-1.135)
F R EDF −0.803 4.694
(-0.106) (0.491)
F STOCK −0.419 −1.059
(-0.612) (-1.056)
%Δ(M GDP REAL,4) −9.047 −2.513
(-1.442) (-0.339)
M UEMP −1.019 −0.956
(-0.335) (-0.333)
Adjusted R-squared 0.7657 0.7521 0.7535 0.6533
Time ﬁxed eﬀect Y Y Y Y
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y Y Y N
Iceland included N Y N N
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Table 26: Explaining Sovereign Credit Default Swap Spreads in Changes
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress the change in sovereign credit
default swap spreads against the change in macro-ﬁnancial variables listed below with ordinary least
squares.
Δ(S CDS)it = cit + β
′
11 ×Δ(LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it + it11
Δ(•, t) stands for ﬁrst diﬀerence of the variable over t quarter(s). %Δ(•) stands for the percentage
change of the variable over the quarter. The table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel
regressions. The standard errors are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
in the residuals. One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively. 19 countries are included in the regression.
Δ(LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES) I II III IV
INTERCEPT 30.11∗ 1.730 4.912∗∗∗ 4.683∗∗
(1.785) (0.275) (5.036) (2.189)
S REV GDP-S EXP GDP+S IRN GDP −0.963 −0.156
(-0.468) (-0.145)
S IRN REV −5.298 1.043∗
(-1.482) (1.950)
Δ(S DEBT GDP-S FXDEBT GDP) 5.380∗∗∗ 5.542∗∗∗ 4.796∗∗∗ 4.897∗∗∗
(2.942) (3.578) (3.200) (3.289)
Δ(S FXDEBT GDP) 8.133∗ 3.975 11.21∗∗∗ 9.129∗∗
(1.684) (0.971) (2.996) (2.246)
Δ(S GEXT S) −7.707∗∗ −7.607∗∗∗
(-2.220) (-2.684)
Δ(S GEXT L) −9.333∗∗∗ −8.619∗∗∗ −7.837∗∗ −7.223∗∗
(-2.800) (-2.789) (-2.368) (-2.268)
Δ(S RESERVES G) 0.171 0.086
(0.130) (0.070)
Δ(S FIXED TOTAL,4) −4.182 −4.537
(-1.592) (-1.603)
Δ(S MATURITY,4) 2.180 2.752
(1.064) (1.370)
%Δ(F NEER) −2.514∗∗∗ −2.807∗∗∗
(-3.352) (-3.425)
Δ(F C EDF) 32.82∗∗∗ 33.06∗∗∗ 41.08∗∗∗ 40.53∗∗∗
(4.311) (4.314) (6.171) (5.853)
Δ(M CA) −10.06∗∗∗ −10.72∗∗∗ −8.488∗∗∗ −8.855∗∗∗
(-4.764) (-4.591) (-3.188) (-3.716)
%Δ(M GDP REAL,4) −1.573 −0.491
(-0.603) (-0.243)
Adjusted R-squared 0.566 0.549 0.514 0.503
Time ﬁxed eﬀect Y Y Y Y
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y N Y N
Iceland included Y Y Y Y
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Table 27: Explaining Sovereign Credit Default Swap Spreads in Levels
Using a quarterly panel dataset between Q1 2004 and Q4 2010, we regress the sovereign credit default
swap spreads against the macro-ﬁnancial variables listed below with ordinary least squares.
S CDSit = cit12 + β
′
12 × (LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES)it + it12
Δ(•, t) stands for ﬁrst diﬀerence of the variable over t quarter(s). %Δ(•) stands for the percentage
change of the variable over the quarter. The table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel
regressions. The standard errors are robust in the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
in the residuals. One, two and three stars denote coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively. 19 countries are included in the regression.
(LOCAL SOVEREIGN VARIABLES) I II III IV
INTERCEPT 275.5 39.69 −250.2∗∗∗ −22.28∗∗
(1.194) (0.488) (-3.979) (-2.522)
S REV GDP-S EXP GDP+S IRN GDP −1.421 −1.373
(-0.383) (-0.277)
S IRN REV −2.816 −9.139∗
(-0.300) (-1.737)
S DEBT GDP 3.776∗ 0.051 3.532∗∗∗
(1.764) (0.257) (3.729)
D(POST Q3 2008)*S DEBT GDP 0.593∗∗
(2.193)
S FXDEBT GDP −8.509∗∗∗ −2.168
(-2.973) (-0.956)
S GEXT S −11.58∗∗∗ −1.615
(-3.064) (-0.569)
S GEXT L 0.164 1.515∗∗∗
(0.080) (2.765)
S RESERVES G −1.126 0.304
(-0.568) (0.297)
S FIXED TOTAL −4.496∗ −0.028
(-1.861) (-0.039)
S MATURITY −8.796 −3.794
(-1.310) (-1.168)
%Δ(F NEER) −2.804∗∗∗ −3.597∗∗∗
(-3.504) (-3.275)
F C EDF 65.63∗∗∗ 51.57∗∗∗ 47.35∗∗∗ 54.31∗∗∗
(5.454) (3.994) (4.510) (11.05)
M CA −10.78∗∗∗ −3.113∗∗∗ −11.21∗∗∗ −2.761∗∗∗
(-3.829) (-4.017) (-4.902) (-2.605)
%Δ(M GDP REAL,4) −7.763 −10.28
(-1.482) (-1.501)
Adjusted R-squared 0.811 0.707 0.715 0.613
Time ﬁxed eﬀect Y Y Y Y
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Y N Y N
Iceland included Y Y Y Y
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Abstract
We show that ﬁnancial linkages across borders are priced in the CDS markets
beyond what can be explained by exposure to common factors. Information on the
relative size and riskiness of aggregate exposures of banks in one country to non-
nationals is used to construct a dynamic measure of the risk arising from foreign
exposures. We also construct a measure which in addition takes into account the
relative size and riskiness of bank exposures to domestic government bonds and
other domestic residents. Both measures help explaining the dynamics of bank
CDS premia after controlling for country speciﬁc and global risk factors. Finally,
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1. Introduction
A key concern in the current European sovereign crisis is that restructuring of sovereign
debt will increase the ﬁnancial stress on banks already under pressure. The fear is that
banks are vulnerable through their holdings of government debt. While exposures to
sovereign debt are clearly important, they are relatively small compared to total balance
sheets. For example, by the end of 2010, holdings of foreign sovereign debt accounted for
only 19% of total foreign claims held by all banks reporting to the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS). Holdings of domestic sovereign debt are also low compared to the
assets of the banks on average representing 8% across all reporting banks in our sample.
A larger source of risk on the banks’ asset side is the claims on banks and the non-
bank private sector in other countries. We show in this paper that these exposures help
explaining the dynamics of bank CDS premia even after controlling for country speciﬁc
and global risk factors. Speciﬁcally, we show that two exposure risk measures based on
consolidated banking statistics from BIS are highly signiﬁcant in explaining movements in
bank CDS spreads. The ﬁrst measure uses information on the relative size and riskiness
of aggregate exposures of banks in one country to non-nationals, i.e. the public sector,
bank and non-banks, in other countries. These cross-country exposures are obtained from
BIS statistics and we combine this information with CDS data to obtain a risk-weighted
exposure measure. Our construction captures that large exposures to one country are
primarily important when the credit risk of that country is high. The measure thus
captures ﬁnancial network eﬀects in the banking system and does so dynamically. Our
second measure combines the ﬁrst risk measure with information on the relative size and
riskiness of exposures to domestic government bonds and other domestic residents. The
domestic exposures are combined with measures of sector speciﬁc default risk as captured
by Moody’s KMV’s so-called Expected Default Frequency (EDF) measures. The EDF
measures give us access to market-based measures of default risk for a very large number of
ﬁrms in each country. We use these data to construct median sector default risk measures
for both the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector and for a real-estate related sector which also
comprises construction. Both measures are shown to be signiﬁcant in explaining changes
in bank CDS spreads, and this is the case even if we spilt our sample into a period
ending in Q4:2007 close to the Bear Sterns collapse and a sample ranging from Q1:2008
to Q4:2010. The role of the exposures is therefore not just related to the current ﬁnancial
crisis, even if the eﬀects are stronger in the second half of our sample. We argue that
proxy hedging behavior may be an explanation.
Furthermore, we consider the eﬀect of the contingent liabilities of sovereigns arising
from implicit or explicit guarantees of the banking system. Here we use a measure which
combines the size of the banking system relative to GDP with the riskiness measured
both through CDS premia and bank EDFs. As one would expect, these guarantees
greatly inﬂuence sovereign CDS premia, even after controlling for traditional local ﬁscal
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measures and global factors.
The literature on banking crises and on the role of bank risk in explaining sovereign
debt crises is extensive. We focus on quantifying cross-country interlinkages that can be
identiﬁed by looking at the asset side of the banks’ balance sheets and we show that the
measures we propose have explanatory power in addition to both global common factors
and local measures of default risk of large classes of domestic borrowers. There are several
theoretical reasons why we would expect such linkages to matter. For example, Kaminsky,
Reinhart, and Vegh (2003) argue that a crisis of one country may spill into other countries
in the presence of a ”large common creditor” who in the face of losses in one country
has to delever positions in other countries. This common creditor might be collections
of other banks, ﬁnancial institutions, or hedge ﬁnds. The same type of mechanism is
explained in more detail in Tressel (2010) who speciﬁcally models the deleveraging of
banks in countries whose banks have been exposed to losses in one country. In his
calibration, Tressel (2010) also uses the consolidated banking statistics from BIS for his
model calibration but he does not focus on the detailed time series of these statistics.
Whether network eﬀects survive as explanatory variables once global common factors
have been accounted for is not widely agreed upon. For example, Eichengreen, Mody,
Nedeljkovic, and Sarno (2009) use dynamic principal component analysis to identify com-
mon latent factors underlying the dynamics of CDS premia for 45 banks in the US and 8
European countries. In their analysis of all possible combinations of pairwise inﬂuences,
they ﬁnd a very limited role of direct contagion. Our risk-weighted aggregate measure
of exposure to all other banks does survive even after correcting for observable common
factors. Rose and Spiegel (2010) ﬁnd ”remarkably little evidence that the intensity of the
crisis across countries can be easily modeled using quantitative techniques and standard
data that is either country speciﬁc or links countries to the source of the crisis.” This pa-
per shows that BIS statistics and CDS spreads do indeed contribute to our understanding
of cross-border contagion. Degryse, Elahi, and Penas (2010) also use BIS consolidated
banking statistics as a basis for simulating how shocks to one country’s banking system
may propagate through the international linkages and cause contagious defaults. Their
focus is not on CDS spreads and their data end in 2006 whereas we cover the current
ﬁnancial crisis all through 2010.
Our paper supplements Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011) in several aspects.
They focus on the two-way feedback eﬀect between sovereign and bank credit risk (see
also Bolton and Jeanne (2011)) which we strongly conﬁrm but with several important
diﬀerences in the empirical analysis. While we also consider sovereign risk factors in
our explanation of bank CDS spreads, we also include private exposures - both foreign
and domestic - in our bank fundamentals. This is important since the bulk of banks’
foreign exposures are to the private sector and not sovereigns. The decomposition of bank
exposures to which we have access to gives a clear picture of the role of ﬁnancial linkages
in the determination of bank credit risk and our EDF measures also add information on
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the risk of bank assets. In this sense our explanatory variables are closer to true bank
fundamentals than bank equity returns used in Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011).
Furthermore, for the purpose of analyzing the role of banking risk for sovereign credit
risk, we extend the modeling of government guarantees. As in Acharya, Drechsler, and
Schnabl (2011) we include the size of the explicit guarantees made in the wake of the
Lehman default, but we use diﬀerent measures to quantify the size of the guarantees.
We also include a dynamic measure of the size of the contingent liability (or implicit
guarantee) that the sovereign may be assumed to give for the domestic banking system.
Our paper is also related to literature on the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads, as
presented for example in Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011). The authors
here show large commonality with the ﬁrst principal component explaining 75% of vari-
ations in sovereign CDS spreads in the period 2007-2010. Most of the commonality in
their study is driven by global factors, risk premiums and investment ﬂows rather than
local factors. We show that the risk of banks is a large component in sovereign credit
spreads and that in turn, the interlinkages between banking systems across borders help
explain variations in bank credit spreads.
2 The Risk-weighted Exposure Matrix
The key data describing the ﬁnancial sector linkages are summarized in what we label
the BIS exposure matrix. We now describe how this is used together with CDS premia
to construct our risk measure for the major banks in each country. As an illustration, we
use the case of Austria.
The publicly available consolidated banking statistics from BIS provide consolidated
foreign claims of a national banking system in one country on all residents (i.e. public
sector, banks and the non-bank private sector) of other countries. For example, the size
of exposures of Austrian banks to residents of Hungary represents the aggregate claims
of all Austrian-owned bank branches and subsidiaries around the world on all residents
of Hungary, i.e. public sector, banks and the non-bank private sector. While this number
includes the exposure to the Hungarian sovereign debt, the biggest contributor is from
private-sector debt. For example, the total claims held in Q4:2010 by BIS reporting banks
on banks, the public sector and the non-bank private sector in Hungary were 10%, 30%
and 60%, respectively. This decomposition is only available as an aggregated number
and we do not have access to data for, say, the decomposition of Austria’s exposures to
Hungary.
A further indication of the prevalence of non-bank private sector exposure is the
ﬁgures for BIS reporting banks’ foreign claims on all the countries in the world. These
were split between approximately 23% on banks, 19% on public sector and 58% on the
non-bank private sector in Q4:2010.
Since we will need to pair the exposures with information on CDS premia either
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on large banks or sovereigns, we include the foreign exposures of 17 countries: Austria
(AT), Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK),
Spain (ES), France (FR), United Kingdom (GB), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT),
Japan (JP), Netherlands (NE), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE), and United States (US).1
The period covered is as with all our data Q1:2004 - Q4:2010.2 Exposures of each of
the 17 countries may well be to countries outside this set of 17 countries, and this is no
problem as long as we have CDS data available for the banks or sovereigns for those other
countries. For example, Korea and Iceland are not in our sample of 17 countries, since
their banks do not report to BIS, but we are able to measure the riskiness of exposures
to those two countries since there are CDS data available for their largest banks.
We do not include all foreign exposures of a country’s banks, since for some countries a
time series of CDS premia is not available for the sovereign or the banks. For that reason
we choose to limit the counting of exposures until we have reached 85% of the total foreign
exposure. More precisely, consider the banks of country A. Order the countries to which
the banks in country A are exposed by the average exposure over the sample period, and
pick enough countries so that the exposure in Q4:2010 is at least 85% of total exposure.
This creates a list of countries to which the banks in country A have the most signiﬁcant
exposures. We measure the riskiness of the foreign exposures by weighing each exposure
with an appropriate CDS spread. If available, we use average bank CDS spreads for the
two largest banks in the country of the exposure. The idea is that the riskiness of the
private sector exposures in a given country are reﬂected in the CDS spreads of the banks
in that country. When bank CDS spreads are not available, as is typically the case for
emerging markets, we use the sovereign CDS spreads instead. In emerging markets, a
large part of the riskiness of an exposure is related to political risk and currency risk and
these risks are also reﬂected in the sovereign CDS spreads. Empirical results in Dittmar
and Yuan (2008) conﬁrm the strong correlation between corporate credit spreads and
sovereign credit spreads in emerging markets.
To illustrate the use of the BIS data, we consider the case of Austria. Table 1 shows
the exposures to the countries towards which the Austrian banking system has its 19
largest exposures until 85% of the exposures are accounted for. The remaining exposures
are collected under ’others’.
The table lists each aggregate foreign exposure as it was reported in Q4:2010. For
example, the exposure to Germany was USD 42.9 bn on average throughout the entire
1We exclude Canada because we have no CDS data on Canadian sovereign debt, and we exclude BIS
bank statistics reporting emerging markets because we have no CDS data for their banks.
2We use BIS consolidated statistics with residency of the ultimate obligor when available. The
ultimate obligor refers to the counterparty who is ultimately responsible for servicing any outstanding
obligations in the event of a default by the immediate borrower. Suppose that an Austrian bank extends
a loan to a company based in Hungary and the loan is guaranteed by a US bank. On an immediate
borrower basis, the loan would be considered a claim of an Austrian bank on Hungary, as the immediate
borrower resides in Hungary. On an ultimate risk basis, however, the loan would be regarded as a claim
of an Austrian bank on the United States since that is where the ultimate risk reside.
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Table 1: The foreign exposure matrix: Austria
Rank Country Average Q4 2010 Share Acc Spread Type Share*CDS
(USD bn) (USD bn)
1 DE 42.9 48.2 0.10 0.10 126 Bank 13
2 CZ 34.8 59.6 0.13 0.23 91 Sov 12
3 HU 23.2 35.0 0.07 0.34 378 Sov 28
4 RO 23.1 39.5 0.08 0.42 297 Sov 25
6 GB 21.6 15.8 0.03 0.26 169 Bank 6
5 HR 19.5 31.3 0.07 0.49 256 Sov 17
7 SK 18.8 27.9 0.06 0.55 82 Sov 5
9 US 17.4 16.3 0.03 0.58 132 Bank 5
8 IT 17.1 22.2 0.05 0.63 176 Bank 8
10 RU 11.0 15.2 0.03 0.66 147 Sov 5
11 NE 10.8 15.7 0.03 0.70 113 Bank 4
12 PL 9.6 14.3 0.03 0.73 144 Sov 4
13 SI 8.4 15.4 0.03 0.80 77 Sov 3
14 FR 8.3 9.3 0.02 0.75 142 Bank 3
15 RS 7.7 7.0 0.01 0.76 256 Sov 4
16 CH 7.7 11.2 0.02 0.82 100 Bank 2
17 UA 6.1 8.8 0.02 0.84 510 Sov 10
18 IE 6.0 2.9 0.01 0.83 1052 Bank 6
19 ES 5.5 6.7 0.01 0.86 259 Bank 4
- Others - 66.3 0.14 1.00 - - -
- Total - 468.7 1.00 1.00 - - 163
The table shows the exposures to the countries towards which the Austrian banking system
has its 19 largest exposures until 85% of the exposures are accounted for. There is not liquid
historical CDS spread on Serbia (RS) and we thus use the one on Croatia (HR).
period and it was USD 48.2 bn in Q4:2010. The list is ordered according to the largest
average exposure. At the end of Q4 2010 the total foreign exposure of the Austrian
banking system was USD 468.7 bn and as we see the exposure to Germany accounted for
roughly 10% of this. At the end of Q4 the average CDS premium for the two largest banks
was 126 bps. The risk-weighted sum of CDS spreads (in which the weights only sum to
0.86) is 163 basis points. Hence the weighted average CDS spread of the exposures that
enter the sample is 1/0.86 * 163 bps = 190 bps. Note that this measure is a risk-weighted
average of Austrian banks’ exposure to other countries in Q4:2010. The measure changes
through time as the weights of the exposures shifts between countries and as the CDS
spreads for the countries change. The risk-weighted foreign exposure is only expected to
matter if the size of the exposure is large enough relative to other exposures. As shown
in Table 2 the total exposure of the Austrian banking system is USD 1010 bn, i.e. the
foreign exposures account for almost half of the total exposure. The 5-yr CDS spread
for Austrian banks depicted in Figure 1 shows the clear covariation with the exposure
measure.
74
Table 2: The total exposure: Austria
Claims on USD bn % GDP Share
Non-nationals 468.7 124 0.46
Domestic sovereign 77.7 20 0.08
Other domestic residents 464.0 122 0.46
Total 1010.4 266 1.00
The table shows the composition of assets for Austrian banks. The claims on the domestic
sovereign include the domestic general government and the central bank.
Figure 1: Austria dynamic exposure
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The graph shows the exposure measure decomposed into major geographical regions. Red:
Eastern Europe non-neighboring countries. Green: Eastern Europe neighboring countries (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia). Blue: Other countries. The black curve shows the
average CDS spread of the two largest Austrian banks.
2.1 Adding Domestic Exposures
In contrast to Austria, Portugal’s BIS matrix exposure does not seem to explain the
movement of Portugal’s average bank CDS spread as seen in Figure 2. To better under-
stand the domestic drivers of default risk, we will also rely on so-called Expected Default
Frequency (EDF) measures, which are estimates of default probabilities. We will return
to these measures below. For now, it suﬃces to think of them as measuring probabilities
of default. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of median ﬁrm EDFs in three sectors: banking,
non-ﬁnancial corporates and for the real estate sector. While EDFs for both the corpo-
rate sector and the real estate sectors increase for Austria, they are at moderate levels
compared to Portugal, who sees a very large spike in the real estate EDFs and a also a
higher level of corporate EDFs than Austria. The spike in bank EDFs in Portugal is very
large and in combination, ﬁgures 1, 2 and 3 suggest that the crisis in Portugal was much
more driven by domestic factors and Austris’a much more driven by foreign exposures.
In Figure 4, looking at CDS spreads for Austria and Portugal, we see the CDS spread
for banks and sovereigns and the domestic banks’ CDS foreign exposure-weighted spread.
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Table 3 lists the largest banks used to ﬁnd the bank CDS spreads. In Austria, there is
a high co-movement between the CDS spread for banks and the Austrian banks’ foreign
exposure-weighted CDS spreads. It indicates that Austrian banks were hit by a shock
originating abroad, especially Eastern Europe. On the contrary, in Portugal we see a
low co-movement, indicating that the the credit risk primarily originated in the domestic
economy.
Table 4 shows summary statistics on foreign exposures for each of the 17 countries.
The table shows the relative size and the (foreign) country of the largest exposure. It
also shows the standard deviation of the time-series variation in the relative size of the
largest exposure. This standard deviation ranges from 0.02 to 0.1. While this does show
some time-series variation in exposures, a much larger source of variation in our exposures
measures comes from the huge ﬂuctuations in CDS premia. In addition, there is huge
geographical variation in the countries to which diﬀerent banks are exposed.
Figure 2: Portugal dynamic exposure
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The graph shows the exposure measure decomposed into major geographical regions. Red:
Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland. Blue: Other countries. The black curve shows the average
CDS spread of the two largest Portuguese banks.
3 The Data
The fundamental measure of bank and sovereign risk that we are trying to explain is CDS
premia. In this section we detail the nature of the CDS data and the local and global
variables that we use in our regressions. More details are available in Table 5 and Table
6.
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Figure 3: Bank, corporate and real estate EDFs
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Austrian banks exposed to some increase in real estate and corporate risk, but the order of
magnitude is far from that of Portugal. Green: Real estate 5-yr EDFs; Blueish: Bank 5-yr
EDFs; Red: Non-bank corporate 5-yr EDFs.
3.1 CDS Data
We use a core sample of 5-yr CDS spreads on 17 sovereigns where the contracts are
denominated in US dollar or Euro. Table 7 shows summary statistics on sovereign CDS
spreads. Note that every country for which we have data for the full sample period at
some point had single digit spreads in basis points on their CDS contracts. The largest
observed end-of-quarter premium is 1010 bps for Greece. The two countries with the
lowest maximum observed premia are Germany (59 bps) and the US (67 bps).
Bank CDS data are denominated in the local currency. They are 5-yr contracts and
have senior unsecured debt as reference obligation. Table 8 shows summary statistics on
bank CDS spreads. The largest maximum spreads are for Greece and Ireland, and the
lowest are for Japanese banks. Table 9 shows summary statistics on the risk-weighted
CDS spreads. The lowest maximum is for the US whereas the highest maximum is for
Greece and Austria. Note the considerable time-series variability of our measure for each
country.
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Figure 4: Bank and sovereign CDS, exposure: Austria and Portugal
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For Austria and Portugal we see the CDS spread for banks and sovereigns and the domestic
banks’ foreign exposure-weighted CDS spread. In Austria, there is a high co-movement between
the CDS spread for banks and the Austrian banks’ foreign exposure-weighted CDS spreads.
It indicates that Austrian banks were hit by a shock originating abroad, especially Eastern
Europe. On the contrary, in Portugal we see a low co-movement, indicating that the the credit
risk primarily originated in the domestic economy. Blue: Average Bank CDS; Red: Sovereign
CDS; Green: Weighted CDS exposure.
We obtain the CDS data from CMA which sources their information on executable
and indicative prices directly from the largest and most active credit investors in the
OTC market. Data from CMA are available daily since 2004 but we use end-of-quarter
observations. There are some holes in the data most notably in the early period which
are ﬁlled using the Fitch CDS pricing source. The included bank and sovereign CDS data
often appear among the top references entities in the world with respect to net notional
outstanding as reported by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC).
3.2 Local Bank Variables
To proxy for default risk for, we use an extensive data set of EDFs (Expected Default Fre-
quencies) obtained from Moody’s Analytics (Moody’s KMV). EDFs provide an estimate
of the default probability of a borrower. The estimate is obtained by using a structural
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model to back out ﬁrm asset value and asset volatility from observed equity prices and
accounting information on leverage. From the estimated asset value and asset volatility,
’distance-to-default’ (DD) is computed, and ﬁnally a non-parametric regression on his-
torical data is used to ﬁnd the empirical connection between DD and EDF. Our extensive
data set of EDF covers all countries used in our exposure matrix calculations and the
data allow us to compute aggregate measures of default risk for a number of diﬀerent
sectors in the economy. We have sorted the EDFs into the following categories: banks,
other ﬁnancials, real estate, and corporate, according to their SIC codes. The EDFs in
the real estate category are the ones with SIC codes for real estate ﬁrms, real estate
investment ﬁrms and construction ﬁrms. In a robustness check, we have kept the EDFs
in the real estate category using only those with SIC codes representing real estate ﬁrms
and real estate investment ﬁrms, and included the construction ﬁrms in the corporate
EDF category. For each country, we consider the median of the EDFs for each category
as the relevant risk measure. We have tried using other quantiles of the EDF distribution
as well, but this did not change our results. While EDFs in general have strong predictive
power, the level for banks has been suspected to be too low. Since we are focusing mainly
on changes in EDFs this is a lesser concern in our paper, see Moody’s (2010). Summary
statistics on corporate EDFs are shown in Table 10, and Table 11 shows the correpsonding
statistics for the broad real estate category i.e. the one including construction ﬁrms.
3.3 Local Government Variables
For use in our regressions for sovereign CDS spreads, we have collected quarterly balance
sheet data for the individual countries from IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS),
OECD and Eurostat. We deﬁne sovereign debt using nominal values of debt from the
”general government sector” which comprises the subsectors of central government, state
government, local government and social security funds. We include net interest payments
relative to revenue and changes in the estimated budget deﬁcit. The latter variable
requires further explanation: The quarterly lending revision is calculated as the sum of the
most recent year-end and year-ahead budget projection by the OECD or the IMF minus
the second most recent forecast for the same period provided by the same organization.
In quarters where they do not update a new budget projection we interpolate a forecast.
3.4 Global Variables
We include a number of global variables that have been used in other works to explain
movements in sovereign credit spreads, see for example Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and
Singleton (2011). The variables we use are:
• Excess return for the U.S. stock market - computed as the diﬀerence between the
value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) -
and the three-month Treasury bill.
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• Percentage changes in the 5 year constant maturity treasury yields.
• Percentage changes in the corporate yield spreads. The investment-grade yield
spreads are computed on the basis-point yield spread between BBB and AAA in-
dustrial bond indices. The percentage changes in high-yield spreads are computed
for the basis-point yield spread between BB and BBB industrial bond indexes. The
used indices represent average yields of a broad cross-section of noncallable AAA-,
BBB-, and BB-rated bonds with maturities approximately equal to ﬁve years. The
source for the yield data is Bloomberg.
• The volatility risk premium. This is computed as the diﬀerence between the VIX
index and the realized volatility for the S&P 500 index over the preceding three
months. Source: Bloomberg.
• Percentage changes in the Libor-OIS spread which measures the diﬀerence between
swap rates linked to collateralized and uncollateralized lending. Source: Bloomberg.
• Itraxx SovX Western Europe comprising 15 names from the Eurozone region plus
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom that trade on Western European
documentation. All constituents are equally weighted and we use a computed the-
oretical price based on individual CDS premia before the start of trading on 28
September 2009.
• The Markit iTraxx Non-Financials index comprising 100 equally-weighted European
entities and the Markit iTraxx Non-Financials index which comprises 25 equally-
weighted European entities. For both the underlying reference obligations are senior
unsecured debt.
Figure 5 shows the time-series behavior of the iTraxx indices. The ﬁgure clearly illustrates
how the crisis which started in the banking sector and the corporate sector over time
develops into a sovereign debt crisis.
4 Bank Foreign Exposures Help Explain Bank CDS
Dynamics
Our ﬁrst task is to investigate whether movement in our risk-weighted exposure measure is
capable of explaining movements in bank CDS spreads. Speciﬁcally, we analyze whether
changes in the average of the CDS spreads of the two largest banks in a country can in
part be explained by a change in the relative size and the riskiness of foreign exposures.
We start by running the following crude panel regression:
Δ(B CDS)k,t = αk,0 + α1 ×Δ(B BIS CDS)k,t
+ α′2 ×Δ(Local Bank Variables)k,t
+ α′3 ×Δ(Global Variables)t + k,t
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Figure 5: iTraxx Financial, Non-Financial and SovX
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The evolution in three major iTraxx CDS indices used for controlling for general levels of credit
risk.
Here, as in all that follows, Δ(B CDS)k,t denotes the change from quarter t − 1 to
t in average bank CDS spreads for country k. Similarly, Δ(B BIS CDS)k,t denotes the
change in our exposure-weighted credit spread over a quarter. Local Bank Variables
are EDF measures for diﬀerent sectors which control for the risk of domestic borrowers.
Finally, the Global Variables is a vector of variables listed in section 3.4. The result is
reported in Table 15. We perform the regression both for the full sample and for two
subperiods. The ﬁrst subperiod is from Q1:2004 until Q4:2007 and the second subperiod
starts from Q1:2008 - the quarter in which Bear Stearns was rescued - and runs until the
end of 2010. The regression uses Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard
errors.
The exposure-weighted credit spread is highly signiﬁcant in the full sample and in both
subsamples. Using the full sample results, a 100 basis point increase in the exposure-
weighted credit spread corresponds to a 100 basis point increase in the average bank
CDS spreads. Note that this is a panel regression result - i.e. we are estimating the same
coeﬃcient for all 17 countries.
The real estate EDF measure, R2 EDF, which measures median default probabilities
in the real estate sector (broadly deﬁned), is also highly signiﬁcant in the full sample and
in the second subsample consistent with the important role played by real estate in bank
losses during the ﬁnancial crisis. In contrast, none of the other local or global variables
are signiﬁcant even at the 5% level in the full sample. Surprisingly, the more general
corporate EDF measure for the entire corporate sector, C2 EDF is not signiﬁcant. This
could be due to a multi-collinearity eﬀect. When we regress Bank CDS premia on the
EDF measure for the entire corporate sector, it is highly signiﬁcant.
It is conceivable that the signiﬁcance of the exposure-weighted credit spread does not
reﬂect ﬁnancial linkages but that it rather captures general movements in CDS premia
which also aﬀect Bank CDS premia. To check whether this is the case, we run new
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regressions in which we control for general movements of CDS premia:
Δ(B CDS)k,t = αk,0 + α1 ×Δ(B BIS CDS)k,t
+ α′2 ×Δ(Local Bank Variables)k,t
+ α′3 ×Δ(Global Variables)t
+ α′4 ×Δ(CDS Indices)t + k,t
The results are reported in Table 16 and include two ways of controlling. First, we include
three general European CDS indices: The iTraxx Sovereign Western Europe, iTraxx Se-
nior Financials and iTraxx Non-Financials. The exposure-weighted credit spread remains
highly signiﬁcant. Second, we regress changes in the exposure-weighted credit spread on
changes in these indices and use the residual of this regression as explanatory variable
in a new regression. This residual clearly carries information on the risk of exposures
that are due to linkages but not to general movements in the CDS market and even this
residual explains changes in CDS spreads. In results not reported here, we have shown
this to apply also in our second subsample, whereas in the ﬁrst subsample the coeﬃcient
is positive but insignicant. Both when including indices and when using residuals, we ﬁnd
that the real estate EDF measure remains highly signiﬁcant. Among the iTraxx indices,
only the index for senior ﬁnancials is signiﬁcant in the full sample. Due to the quarterly
sampling, it is diﬃcult to show a role of government guarantees in lowering bank credit
spreads over the full time series. We will return to the role of government guarantees in
connection with sovereign spreads below.
The fact that interlinkages are priced in CDS markets throughout the entire sample
may have several explanations. A common practice among hedge funds and risk managers
is to hedge exposures through ’proxy hedging’ - i.e. hedging through correlated but
’cheaper’ hedging vehicles (see e.g. IMF (2010) and Association for Financial Markets in
Europe (2011a)). For example, a bank may wish to hedge emerging market credit risk in
Eastern Europe, either because it has exposure to sovereigns itself (as a direct exposure
or as counterparty risk in large derivatives contracts) or because it wishes to hedge a
large loan exposure in such countries using a ’macro’ hedge. A cheaper solution may be
to buy protection on Austrian banks which are known to have large exposures in these
countries. This would explain the co-movement of bank CDS spreads across countries and
why market participants seem to follow these interlinkages carefully. Interestingly, the
pricing eﬀects are stronger in the second half of our sample - a period where the hedging
demand due to counterparty credit risk has increased, both because the risk itself has
increased and because of regulatory requirements in Basel III. This is consistent with the
use of proxy hedging as a driver of CDS spreads.
Another cheaper ’proxy hedge’ than the hedge using CDS on the Austrian banks
mentioned above is one using the CDS on the Austrian government since the banking
sector has an implicit sovereign guarantee. The new Basel III rules encourage banks
to use sovereign CDS to hedge Credit Value Adjustments (CVA). Banks are required
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to hold capital against potential mark-to-market losses (i.e. CVA risk) associated with
deterioration in the credit worthiness of a counterparty. One way to manage this risk is
to buy a CDS referencing the country. The Basel rules encourage an appropriate proxy
spread when a CDS spread is not available or illiquid. First, a bank that grants credit
to corporations and banks located in a particular country may use sovereign CDS to
hedge the associated credit or counterparty exposures. Second, buying of sovereign CDS
protection can be used to hedge the credit risk of sovereign counterparties who are not
posting collateral in, for example, large interest rate and currency swap transactions with
banks. Association for Financial Markets in Europe (2011b) document that the expected
potential exposure of dealers to European sovereigns may total as much as USD 70bn or
around 50 percent of net notional CDS contracts outstanding on these reference entities.
The report concludes: ”What is not known is how much of the exposure is actually hedged.
It is, however, reasonable to assume that, during this period, the amount of hedging has
increased due to turmoil in the market for sovereign risk and the impact of CVA on
dealers’ income statements.”
While foreign exposures clearly are important contributors to bank risk, it is still
unlikely to capture the full picture. Banks have large domestic corporate exposures and
they often have exposures to their own government and central bank as well. For example,
as shown in Table 2, at the end of Q4:2010 Austrian banks had total exposures of USD
1010 bn corresponding to 266% of Austrian GDP. Of these exposures, 46% are foreign
exposures reported to BIS, 8% are exposures to own government and central bank and
the remaining 46% are other domestic exposures. We therefore wish to construct another
risk measure that takes all these three types of exposures into account. To measure
the risk of domestic government debt, the CDS premium on the sovereign would seem
a natural choice. However, as we show below, sovereign CDS spreads and bank CDS
spreads are simultaneously determined, and we therefore follow Kallestrup (2011) and
use the following measure: We regress sovereign CDS premia on a number of explanatory
variables of sovereign credit risk. In our regression, four variables are signiﬁcant and
these are domestic debt, foreign currency debt, long-term external debt, and the current
account balance. S RISK is then the ﬁtted value of the CDS spread from this regression
and it is used to measure that part of sovereign which is not related to the banking sector.
Note that S RISK is signiﬁcant in the regression performed in Table 16.
There is no CDS measure which captures the risk of domestic exposures. Instead, we
use the EDF for the real estate sector as the risk measure. While an EDF is not equal to
a CDS spread, it is likely to be of the same order of magnitude. In a risk neutral world,
the EDF measured in basis points would be larger than the CDS spread which would
be roughly equal to the EDF multiplied by the loss rate in default. But risk premia are
likely to make CDS spreads larger than this risk neutral level by some factor. Since, in
addition, we are looking at changes in these variables, it is reasonable to assume that
EDF levels and CDS premia are at the same scale. The extended bank exposure risk
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measure we propose to measure is then the following:
Δ(Bank Credit Risk)k,t =
(Foreign claims
Total
)
k,t
×Δ(B BIS CDS)k,t
+
(Domestic credit
Total
)
k,t
×Δ(R2 EDF)k,t
+
(Claims on sovereign
Total
)
k,t
×Δ(S RISK)k,t
The BIS exposure-weighted credit spread is now weighted by the fraction of foreign
exposures to total bank assets. In addition, the ﬁtted value of the domestic sovereign
CDS premium is weighted by the relative size of this exposure and the median corporate
EDF is weighted by the fraction of domestic exposures to total exposure. One might
alternatively use exposures relative to book value of equity but this does not change our
conclusions. Summary statistics for all three risk weights are shown in Table 12, Table 13
and Table 14. As seen in Table 17 this new measure is also highly signiﬁcant. Changes
in the iTraxx Senior Financials remain signiﬁcant. Note that our extended measure is
signiﬁcant even after splitting into the two subsamples with the rescue of Bear Sterns
marking the beginning of the second subsample.
5 Sovereign CDS Spreads and Contingent Liabilities
So far we have focused on the asset side of banks’ balance sheets focusing on measures of
asset quality that include ﬁnancial linkages and shown that they can help explaining bank
risk as measured by CDS premia. Implicit and explicit government guarantees imply that
bank risk plays a huge role on the liability side of sovereign’s balance sheet. In this section
we show that bank risk has become a dominating factor in the determination of sovereign
credit spreads. The regression now has the following form:
Δ(S CDS)k,t = αk,0 + α
′
1 ×Δ(Domestic Government Variables)k,t
+ α′2 × (Guarantees)k,t
+ α′3 ×Δ(Global Variables)t + k,t
where Global Variables and Domestic Government Variables are deﬁned above. The
ﬁscal variables are traditionally viewed as determinants of sovereign default risk. The
term Guarantees refers to variables seeking to measure the size and riskiness of implicit
and explicit guarantees made to the domestic banking system. The explicit guarantee
(labeled Guarantee in Table 18) is a variable which is only active (i.e. non-zero) in
quarters where a country has issued an explicit guarantee on parts of banks’ liabilities.3
When this is the case, the variable takes on a value equal to the size of the guarantee,
3There have been many types of ﬁnancial support schemes, such as capital injections, purchases of
assets, central bank support and liquidity provisions. These are not included here.
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as reported by IMF (2009), relative to GDP. For all countries, this guarantee is made in
Q4:2008.4
We have two additional variables seeking to measure the size of the sovereign’s ’con-
tingent liability’ on the banking sector. The ﬁrst variable is the size of the domestic
banking system (measured as claims on domestic entities and non-nationals) relative to
GDP multiplied by the average CDS premium of the two largest banks. This measure
seeks to combine the size of the potential liability and its riskiness into one measure. The
second variable uses median bank EDF instead of bank CDS to measure riskiness.
Columns I and II of Table 18 report the result of the regression when we use the
CDS-based measure of the size of the implicit guarantee. Column I does not include the
Q4:2008 explicit guarantees, column II does. Both implicit and explicit guarantees are
highly signiﬁcant. In columns III and IV the CDS-based measure of implicit guarantees
is replaced by an EDF-based measure. Again, both implicit and explicit guarantees are
highly signiﬁcant. In all four regressions, the excess return on the US equity market, and
changes in yield spreads on investment grade and high yield bonds are highly signiﬁcant
- consistent with the ﬁndings in Longstaﬀ, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011).
Interestingly, changes in the domestic government variables are not seen to have a
signiﬁcant impact on the CDS premia. The negative sign on the LIBOR-OIS spread in
somewhat puzzling. An increase in this variable should indicate an increase in general
bank credit risk and we would therefore expect a positive sign of the regression coeﬃcient.
Column V addresses the possibility of endogeneity of bank CDS premia, i.e. that
sovereign and bank CDS are determined jointly. To demonstrate that Bank CDS premia
do indeed inﬂuence sovereign CDS premia, we choose as instrument for bank credit risk
the amount of central bank funding of banks - typically done through collateralized
lending. The idea is that increases in central bank funding is a sign of increased bank
credit risk. See Kallestrup (2011) for more on this.
Table 19 includes iTraxx indices as explanatory variables, but apart from this we
proceed exactly as in Table 18. Implicit guarantees are still signiﬁcant, and the explicit
guarantees are also signiﬁcant, albeit on one of the regressions only at the 10% level.
Unsurprisingly, the general level of sovereign credit risk as measured by iTraxx Sovereign
is signiﬁcant. The presence of this variable removes the signiﬁcance of the excess return
on the US stock market, but not of the yield spreads on high yield bonds.
Instead of using as regressor the general level of sovereign credit spreads as measured
by the iTraxx SovX index, in Table 20 we regress the deviations of the country-speciﬁc
CDS spreads from the SovX index on the same variables used in Table 18. Explicit and
implicit guarantees remain signiﬁcant. Interestingly, when we use EDFs to measure the
riskiness of the banking system (columns III and IV), global variables with exception of
4The guarantee on the Irish banking system was given September 29 and in force September 30. The
price impact seems to mostly take place in Q4, and therefore we have used this as the relevant quarter
for Ireland also.
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changes in the 5-yr Constant Maturity Treasury interest rate are insigniﬁcant.
6 Conclusion
We show that ﬁnancial linkages across borders are priced in the CDS markets beyond
what can be explained by exposure to both global and country-speciﬁc factors. Financial
linkages are measured using BIS consolidated banking statistics and these statistics are
combined with CDS spreads to construct a risk-weighted foreign exposure measure for
banking systems in 17 countries.
We also construct a measure which takes into account the entire asset side of banking
systems by combining the information on foreign exposures with information on the rela-
tive size and riskiness of exposures to domestic government bonds and to other domestic
residents. This measure also helps explaining bank CDS premia.
While the ﬁrst measure is relevant for proving that banks’ foreign ﬁnancial exposures
are reﬂected in CDS spreads, the second measure is a better candidate for detecting
riskiness of a banking system when the risk arises both from exposure to foreign and to
domestic factors. The De Larosie`re Report (2009) (p.63) advocates the establishment
of a common data base containing relevant information on risk exposures of ﬁnancial
institutions and markets, both at the national and international level. The analysis here
shows that markets seem to have taken such exposures into account in the pricing of
CDS contracts and to the extent that CDS premia do reﬂect default risk, this is evidence
in support of the idea, that such information could help building early warning systems.
We argue that a likely explanation for the signiﬁcant eﬀect of linkages - even before the
onset of the ﬁnancial crisis - could be the use of proxy hedging. This would be consistent
with the stronger eﬀect found in the second half of our sample which covers the current
ﬁnancial crisis.
Having established that the bank asset side provides evidence on the contagion eﬀects
of banking systems, we turn to sovereign risk and consider the eﬀect of the contingent
liabilities of sovereigns arising from implicit or explicit guarantees of the banking system.
We use a dynamic measure for the implicit guarantees and a measure of the explicit guar-
antee after the Lehman bankruptcy and show that they help quantify how the banking
system contributes to sovereign credit risk. Since banks’ foreign linkages are a big factor
in explaining bank risk, and bank risk clearly help explain sovereign risk, our analysis
also shows that the interlinkages in the banking system contribute to systemic sovereign
risk.
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A Summary Statistics and Variable description
Table 3: Banking groups as percentage of GDP, 2009
Size of bank GDP
Country Bank Name USD bn USD bn %GDP
AT Erste Group Bank AG 291 382 76
AT Raiﬀeisen Zentralbank Oesterreich AG 213 382 56
AU National Australian Bank 576 994 58
AU Westpac 519 994 52
BE Dexia Group NV 832 472 176
BE KBC Group NV 467 472 99
CH UBS AG 1301 492 264
CH Credit Suisse Group AG 1001 492 203
DE Deutsche Bank AG 2162 3339 65
DE Commerzbank AG 1216 3339 36
DK Danske Bank AS 597 310 193
ES Banco Santander SA 1600 1468 109
ES Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 771 1468 53
FR BNP Paribas 2964 2656 112
FR Cre´dit Agricole-Cre´dit Agricole Group 2440 2656 92
GB Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 2749 2179 126
GB Barclays Bank Plc 2234 2179 103
GR National Bank of Greece SA 163 331 49
GR EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA 121 331 37
IE Bank of Ireland Plc 261 222 117
IE Allied Irish Banks Plc 251 222 113
IT Unicredit SpA 1338 2118 63
IT Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 900 2118 42
JP Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 1930 5069 38
JP Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group 1144 5069 23
NE ING Group NV 1676 797 210
NE Rabobank 875 797 110
PT Banco Comercial Portugues SA 138 233 59
PT Banco Espirito Santo SA 119 233 51
SE Nordea Bank AB 731 406 180
SE Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 324 406 80
US Bank of America Corporation 2223 14119 16
US JP Morgan Chase Co. 2032 14119 14
The table lists the largest banks in each country used to ﬁnd the average bank CDS spread.
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Table 7: Sovereign CDS spreads
ISOCODE Mean Max Min Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 35 177 2 49 28
AU 25 131 2 34 28
BE 36 222 1 54 28
CH 55 128 35 30 8
DE 15 59 1 19 28
DK 20 115 1 28 28
ES 58 350 2 89 28
FR 22 108 1 30 28
GB 42 123 2 41 19
GR 150 1010 4 275 28
IE 120 609 2 164 21
IT 57 240 4 70 28
JP 26 95 3 30 28
NE 25 91 1 28 22
PT 72 501 4 126 28
SE 22 124 2 32 28
US 16 67 0 21 28
All 46 1010 0 100 434
Summary statistics on sovereign CDS spreads. Note that every country for which we have data for the
full sample period have had single digit spreads in basis points on their CDS contracts. The largest
observed end-of-quarter premium is 1010 bps for Greece. The two countries with the lowest maximum
observed premia are Germany (59 bps) and the US (67 bps).
Table 8: Average bank CDS spreads
ISOCODE Mean Max Min Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 93 429 10 104 28
AU 53 160 6 51 28
BE 104 390 8 116 28
CH 65 217 8 66 28
DE 58 160 10 48 28
DK 47 199 4 52 28
ES 66 259 8 73 28
FR 49 147 6 48 28
GB 73 278 6 78 28
GR 166 989 6 289 28
IE 162 1052 7 244 28
IT 56 176 8 54 28
JP 45 120 7 36 28
NE 49 170 5 51 28
PT 115 851 10 187 28
SE 52 194 8 52 28
US 70 300 12 67 28
All 78 1052 4 123 476
The table shows summary statistics on bank CDS spreads. The largest maximum spreads are for Greece
and Ireland, and the lowest are for Japanese banks.
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Table 9: Risk-weighted sum of CDS spreads
ISOCODE Mean Max Min. Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 81 318 10 87 28
AU 47 164 5 46 24
BE 60 195 7 62 28
CH 59 217 10 55 28
DE 65 210 9 63 28
DK 51 175 7 52 28
ES 74 206 10 55 28
FR 63 204 9 60 28
GB 57 215 10 53 28
GR 107 344 20 94 28
IE 69 161 7 53 20
IT 64 210 9 62 28
JP 57 210 9 54 28
NE 58 180 10 52 28
PT 72 234 10 72 28
SE 48 190 6 51 28
US 57 160 10 45 28
All 64 344 5 62 464
The table shows summary statistics on the risk-weighted CDS spreads. The lowest maximum is for the
US whereas the highest maximum is for Greece and Austria.
Table 10: Corporate EDFs
ISOCODE Mean (%) Max (%) Min (%) Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 0.6 1.4 0.1 0.4 28
AU 1.0 2.8 0.4 0.7 28
BE 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.2 28
CH 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.1 28
DE 0.9 1.8 0.4 0.5 28
DK 0.6 2.2 0.1 0.6 28
ES 0.3 0.9 0.1 0.3 28
FR 0.9 2.1 0.3 0.5 28
GB 1.0 2.9 0.4 0.7 28
GR 2.7 7.0 0.5 1.8 28
IE 0.8 2.6 0.2 0.7 28
IT 0.7 1.9 0.2 0.6 28
JP 0.9 2.4 0.3 0.6 28
NE 0.5 1.3 0.1 0.3 28
PT 0.9 2.0 0.2 0.6 28
SE 1.0 2.6 0.3 0.6 28
US 1.3 4.2 0.4 0.9 28
All 0.9 7.0 0.1 0.9 476
The table shows summary statistics on the median corporate expected default frequency in each country.
The maximum is for Greece.
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Table 11: Real estate EDFs
ISOCODE Mean (%) Max (%) Min (%) Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 0.7 3.6 0.0 0.9 28
AU 1.4 7.2 0.2 1.9 28
BE 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.2 28
CH 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.1 28
DE 0.9 2.2 0.2 0.7 28
DK 1.2 3.9 0.2 1.1 28
ES 0.7 2.4 0.1 0.8 28
FR 0.5 1.5 0.1 0.4 28
GB 0.9 3.3 0.1 0.9 28
GR 2.9 6.0 0.8 1.5 28
IE 3.0 19 0.1 4.8 28
IT 0.7 2.1 0.1 0.7 28
JP 2.3 6.2 0.6 1.5 28
NE 0.6 3.0 0.1 0.7 28
PT 1.8 7.8 0.0 2.3 28
SE 0.7 2.6 0.1 0.7 28
US 1.4 6.8 0.3 1.7 28
All 1.2 19 0.0 1.8 476
The table shows summary statistics on the median for the broad real estate category (i.e. the one
including construction ﬁrms) in each country. The maximum is for Ireland.
Table 12: The share of banks’ claims on foreigners
ISOCODE Mean (%) Max (%) Min (%) Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 0.44 0.52 0.23 0.10 28
AU 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.01 28
BE 0.63 0.72 0.40 0.11 28
CH 0.71 0.78 0.60 0.06 28
DE 0.44 0.48 0.39 0.02 28
DK 0.25 0.32 0.10 0.06 28
ES 0.28 0.33 0.23 0.02 28
FR 0.47 0.52 0.40 0.04 28
GB 0.42 0.45 0.37 0.02 28
GR 0.19 0.28 0.11 0.04 28
IE 0.56 0.64 0.44 0.04 28
IT 0.22 0.31 0.14 0.06 28
JP 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.02 28
NE 0.55 0.63 0.42 0.07 28
PT 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.02 28
SE 0.51 0.56 0.40 0.04 28
US 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.03 28
All 0.38 0.78 0.08 0.18 476
The table shows summary statistics on the share of banks’ claims on foreigners in each country. The
Swiss banking system has the largest exposure abroad.
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Table 13: The share of banks’ claims on the domestic sovereign
ISOCODE Mean (%) Max (%) Min (%) Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.02 28
AU 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 28
BE 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.02 28
CH 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 28
DE 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.01 28
DK 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.03 28
ES 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.02 28
FR 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.01 28
GB 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 28
GR 0.15 0.20 0.10 0.03 28
IE 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.01 28
IT 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.02 28
JP 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.03 28
NE 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.01 28
PT 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.01 28
SE 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 28
US 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.03 28
All 0.08 0.31 0.00 0.06 476
The table shows summary statistics on the share of banks’ claims on the domestic sovereign in each
country. The Japanese banking system has the largest exposure towards its own government.
Table 14: The share of banks’ claims on domestic residents
ISOCODE Mean (%) Max (%) Min (%) Std. Dev. Obs.
AT 0.49 0.65 0.43 0.08 28
AU 0.73 0.75 0.71 0.01 28
BE 0.28 0.47 0.21 0.09 28
CH 0.26 0.35 0.21 0.05 28
DE 0.45 0.49 0.42 0.02 28
DK 0.71 0.81 0.67 0.04 28
ES 0.65 0.69 0.61 0.02 28
FR 0.44 0.49 0.41 0.03 28
GB 0.56 0.63 0.52 0.03 28
GR 0.66 0.71 0.58 0.04 28
IE 0.41 0.48 0.35 0.04 28
IT 0.64 0.74 0.57 0.07 28
JP 0.59 0.65 0.53 0.04 28
NE 0.41 0.52 0.34 0.06 28
PT 0.72 0.76 0.70 0.02 28
SE 0.46 0.58 0.42 0.04 28
US 0.81 0.86 0.70 0.06 28
All 0.55 0.86 0.21 0.16 476
The table shows summary statistics on the share of banks’ claims on domestic residents in each country.
The U.S. banking system has the largest exposure towards its own residents.
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B Regression Results
Table 15: Regressing bank CDS spreads on exposure-weighted spreads in diﬀerent periods.
This table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ(B CDS)k,t = αk,0 + α1 ×Δ(B BIS CDS)k,t + α′2 ×Δ(Local Bank Variables)k,t
+α′3 ×Δ(Global Variables)t + k,t
Δ(•) and %Δ(•) stand for ﬁrst diﬀerence and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, re-
spectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time. We perform the analysis ﬁrst for the
whole sample from the ﬁrst quarter of 2004 to the last quarter of 2010. Afterwards we perform the same
analysis on sub-periods. All equations are estimated with OLS and country ﬁxed eﬀects.
VARIABLES FULL SAMPLE Q1 2004 - Q4 2007 Q1 2008 - Q4 2010
INTERCEPT 1.110 −0.431 9.078∗∗
(0.414) (-1.069) (2.274)
Δ(B BIS CDS) 1.004∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗
(5.533) (2.442) (4.777)
Δ(R2 EDF) 10.18∗∗∗ 1.187 11.46∗∗∗
(6.055) (1.151) (9.190)
Δ(C2 EDF) 11.23 −1.486 1.376
(0.374) (-0.491) (0.037)
ER3M −65.03 −4.164 −17.37
(-0.994) (-0.307) (-0.161)
VPSPX 1.558 0.408∗∗∗ 1.102
(1.575) (3.114) (0.953)
%Δ5YCMT 7.061 −8.697∗∗∗ 25.76
(0.731) (-4.251) (0.737)
%ΔHY −16.24 7.074∗∗∗ 7.774
(-1.031) (3.374) (0.158)
%ΔIG −11.11 5.403∗∗∗ −33.05
(-0.885) (3.824) (-1.232)
%Δ(OISUS) 4.295∗ 0.124 12.13∗∗
(1.667) (0.408) (2.056)
Adjusted R-squared 0.3818 0.5266 0.3806
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Table 16: Controlling for the comovement of the CDS market - Introducing the CDS index.
This table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ(B CDS)k,t = αk,0 + α1 ×Δ(B BIS CDS)k,t + α′2 ×Δ(Local Bank Variables)k,t
+α′3 ×Δ(Global Variables)t + α′4 ×Δ(CDS Indices)t + k,t
Δ(•) and %Δ(•) stand for ﬁrst diﬀerence and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, re-
spectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time. In Column I, we simply introduce the
indexes along the BIS matrix. In column II, we have regress the BIS matrix on the CDS indexes and use
the residuals from this regression as a variable to explain the CDS spreads. All equations are estimated
with OLS and country ﬁxed eﬀects.
VARIABLES I II III
INTERCEPT −2.201 −1.258 0.462
(-0.791) (-0.489) (0.244)
Δ(B BIS CDS) 0.465∗∗∗ 0.922∗∗∗
(3.555) (5.085)
Δ(B BIS RES) 0.207∗∗∗
(2.930)
Δ(R2 EDF) 10.67∗∗∗ 10.37∗∗∗ 12.07∗∗∗
(7.476) (7.438) (7.105)
Δ(C2 EDF) −5.234 −0.770 −4.726
(-0.222) (-0.028) (-0.192)
ER3M 16.65 −0.949 −78.44
(0.266) (-0.015) (-1.249)
VPSPX 0.976 0.609 1.614
(1.421) (0.776) (2.258)
%Δ5YCMT −2.253 −6.512 −5.114
(-0.277) (-0.824) (-0.600)
%ΔHY −4.109 13.74 −16.76
(-0.563) (1.176) (-1.057)
%ΔIG 10.21 1.575 −6.693
(0.969) (0.148) (-0.577)
%Δ(OISUS) 1.590 1.976 4.531
(0.806) (0.959) (1.576)
Δ(S RISK) 0.798∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗
(3.379) (3.400) (4.095)
Δ(S SOVX) 0.236 0.240
(0.808) (0.811)
Δ(F NONFIN) −0.279 −0.346
(-1.237) (-1.588)
Δ(B FINSNR) 0.735∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗
(3.312) (5.526)
Adjusted R-squared 0.4637 0.4603 0.4328
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Table 17: Total bank credit risk. This table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the panel
regression:
Δ(B CDS)k,t = αk,0 + α1 ×Δ(Bank Credit Risk)k,t
+α′2 ×Δ(Global Variables)t + α′3 ×Δ(CDS Indices)t + k,t
The variable Δ(Bank Credit Risk) uses the exposure measure obtained by combining foreign exposures
(weighted by CDS spreads) with domestic exposures weighted by the ﬁtted value of the CDS spreads (for
domestic government bonds) or EDFs for other exposures as explained in equation 4. Δ(•) and %Δ(•)
stand for ﬁrst diﬀerence and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, respectively. k is the
index for countries and t is the index for time. The equation is estimated with OLS and country ﬁxed
eﬀects.
VARIABLES FULL SAMPLE Q1 2004 - Q4 2007 Q1 2008 - Q4 2010
INTERCEPT −2.524 −0.659 −2.184
(-0.785) (-1.439) (-0.457)
Δ(B CREDIT RISK) 0.182∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗
(3.124) (3.752) (2.517)
ER3M −14.20 29.76∗∗ 39.37
(-0.195) (2.511) (0.367)
VPSPX 0.818 0.190 0.688
(1.163) (1.369) (0.401)
%Δ5YCMT 3.868 6.384∗∗∗ 6.447
(0.415) (3.387) (0.285)
%ΔHY −5.043 3.486∗∗ −14.83
(-0.877) (2.175) (-0.213)
%ΔIG 13.90 1.531 22.87
(1.444) (1.302) (0.929)
%Δ(OISUS) 1.669 0.952∗∗∗ 9.679∗
(1.086) (3.049) (1.908)
Δ(S SOVX) 0.386 2.312∗∗∗ 0.268
(1.150) (4.155) (0.706)
Δ(F NONFIN) −0.447∗ 0.216∗∗ −0.315
(-2.269) (1.988) (-1.030)
Δ(B FINSNR) 1.097∗∗ 0.065 1.108∗∗∗
(4.533) (0.583) (4.319)
Adjusted R-squared 0.4050 0.6157 0.3898
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Table 18: The Sovereign CDS equation. This table reports the coeﬃcients and t-statistics for the
panel regression:
Δ(S CDS)k,t = αk,0 + α
′
1 ×Δ(Domestic Government Variables)k,t
+α′2 × (Guarantees)k,t + α′3 ×Δ(Global Variables)t + k,t
Δ(•) and %Δ(•) stand for ﬁrst diﬀerence and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, re-
spectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time. In column III and IV we use the
EDFs as a measure of risk for the banking systems instead of the CDS’s. All equations are estimated
with OLS and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Column V is estimated with 2SLS where the change in central bank
collateralized loans is an instrument for Δ(S CDS).
VARIABLES I II III IV V
INTERCEPT 1.012 0.341 −0.076 −0.805 1.140
(0.359) (0.119) (-0.020) (-0.212) (0.271)
Δ(S IRN REV) −5.550 −5.309 −4.905 −4.694 −6.944∗∗
(-1.088) (-1.046) (-0.816) (-0.791) (-2.182)
S FDEF GDP 0.646 1.067∗∗ 0.053 0.520 3.592∗
(1.223) (2.199) (0.050) (0.538) (1.851)
GUARANTEES 0.399∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗
(4.734) (4.356) (6.502)
Δ(B CDS)*B GDP 0.098∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗
(2.803) (2.862) (2.362)
Δ(B EDF)*B GDP 2.197∗∗∗ 2.305∗∗∗
(9.885) (11.48)
ER3M −46.32∗∗ −50.54∗∗∗ −188.0∗∗∗ −192.5∗∗∗ 189.0∗
(-2.376) (-2.750) (-3.175) (-3.272) (1.939)
VPSPX 1.282∗ 1.391∗∗ 2.448∗∗ 2.572∗∗ −0.286
(1.900) (2.045) (2.038) (2.129) (-0.562)
%Δ5YCMT −12.65 −10.64 −21.03∗ −18.91∗ 5.893
(-1.381) (-1.212) (-1.931) (-1.809) (0.526)
%ΔHY 30.23∗∗∗ 24.46∗∗ 17.78∗∗∗ 12.08∗ 51.54∗∗
(2.874) (2.304) (2.727) (1.855) (2.472)
%ΔIG 24.57∗∗∗ 21.00∗∗∗ 24.69∗∗∗ 21.12∗∗∗ 21.37∗∗∗
(3.839) (3.337) (3.102) (2.723) (2.784)
%Δ(OISUS) −4.735∗∗∗ −3.684∗∗∗ −1.325∗ −0.264 −9.901∗∗
(-3.643) (-2.754) (-1.723) (-0.344) (-2.567)
Adjusted R-squared 0.4029 0.4201 0.2109 0.2284
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Table 19: The Sovereign CDS equation with indices. This table reports the coeﬃcients and
t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ(S CDS)k,t = αk,0 + α
′
1 ×Δ(Domestic Government Variables)k,t + α′2 × (Guarantees)k,t
+α′3 ×Δ(Global Variables)t + α′4 ×Δ(CDS Indices)t + k,t
Δ(•) and %Δ(•) stand for ﬁrst diﬀerence and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, re-
spectively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time. In column III and IV we use the
EDFs as a measure of risk for the banking systems instead of the CDS’s. All equations are estimated
with OLS and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Column V is estimated with 2SLS where the change in central bank
collateralized loans is an instrument for Δ(S CDS).
VARIABLES I II III IV V
INTERCEPT −0.059 −0.374 −3.008 −3.336 4.893∗
(-0.021) (-0.140) (-0.730) (-0.834) (1.678)
Δ(S IRN REV) −5.126 −5.094 −5.554 −5.532 −5.154∗∗
(-1.526) (-1.496) (-1.447) (-1.435) (-2.094)
S FDEF GDP 0.148 0.307 −0.824 −0.649 3.465∗
(0.281) (0.627) (-1.101) (-0.841) (1.816)
GUARANTEES 0.143∗∗ 0.146∗ 0.179∗∗
(2.362) (1.859) (2.128)
Δ(B CDS)*B GDP 0.084∗∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.233∗∗
(2.545) (2.570) (2.374)
Δ(B EDF)*B GDP 1.600∗∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗
(7.522) (7.490)
ER3M 25.52∗ 24.01 14.89 13.18 30.39
(1.697) (1.602) (0.708) (0.640) (0.792)
VPSPX 0.139 0.223 0.746 0.835 −0.685∗
(0.326) (0.549) (1.136) (1.334) (-1.771)
%Δ5YCMT −16.11∗ −15.57∗ −20.68∗∗ −20.13∗ −6.256
(-1.708) (-1.684) (-1.990) (-1.957) (-0.638)
%ΔHY 7.337∗∗ 7.129∗∗ 7.482∗∗∗ 7.303∗∗∗ 9.773∗
(2.456) (2.328) (3.555) (3.424) (1.921)
%ΔIG 3.736 3.870 11.97∗∗ 12.09∗∗ −13.54∗
(0.730) (0.746) (2.426) (2.412) (-1.794)
%Δ(OISUS) −1.883∗∗∗ −1.786∗∗∗ −1.476∗∗ −1.377∗∗ −2.596∗∗
(-3.854) (-3.598) (-2.234) (-2.181) (-2.584)
Δ(S SOVX) 0.843∗∗∗ 0.815∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 0.931∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗
(4.273) (3.918) (3.579) (3.313) (4.059)
Δ(F NONFIN) −0.002 −0.020 −0.100 −0.118∗∗ 0.177
(-0.034) (-0.266) (-1.556) (-1.829) (1.215)
Δ(B FINSNR) −0.213∗ −0.190 0.078 0.101∗ −0.784∗∗∗
(-1.805) (-1.509) (1.339) (1.654) (-2.630)
Adjusted R-squared 0.5274 0.5284 0.4120 0.4128
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Table 20: The Sovereign CDS equation minus the SovX index. This table reports the coeﬃcients
and t-statistics for the panel regression:
Δ(S CDS-S SOVX)k,t = αk,0 + α
′
1 ×Δ(Domestic Government Variables)k,t
+ α′2 × (Guarantees)k,t + α′3 ×Δ(Global Variables)t + k,t
Δ(•) and %Δ(•) stand for ﬁrst diﬀerence and percentage change of the variable over the quarter, respec-
tively. k is the index for countries and t is the index for time. All equations are estimated with OLS and
country ﬁxed eﬀects. In column III and IV we use the EDFs as a measure of risk for the banking systems
instead of the CDS’s. All equations are estimated with OLS and country ﬁxed eﬀects. Column V is
estimated with 2SLS where the change in central bank colleralised loans is an instrument for Δ(S CDS).
VARIABLES I II III IV V
INTERCEPT −1.922 −2.090 −2.597 −2.780 −1.364
(-0.724) (-0.772) (-0.778) (-0.822) (-0.350)
Δ(S IRN REV) −5.516∗ −5.456∗ −5.346 −5.291 −6.943∗∗∗
(-1.762) (-1.753) (-1.415) (-1.412) (-3.687)
S FDEF GDP −0.456 −0.351 −0.854 −0.732 1.945
(-0.863) (-0.640) (-1.271) (-1.111) (1.000)
GUARANTEES 0.100∗∗ 0.106∗∗ 0.137∗∗
(2.445) (2.311) (2.155)
Δ(B CDS)*B GDP 0.070∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.208∗∗
(2.297) (2.307) (2.305)
Δ(B EDF)*B GDP 1.631∗∗∗ 1.659∗∗∗
(10.26) (10.41)
ER3M 112.0∗∗∗ 111.0∗∗∗ 10.62 9.453 328.7∗∗∗
(4.513) (4.475) (0.178) (0.158) (4.178)
VPSPX −0.175 −0.147 0.648 0.679 −1.672∗∗∗
(-0.257) (-0.214) (0.592) (0.615) (-3.296)
%Δ5YCMT −12.44 −11.94 −18.87∗∗ −18.33∗ 3.088
(-1.378) (-1.330) (-1.990) (-1.955) (0.305)
%ΔHY 9.609 8.168 0.581 −0.904 32.78∗
(0.954) (0.816) (0.094) (-0.149) (1.837)
%ΔIG 7.914 7.021 7.533 6.586 7.362
(1.472) (1.327) (1.200) (1.073) (1.055)
%Δ(OISUS) −2.819∗∗ −2.557∗∗ −0.392 −0.117 −8.210∗∗∗
(-2.396) (-2.149) (-0.521) (-0.146) (-2.631)
Adjusted R-squared 0.2392 0.2392 0.0872 0.0872
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assets. Helped by strong credit ratings and an implicit sovereign guarantee, the
banks were able to fund their risky business model through foreign deposits and by
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1 Introduction
The collapse of Iceland’s three largest banks in late September and early October 2008 is
the biggest banking failure relative to the size of an economy in modern history. Financial
crises are of course always easier to spot with the beneﬁt of hindsight, but it is fair to
say that there were many indications that the fall of the Icelandic banking system was
an accident waiting to happen. Not only were commonly used early warning indicators
of banking crises very strong in the case of Iceland, but there had in fact already been
a mini funding crisis in early 2006. In this chapter we list the warning indicators and
document how the Icelandic banks managed to continue their aggressive growth despite
the funding crisis in 2006. Strong reported ﬁnancial key ﬁgures masked the true riskiness
of the Icelandic business model and the extreme concentration risk in the ﬁnancial system.
In addition, investors and rating agencies overestimated the value of potential sovereign
support from a country whose ﬁscal capacity was limited compared with the size of
the banks’ assets. Helped by strong credit ratings and implicit sovereign guarantees,
the banks were able to fund their risky business model through foreign deposits and by
accessing bond markets outside of Europe. While central bank liquidity facilities have
been critical in saving the global banking system, the Icelandic case study also reveals
how such facilities may prolong a crisis, make it deeper and ultimately contribute to a
crash of a ﬂoating exchange rate. The chapter is organised as follows: the next section
describes the severity of the banking crisis, the currency crisis and the public debt crisis.
We then focus on early warning indicators of a ﬁnancial crisis in Iceland. The subsequent
section documents the fact that the focus of regulators and rating agencies on apparently
strong ﬁnancial key ﬁgures downplayed the true riskiness of the banks’ business model.
In the next section we analyse the asset side of the balance sheet and show the extreme
concentration risk in the Icelandic ﬁnancial system. We then document how the banks
were able to fund their risky business model by accessing bond markets, through foreign
deposits and using central bank liquidity facilities. Sovereign support and credit ratings
probably played an important role in this process. We give our conclusion in the ﬁnal
section.
Our analysis is based on a wide range of publicly available statistics and information.
Institutions such as the Central Bank of Iceland (2009a, 2010), the International Mone-
tary Fund (2008b) and the OECD (2009) have also published reports on the crisis in Ice-
land. Verbal reviews can also be found in Fridriksson (2009), Ja¨nna¨ri (2009) and Jo´nsson
(2009). In April 2010, the Icelandic Parliament’s Special Investigation Commission pub-
lished a report on the collapse of the Icelandic banking system (Special Investigation
Commission 2010). The report, which runs to more than 2,000 pages, documents the
fact that the banks did not comply with the domestic laws and regulations, and this may
eventually lead to prosecutions. Although we will describe some questionable business
practices, our focus is mainly on using the data that was available to supervisors or the
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public. We consider only the history up to the collapse in early October 2008.
2. A Triple Crisis in Iceland
As a starting point, we brieﬂy describe the extent of the triple crisis which culminated
in the default of the three largest banks in October 2008. At its peak in March 2008,
the book assets of three banks, Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir, stood at more than
1,000% of GDP (Figure 1).1 The banks maintained branches and subsidiaries in more
than 20 countries, but they focused primarily on Iceland, the UK, Denmark and Norway.
When the three largest banks collapsed, they accounted for around 85% of the Icelandic
banking system. Six months later, when savings and loan funds (Reykjavik Savings Bank
and Icebank) as well as the investment bank Straumur-Burdaras were in ﬁnancial trouble,
more than 90% of the banking system was in wind-up proceedings. The write-downs were
very large. As of October 2008, independent auditors assessed asset values of the three
banks after write-downs to be around 300% of GDP, down from book values of assets
around 835% of GDP. The write-downs as a percentage of assets were 69.4, 65.2 and 54.2
for Kaupthing, Glitnir and Landsbanki, respectively. Write-downs on loans to holding
companies and the banks’ largest customers were the biggest contributors. The share of
non-performing loans was very high compared with other recent systemic banking crises,
as shown in Figure 2. This is, of course, in part due to the fact that the failure of the
Icelandic banks took place during the most serious international ﬁnancial crisis since the
Great Depression.
In addition to the systemic banking crisis, large market pressure to sell assets denom-
inated in the Icelandic kro´na (IKr) put heavy pressure on the currency. Ultimately there
was an eﬀective collapse of the freely ﬂoating exchange rate. The sharp depreciation
posed a risk for the small open economy depending on imports and domestic households
as well as companies with foreign currency denominated loans. The International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) therefore, as part of a rescue package, recommended capital controls
to stabilise the exchange rate at a higher level than determined in the free market. In
Figure 3 we show the drop in the real exchange rate and compare it with other drops in
banking crises after 1990. Later, we will see that the drop in the exchange rate in the
”oﬀshore market”, ie, the market for Icelandic kro´na outside of Iceland, was much larger.
The high gross cost of recapitalising the banking system and future public deﬁcits
will also lead to a strong increase in public sector debt. As seen in Figure 4, the rise in
public sector debt relative to GDP is higher for Iceland than other countries experiencing
1Assets are henceforth measured as consolidated assets, meaning the assets of the parent company
including the assets of foreign subsidiaries (except if mentioned otherwise). The rapid rise in assets
relative to GDP in 2008 was partly caused by the depreciation of the domestic currency relative to the
rise in the domestic price level. The value of foreign currency assets measured in domestic currency is
calculated using the onshore exchange rate, whereas the GDP is measured in current prices. In foreign
currency terms, the three banks’ balance sheets peaked in euro terms at more than 120 billion in Q4
2007. At the same time Iceland’s annual GDP was more than 14 billion.
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Figure 1: Assets of the Icelandic banks
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Book values of assets for the seven largest Icelandic banks from 2003 to Q2 2008. In
Q3-Q4 2008, data is based on information from the accounting ﬁrm Deloitte LLP and the
consulting ﬁrm Oliver Wyman. The values of assets after write-downs are shown in Q4
2008. Source: Consolidated ﬁnancial accounts and the Special Investigation Commission.
Figure 2: Non-performing loans in systemic banking crises
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The highest level of non-performing loans is shown as percentage of total loans during
the years [t, t+5], where t is the initial year of the crisis. In Iceland, the share of non-
performing loans is assessed to be around 50%. FI, Finland; SE, Sweden; MX, Mexico;
BG, Bulgaria; TH, Thailand; KR, Korea; ID, Indonesia; MY, Malaysia; PH, Philippines;
RU, Russia; TR, Turkey; AR, Argentina; IS, Iceland. For example, FI is at 13% in 1991,
which means the peak in non-performing loans in the period from 1991 to 1996 is 13%.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Andersen (2009).
a systemic banking crisis. The Republic of Iceland avoided a sovereign default because
the government had an initial low debt burden and a balanced public budget prior to the
crisis. In terms of non-performing loans, drop in exchange rate and relative increase in
public debt, the Icelandic crisis was arguably the worst triple crisis since 1990.2
3 Early Warning Crisis Indicators
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009) note that ”economists do not have a terribly good idea of what
kinds of events shift conﬁdence and of how to concretely assess conﬁdence vulnerability.
2It is diﬃcult to compare output losses across countries when banking crises reﬂect unsustainable
economic developments before the crises.
106
Figure 3: Real currency drop in systemic banking crises
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The depreciation of the domestic real (onshore) exchange rate is shown. It is measured
as the fall from the peak to the trough. The year of the systemic banking crisis (which
may be diﬀerent from the year of the exchange rate crisis) is shown. Source: Bank for
International Settlements.
Figure 4: Increase in ﬁscal debt in systemic banking crises
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The increase in gross government debt is shown as a percentage of GDP over the period
[t, t+5], where t denotes the starting year of the crisis. The data for Iceland is based
on the Central Bank of Iceland’s 2012 forecast. The year of the systemic banking crisis
(which may be diﬀerent from the year of the sovereign debt crisis) is shown. The net ﬁscal
cost, which includes the recovery proceeds over the same period, is not shown. Source:
Laeven and Valencia (2008) and the Central Bank of Iceland.
What one does see, again and again, in the history of ﬁnancial crises is that when an
accident is waiting to happen, it eventually does”.
While each crisis is diﬀerent, there do exist a number of indicators which signal that a
systemic banking crisis is waiting to happen. Important indicators are a rapid expansion
of the banking system, a private-sector credit boom, a large rise in equity and property
prices, a rapid real exchange rate appreciation in combination with balance sheet mis-
matches in the economy, a large current account deﬁcit and a large external short-term
debt build-up.3 In the sections below, we brieﬂy recall why these indicators are relevant
predictors of banking crises and we document that the indicator levels in the case of
Iceland were exceptionally high compared with both non-crisis and crisis countries.
3See also Borio and Lowe (2002), Bordo and Jeanne (2002), Borio and Drehmann (2009) as well as
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009, 2010).
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3.1 Large Bank Balance Sheets Relative to the Economy
We ﬁrst look at the growth and the size of the Icelandic banks’ balance sheets relative
to the domestic GDP in the years leading up to the crisis. The sizes of the assets are
measured relative to the Icelandic GDP, since around one-third of the banks’ loans were
to Icelandic entities according to the banks’ reported balance sheets.4 Rapid organic
growth can be a signal of problems because it is often accompanied by lower asset quality
(ie, riskier loans) and growth through acquisitions is associated with a risk of overpaying
for assets. The rapid rise in the Icelandic banks’ balance sheets relative to GDP has
been without historical precedent. The banks’ assets expanded from around 100% of
GDP in 2003 to more than 1,000% of GDP by 2008. In the period from 2003 to 2008,
the primary driver behind the expansion of the banks’ balance sheets was the growth
in existing activities (internal growth), whereas external growth through acquisitions
accounted for around 160% ofGDP. The latter was especially pronounced in 2004 and
2005, when Kaupthing acquired the Danish bank FIH Erhvervsbanks and the British
bank Singer & Friedlander, respectively.
The overall size of the banking sector relative to the domestic GDP is also a relevant
indicator, since it may reﬂect the sovereign’s contingent liabilities in times of ﬁnancial
trouble. On this scale, the size of the Icelandic banking system was large but broadly
similar to that of Ireland and Switzerland (Figure 5). The main diﬀerence, however,
was that the large Swiss banks were assessed to be systemically important outside of
Switzerland, as demonstrated, for example, by the liquidity swap facilities in foreign
currency provided by the European Central Bank and the Federal Reserve to the Swiss
National Bank. In contrast, the Icelandic banking system was not assessed as too big to
fail outside of Iceland. Interestingly, the relative size of the Icelandic banking system was
much smaller than in Luxembourg, a country which did not face severe banking problems
in 2008. As shown in Figure 6, the banks’ assets in Luxembourg primarily belonged to
subsidiaries of foreign banks and this may lower the sovereign’s willingness to assist these
banks in the case of ﬁnancial problems. Later we will also see that both Switzerland and
Luxembourg were large net external creditor nations, whereas Iceland was a large net
external debitor.
3.2 Iceland’s Private Sector Credit Boom
The rapid growth of the banks’ assets was partly a result of a rapid expansion of credit to
the private sector in Iceland.5 As with the growth in assets, this is an indicator of lower
marginal asset quality of the banks’ loan portfolios, but deteriorating marginal asset
quality is particularly likely in a small, less diversiﬁed country like Iceland. Domestic
credit provided by deposit money banks to households and companies as well as holding
4That said, the location of the assets is complicated by the fact that the banks lent large sums to
holding companies that operated both in Iceland and outside the country.
5According to stated ﬁnancial reports, around one-third of the banks’ loans were to Icelandic entities.
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Figure 5: Bank assets relative to GDP
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The end-of-year assets of domestically registered banks (excluding assets of foreign sub-
sidiaries) in countries with large banking systems are shown relative to GDP. The three
largest Icelandic banks’ consolidated assets (ie, including the assets of the banks’ foreign
subsidiaries) are shown from 2003 to Q2 2008, since data on the assets of domestically
registered Icelandic banks is only available from Q2 2007. Source: OECD (2009).
Figure 6: Banking systems: the share that is 50% or more foreign
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The capital of the Icelandic banks was domestically owned, whereas the banks in Lux-
embourg were primarily owned by foreigners (year-end 2005 data). IS, Iceland; CH,
Switzerland; UK, United Kingdom; LU, Luxembourg. Source: World Bank.
companies accounted for around 250% of GDP by year-end 2007. In addition, the state-
guaranteed mortgage lender, the HF Fund, provided credit to households for around 40%
of GDP (Figure 7).6 The bank credit expansion to residents in Iceland has been without
historical precedence, as seen in Figure 8, where we see countries with a high amount of
bank credit to GDP.
3.3 A Rapid Rise in Stock Prices and House Prices
A rapid rise in stock prices and house prices is often associated with more collateralised
borrowing, which fuels further increases in asset prices. When the market turns, there
is the danger of a negative price spiral in which collateral value erodes because of forced
6The Housing Financing Fund (the HF Fund) is a residential mortgage lender with an explicit state
guarantee and an objective to support the government’s housing policy.
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Figure 7: Bank and the HF Fund’s credit to the private sector

0
100
200
300
400
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08
% of GDP
HFF credit to households
DMBs' credit to households
DMBs' credit to companies and holding companies
Icelandic deposit money banks’ (DMBs) credit to Icelandic households and companies
(including holding companies) is shown. Credit provided by the Housing Financing Fund
is also shown. Source: The Central Bank of Iceland, OECD and the authors’ calculations.
Figure 8: Bank credit to the private sector
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is shown Figure 7. Source: Fitch Ratings.
asset sales and unwinding of positions. The banks’ lending to the private sector in
Iceland was channelled into the domestic equity market. Remarkably, a large part of
this rise was driven by domestic demand. The Special Investigation Commission (2010)
has documented that the large increase of stock prices until mid-2007 was driven by the
increasing domestic leverage in stock purchases (see also the next section). Foreign capital
was also channelled into the stock market but the foreign ownership was estimated at
only around 10 to 15% in mid-2007 (International Monetary Fund 2007). The Icelandic
stock market benchmark index rose by close to 500% between January 2003 and July
2007, when it peaked with a market capitalisation around 270% of GDP (Figure 9).
The banks’ lending to the private sector in Iceland was also channelled into non-
tradeable sectors, which triggered price and wage inﬂation and thus a general loss of
competitiveness. Real house prices rose by more than 80% over eight years to the peak
in year-end 2007. It was especially pronounced in 2005 after the banks started to expand
their mortgage lending (Figure 7). That said, the rise in house prices in Iceland was
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Figure 9: Stock market performance
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The OMX Iceland 15 (OMXI-15) was the benchmark index based on 15 companies with
the highest market capitalisation. Trading was suspended in the banks on October 6,
2008. Source: Bloomberg.
similar to the rise in other advanced economies (Figure 10).
Figure 10: Real house prices
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Iceland’s real house price inﬂation was comparable with the sharp rises in other developed
economies. Source: OECD.
3.4 Real Exchange Rate Appreciation
Domestic households and companies had large amounts of loans indexed to foreign cur-
rency despite mainly owning krna-denominated assets. This asset-liability mismatch
made households and companies vulnerable to a depreciation of the domestic currency.
The banks’ massive domestic lending to the private sector in Iceland, combined with
investment projects, large wealth eﬀects and tax cuts, resulted in a consumption boom.
This was the main reason why, in order to curb the rise in inﬂation, the Central Bank
of Iceland repeatedly raised its policy rate, which eventually reached double ﬁgures in
early 2006. Inﬂation remained well above its trading partners though. An unfortunate
by-product of the tight monetary policy was the attractiveness of currency carry trading.
The high interest resulted in a massive inﬂow of capital into Iceland as well as further
borrowing in foreign currency by households and companies and a strengthening of the
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real exchange rate relative to its recent trend.7 As shown in Figure 11, the domestic cur-
rency experienced two episodes of rapid appreciation in the years leading up to the crisis.
The inﬂow of capital was of course a by-product of the large current account deﬁcit, as
seen in the next subsection. In mid-2007, it was estimated that foreigners held around
25-30% of the ﬁxed income market (International Monetary Fund 2007). In addition,
there were a large number of other high-yielding instruments available for the currency
carry trader such as krna-denominated Eurobonds, FX swaps, etc. Later in this chapter
we take a closer look at borrowing in foreign currency.
Figure 11: Real eﬀective exchange rate
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The real exchange rate is shown relative to its long-term average (with 2005 as a base
year). Source: Bank for International Settlements.
3.5 A Persistent Current Account Deﬁcit
The consumption spree in Iceland and the strong currency were the main factors behind
the increased demand for foreign goods.8 As of 2006, the current account deﬁcit was
more than 20% of GDP and the largest in the world. It reﬂected a deﬁcit on goods and
services (a trade deﬁcit) and interest rate payments on the country’s external debt (see
the items in Figure 12).9 In 2003-5 interest rate payments to foreigners accounted for
around 2-5% of GDP and they rose to more than 20% in 2008.
A country with a current account deﬁcit is running down its net foreign asset position.
The net international investment position (NIIP), ie, the sum of external assets minus
the stock of external liabilities, for Iceland was -131% of GDP at year-end 2007, as seen
in Figure 13. The negative NIIP increased as a result of the accumulation of current
account deﬁcits and valuation eﬀects on the external assets and debt. Iceland’s high net
debt burden clearly reﬂected an unsustainable position and the economy was vulnerable
7An assessment of the central bank’s interest rate policy is beyond the score of this chapter. See
Special Investigation Commission (2010) for further comments.
8Large investments in aluminium and power also accounted for a part of the deﬁcit. (See also Figure
16.)
9The largest ever quarterly deﬁcit was recorded at 78% of GDP in Q4 2008, fuelled by losses by
Icelandic entities on a foreign exposure (which is registered as a negative dividend and/or retained
earnings).
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Figure 12: A large current account deﬁcit
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Iceland’s current account was constantly in deﬁcit. The current account balance shows
exports and imports of goods and services, together with income and transfers. Source:
The Central Bank of Iceland.
to a sudden capital ﬂow reversal. Macroeconomic theory predicts that countries with a
large negative NIIP should experience a depreciation of real exchange in order to generate
a trade surplus to pay interest rates on the external liabilities. In Iceland, a depreciation
of the currency would have the unfortunate eﬀect of increasing the cost of servicing debt
for households and companies that had loans indexed to foreign currency. We will return
to this point later.
Figure 13: The net international investment position
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Iceland’s net international investment position (NIIP) is the sum of net external debt and
net external equity positions. Assets and liabilities are shown with deposit money banks
(DMBs) undergoing wind-up proceedings after Q3 2008. Source: The Central Bank of
Iceland.
It is common to exclude the net external equity position in the NIIP. Iceland’s net
external debt (the stock of external debt minus the stock of external assets) amounted to
around 230% of GDP at yearend 2007. According to Fitch data, Iceland’s net external
debt was the second highest level in the world (the highest being in Bermuda), whereas
the gross debt was higher in a few other countries (Bahrain, Ireland, Bermuda and Lux-
embourg). Figures 14 and 15 compare debt in Iceland with that in selected countries
with high gross external debt levels.
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Figure 14: Gross external debt as a percentage of GDP
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Source: Fitch Ratings.
Figure 15: Net external debt as a percentage of GDP
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Net external debt position of the countries shown in Figure 14. Source: Fitch Ratings.
3.6 A High Amount of Short-term External Debt
Rolling over short-term debt in foreign currency exposes the banks to funding risk in for-
eign exchange markets. Iceland’s gross external debt (liabilities of residents to foreigners)
reached around 520% of GDP in year-end 2007, while Icelandic deposit money banks ac-
counted for around 455% of GDP.10 After the onset of the global credit crisis in 2007, the
banks’ share of short-term external debt rose sharply, as seen in Figure 16. This reveals
the large exposure of the banks’ parent companies to potential foreign exchange funding
liquidity risk. The banks’ external short-term debt covers deposits in foreign branches
and loans, where repurchase agreements are treated as loans. We return to Iceland’s
short-term external debt later.
10Gross external debt is the stock of all debt of residents to non-residents. In 2008, a large part of the
increase relative to GDP can be attributed to depreciation of the kro´na relative to the domestic price
level (see the explanation in footnote 1).
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Figure 16: Gross external debt
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DMBs accounted for the majority of Iceland’s gross external debt (according to parent
company data). Short-term debt is deﬁned as an original maturity of less than one year.
The banks’ liabilities being wound up are shown separately after Q3 2008. Direct invest-
ments are included in the ”others” component. Source: The Central Bank of Iceland.
3.7 The Mini Crisis of Early 2006
The strong economic imbalances, almost all of which were public knowledge, were not
ignored by the markets. In late 2005 and early 2006, doubts about the Icelandic banks’
business models began to emerge. Market participants were worried about the banks’
growth pace and their underlying asset quality, the high dependence on bond ﬁnancing
in the European market and their low deposit base as well as cross-shareholding be-
tween the banks themselves and between banks and major ﬁnancial undertakings. In
February 2006, the rating agency Fitch changed the outlook from stable to negative on
the sovereign, stating that it had been ”triggered by a material deterioration in Iceland’s
macro-prudential risk indicators, accompanied by an unsustainable current account deﬁcit
and soaring net external indebtedness.” In March 2006, doubts over Icelandic vulnera-
bilities turned into fears. Merrill Lynch’s (2006) banking report stated ”we think the
banks should be compared less with other European banks and more with emerging mar-
ket banks, since the systemic risks we see in Iceland have much more in common with
emerging markets. Danske Bank’s (2006) macro report stated ”we look at early warning
indicators for ﬁnancial crises and conclude that Iceland looks worse on almost all mea-
sures than Thailand did before its crisis in 1997, and only moderately more healthy than
Turkey before its 2001 crisis.
The negative ”publicity” resulted in a re-evaluation of the risk associated with the
Icelandic banking system. Access to the European bond markets eﬀectively closed and
several money market funds refused to roll over the banks’ extendable notes in March
2006 (see, for example, The Times 2006). It resulted in a signiﬁcant downward pressure
on the currency and equity market as well as wider credit default swap (CDS) spreads
on the banks.11 It was named the mini crisis of 2006. But why did this mini crisis not
11The depreciation of the kro´na sparked an unwinding of the currency carry trades around the world,
for instance in the high-yielding New Zealand dollar. In fact, the kro´na achieved the nickname ”the
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grow into a much more severe crisis? It is hard to document econometrically, but there is
certainly evidence to suggest that reassurances from diﬀerent sources played a large role.
Reports from other investment banks pointed to an overreaction towards credit fears in
Iceland, and Moody’s (2006) issued a special comment in April with the title ”Iceland’s
Solvency and Liquidity Are Not at Risk” stating Iceland is well positioned to deal with any
potential claims on government resources that might emanate from a systemic problem
in any sector of the economy. Our Aaa rating for Iceland is compatible with such an
extreme scenario. Furthermore, a strong counterattack was provided in a report by
Herbertsson and Mishkin (2006), sponsored by the Iceland Chamber of Commerce. The
report analysed a few early warning crisis indicators in Iceland. In particular, the focus
was on the very low net government debt relative to GDP as well as the banks’ (moderate)
exposure to Icelandic households and businesses. In the words of the authors: ”our
analysis indicates that the sources of ﬁnancial instability that triggered ﬁnancial crisis
in emerging market countries in recent years are just not present in Iceland, so that
comparisons of Iceland with emerging market countries are misguided. They concluded
that the probability of an emerging-market-style ﬁnancial crisis was very low in light of
Iceland’s developed economy and ﬂoating exchange rate. That said, they also mentioned
the risk of a self-fulﬁlling prophecy by investors pulling away from Icelandic exposure en
masse.
After reviewing the Mishkin report, Morgan Stanley (2006) analysts, for example,
concluded that there was no risk of a ﬁnancial crisis in Iceland and recommended investing
in Tier 1 capital of the banks. It is diﬃcult to establish a direct causal link, but the banks’
CDS spreads subsequently narrowed and the mini crisis ended in May 2006. It did have
some lasting eﬀects, however. The CDS spreads on the Icelandic banks stabilised at a
higher level than on other Nordic banks. Also, in response to the international criticism,
the Icelandic banks decided to diversify their funding mix: a strategy made possible by
the banks’ relatively strong credit ratings (see the next section). Furthermore, the banks
tried to scale down their opaque cross-ownership structures.
It is interesting to note that, at the time of the mini-crisis in early 2006, market
participants were concerned that the size of the three banks stood at between ﬁve and
six times GDP and the banks’ gross external debt at three times GDP. At the time of
the collapse in 2008, these two ﬁgures had, in fact, doubled.
4 How can Bank Fundamentals look sound despite
Problems?
In this section we take a closer look at arguments behind the high ratings assigned to the
three largest Icelandic banks. We focus on Moody’s setup, since Standard & Poor’s only
canary in the coal mine”, as a sell-oﬀ in the kro´na signalled investors’ elevated risk aversion in the
currency markets.
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rated one of the banks and Fitch consistently rated the banks ’A’ in the period from 2003
to 2007. Moody’s bank senior debt and deposit rating is a function of the ”bank ﬁnancial
strength rating” (BFSR), reﬂecting an opinion of a bank’s stand-alone ﬁnancial strength
relative to other rated banks globally, and an assessment of the degree of sovereign or
other support in the event of ﬁnancial distress. A bank’s ﬁnal credit rating may thus be
higher than its BFSR. Moody’s BFSR scorecard assigns equal weighting to quantitative
ﬁnancial fundamentals and qualitative indicators in mature markets like Iceland. Figure
17 shows Moody’s (2007b) assessment of fundamental and qualitative indicators for the
Icelandic banks in November 2007. Iceland’s overall credit risk assessment was less benign
than their average Nordic peers, but it did not signal any immediate cause for concern. In
the sections below, we investigate in detail Moody’s assessment of quantitative ﬁnancial
fundamentals and qualitative indicators, as well as sovereign support factors.
Figure 17: Moody’s stand-alone assessment of the Icelandic banking

Moody’s assessment of the banks’ quantitative and qualitative fundamentals in Icelandic
and in the Nordic region. Quantitative ﬁnancial fundamentals are proﬁtability, capi-
tal, liquidity, eﬃciency and asset quality, whereas qualitative fundamentals are franchise
value, risk positioning and regulatory as well as operating environment. Source: Moody’s
(2007b).
4.1 Window Dressing Quantitative Financial Fundamentals
Moody’s ﬁve factors behind ﬁnancial quantitative fundamentals are asset quality, prof-
itability, total capital, liquidity and eﬃciency. At ﬁrst sight, traditional indicators of
these factors for the Icelandic banks were relatively favourable right up to the crash of
the banking system. How could this happen? Below, we address this question for all
factors except ”eﬃciency”, which plays a smaller role in assessing the risk of bank fail-
ure. In summary, we argue that Moody’s indicators of ”asset quality” were based on the
banks’ (backward-looking) loan loss reserves and therefore did not capture the deteriorat-
ing asset quality. Inadequate loan loss reserves inﬂated proﬁtability, and total capital was
grossly exaggerated because of overestimation of asset value and failure to account for
”weak capital”, ie, bank-funded purchases of their own stocks. ”Liquidity” was based on
the banks’ own estimates which, similar to banks in other countries, failed to account for
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the drastic dry-up in market liquidity during the crisis. In Iceland, the banks were also
dependent on smoothly functioning foreign exchange markets. Some of these issues were
problems of rating methodology and an over-reliance on ﬁgures reported by the banks
themselves. Others, such as the problem with ”weak capital”, point to a weakness in
ﬁnancial supervision which, for example, should have detected the extent of weak capital.
Remarkably modest Problem Loans
In 2006 and 2007, the three banks’ average loan loss reserves for future asset quality
deteriorations were less than 1% of the gross outstanding loans. These tracked the banks’
historical strong credit performance. The amount of reported problem loans, ie, the sum
of doubtful and non-performing loans, was broadly in line with their Nordic peers. As
shown in Figure 18, the number of problem loans was in fact lower in 2005-8 than in
2003-4. The implementation of the new accounting standard explains the decline in loan
loss reserves in 2004-5: the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), which
applied to Icelandic banks from 2005, required the banks to recognise loan loss reserves
only after a loss or trigger event was identiﬁed. However, the drastic write-downs in asset
values after the collapse suggest that there must also have been misreporting of loan
performance. To quote the Special Investigation Commission (2010): When the banks
collapsed there was an inevitable and signiﬁcant reduction in the value of their assets.
It is, however, the Commission’s ﬁnding that the quality of loan portfolios had started to
erode at least 12 months before the collapse and continued to erode until the collapse, even
though this was not reported in the banks’ ﬁnancial statements. The same commission
reports that loan ”renegotiations” had been common for large loans in order to avoid the
need to report them as non-performing.
Figure 18: Problem loans and loan loss reserves
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The average share of loan loss reserves made by the three banks. Problem loans are
deﬁned as the sum of doubtful and non-performing loans. Source: Moody’s.
Reported High Returns on Equity
According to their published ﬁnancial statements, the Icelandic banks appeared to be
very proﬁtable despite the high capital ratios. The average return on equity (ROE) was
higher than in the rest of the Nordic region, as can be seen in Figures 17 and 19. Ex
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post, it is clear that the high ROE was boosted by the insuﬃcient loan loss reserves and
insuﬃcient recognition of problem loans.
Figure 19: Icelandic banks’ return on book value of equity
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Returns are based on reported net income (period end). Returns for H1 2008 areannu-
alised. Source: Moody’s.
Capital Ratios and Leverage
The reported regulatory capital ratios stated by the Icelandic banks placed them among
the best-capitalised banks in the world. Although an International Monetary Fund (2009)
study documents that the capital ratios for eventually failing banks before 2008 were
higher than for non-failing banks, high capital ratios are normally associated with ﬁnan-
cial robustness. As seen in Figure 20, the Icelandic banks’ average total capital ratio was
around 13% in the period between 2003 and mid-2007. In 2008, it dropped slightly but
remained well above the statutory minimum requirements at 8% (ie, the total capital
base divided by risk-weighted assets). The banks had internal targets of total capital
ratios of 10-11%. If we trust that assets were worth par, as recorded by the Icelandic
banks (which certainly was not the case), the leverage ratio on the total capital base
was around 12. The ratio of asset to shareholder equity was around 17 and the ratio
of asset to shareholder equity minus intangible assets was around 26. Hence, the banks’
leverage, which is not inﬂuenced by the banks’ reported risk-weighted assets, appeared to
be moderate. The average Tier 1 capital, which is closest to equity but includes hybrid
capital, was also relatively high. In the next section, we will consider underestimation of
risk when the banks computed risk-weighted assets. Below, we focus on the low quality
of the banks’ reported capital.
After the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis, the banks extended their direct loans with
collateral in their own shares and raised the positions of forward contracts on their own
shares. The direct ﬁnancing by the banks of their own shares can be called ”weak equity”
(Special Investigation Commission 2010). In Figure 21 we see the weak equity relative to
the total capital. In mid-2008, it represented around 25% of the combined capital base
or more than 50% of the core capital (total capital base excluding subordinated loans).
Cross-ﬁnancing in stocks between the banks peaked in 2007. If we include cross-ﬁnancing
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Figure 20: Total capital ratios and Tier 1 capital
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The Icelandic regulators allowed Tier 1 capital to include up to 33% of hybrid capital.Weak
equity is deﬁned as the direct ﬁnancing by the banks of their own shares. Total capital is
measured as Tier 1 capital plus subordinated loans excluding hybrid core capital. RWAs
are reported by the banks. Source: Moody’s and the Special Investigation Committee.
in the ”weak equity” measure, it amounted to around 34% of total capital and more than
70% of core capital in mid-2008.
Figure 21: Total capital of the three banks
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The total capital base of the three Icelandic banks was around 83% of GDP in Q2 2008.
Subordinated debt represented around 53% of the capital base. The banks’ direct ﬁnanc-
ing by the banks of their own shares and cross-ﬁnancings of shares accounted for around
34% of the capital base. Equity based on annual accounts minus the above-mentioned
deductions accounted for the remaining 13% of the capital base. Source: The Special
Investigation Commission.
It is also interesting to take a close look at the banks’ leverage. The leverage on
book equity minus all deductions (own and cross-ﬁnancing equity ﬁnancing as well as
subordinated debt) stood around 85 in mid-2008, as seen in Figure 22. Therefore, the de
facto equity cushion of the banks did not oﬀer much protection to the banks’ creditors.
In fact, the banks had reduced their economic capital without it being apparent in their
balance sheets.
Prudential supervision by the Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority would have
required that loans exclusively secured with the banks’ shares were subtracted from the
capital. In Figure 20 we see that this factor alone would have pulled capital towards the
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Figure 22: Leverage of the three banks
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The banks’ real leverage based on diﬀerent measures of capital, which are deﬁned in Figure
21. Leverage is deﬁned as assets divided by equity. Source: The Special Investigation
Commission and the authors’ calculations.
8% statutory minimum requirement in mid-2008 (for Landsbanki the ratio was below the
8% ratio in mid-2007). In addition, individual capital requirement for the banks should
have been raised on the back of the higher risks associated with the banks’ investment
banking activities and the elevated risk of an economic downturn in Iceland (and thus
higher loan losses). Stricter capital rules are allowed within the Basel II rules.
Future bank regulation is likely to partly address the issue. The Basel III bank reg-
ulation proposes raising the quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base as
well as promoting the stability of the ﬁnancial system as a whole. In the words of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009): The reforms strengthen bank-level, or
microprudential, regulation, which will help raise the resilience of individual banking in-
stitutions to periods of stress. The reforms also have a macroprudential focus, addressing
system wide risks that can build up across the banking sector as well as the procyclical
ampliﬁcation of these risks over time. Clearly these two micro and macroprudential ap-
proaches to supervision are interrelated, as greater resilience at the individual bank level
reduces the risk of system wide shocks. Micro-prudential capital requirements would have
excluded the Icelandic banks’ subordinated capital in the calculations of Tier 1 capital.
Furthermore, macro-prudential capital requirements would have been raised in the light
of the three banks’ contribution to systemic risk in the economy. The capital requirements
would have been very high given the three banks’ systemic importance in the economy.
Satisfactory liquidity positions
The Icelandic banks’ reported maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities was not
extensive relative to other global banks. The maturity proﬁle of the banks’ assets and lia-
bilities is illustrated in Figure 23. In addition to the liquid assets shown, the banks’ longer
term asset portfolio and undrawn committed credit facilities were important sources of
liquidity. Following the mini crisis of early 2006, the Icelandic banks decided to have
liquidity policies that ensured suﬃcient liquid funds if the banks were unable to access
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capital markets or interbank markets over at least the next 12 months (but with an as-
sumption of stable deposits). As of year-end 2007, the Icelandic banks reported that they
passed Moody’s 12-month liquidity test even with a partial run on retail and corporate
deposits.
Figure 23: Short-term versus long-term assets and liabilities
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The banks’ reported maturities of assets and liabilities. Assets are shown as positive
and liabilities as negative numbers. The black line shows the diﬀerence between assets
and liabilities with a maturity of less than one year. Deposits are shown as short-term
liabilities even though they are typically not required to be repaid in a short period of
time. Source: annual and interim reports.
Banks may pledge securities (like government bonds and other related securities) as
collateral in return for central banks, investment banks and money market funds providing
short-term funding (see also the penultimate section). Also, committed lines of credit
can in principle be drawn up to their maximum. In reality, however, lines of credit
are not totally committed liquidity insurance. In Iceland, many of the credit lines were
contingent upon a minimum credit rating (Moody’s Baa2). Furthermore, the liquidity
facility provider to the Icelandic banks was often allowed to set the yield on the loans
according to quotes in the CDS market (Special Investigation Commission 2010). The
main risks for the Icelandic banks were that creditors would not roll over the debt (or
reﬁnance at much wider credit spreads) and repo lenders as well as trading counterparties
required more collateral before long-term assets fully matured. Ex post, it was evident
that the banks severely underestimated funding liquidity risk in foreign currency, but
this problem was not unique to the Icelandic banks. Furthermore, the banks’ reported
liquidity pools, like the sale of bonds and subsidiaries of the banks, turned out to be very
diﬃcult to monetise in a distressed market environment.
4.2 Qualitative Fundamentals below their Nordic Peers
We now turn to Moody’s assessment of the Icelandic banks’ qualitative factors: franchise
value, regulatory environment and operating environment, as well as risk positioning. The
ﬁrst three factors were assessed as ”moderate” but with the banks’ risk position having a
low score. Moody’s ”franchise value” consists of an assessment of four sub-factors: mar-
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ket share and sustainability, geographical diversiﬁcation, earnings stability and earnings
diversiﬁcation. The banks’ earnings were considered unstable, as economic stability was
assessed to be more volatile in Iceland (exacerbated by large macroeconomic imbalances).
That said, the loan portfolio was judged to be partly diversiﬁed, as foreign operations
of the banks accounted for a growing share of the total assets. Icelandic regulation
and enforcement of regulation was not a cause for concern for the credit rating agencies
since it was in line with Basel and EU regulation. Furthermore, the level of corruption
was very low. Moody’s ”risk positioning” score consists of an assessment of corporate
governance, controls and risk management, ﬁnancial reporting transparency, credit risk
concentration, liquidity management and market risk appetite. Moody’s considered the
overall ”risk positioning” score to be low. The banks’ credit scores on qualitative and
quantitative fundamentals in the ”polygon” (Figure 17) can be used to understand the
BFSR by year-end 2007.
4.3 The Icelandic banks’ way in to the Aaa League
It is illustrative to take a closer look at Moody’s rating of Kaupthing, the largest of
the three Icelandic banks, over time (Figure 24). The ratings of the two other Icelandic
banks broadly followed the same pattern. Prior to 2003, Kaupthing had been an unrated
investment bank, but as the bank merged with the Icelandic retail bank, Bu´nadarbanki
slands (”the agricultural bank”) it received a long-term deposit and debt A3 credit rating
from Moody’s. Later it was upgraded to A2 by Moody’s to ”reﬂect ... the bank’s suc-
cessful execution of the merger of the two predecessor entities in May 2003, resulting in a
well diversiﬁed and dominant market player with healthy ﬁnancial fundamentals.” After
the acquisition of Danish FIH Erhvervsbanks, where consolidated assets approximately
doubled, the bank was upgraded to A1 to ”reﬂect ... the bank’s leading position in its
domestic market in Iceland, the fact that it is one of the country’s largest institutions,
and its healthy ﬁnancial fundamentals.” In 2005, Kaupthing acquired the London-based
investment bank Singer & Friedlander. Moody’s A1 rating reﬂected the strong likelihood
of state support in the event of systemic shock, with the BFSR remaining unchanged at
A2. In fact, the stand-alone rating was downgraded to A3 in the second half of 2006.
In February 2007, Moody’s (2007a,c) incorporated additional ﬁnancial support into
its bank ratings trough its joint-default analysis (JDA). The Icelandic banks were thus
temporarily upgraded to Aaa. A reﬁnement of its bank rating methodology in April
2008 modiﬁed ratings to Aa3 after heavy criticism of the JDA. Each of the banks thus
”only” received a three-notch uplift in its debt/deposit ratings from its stand-alone credit
rating. Moody’s justiﬁcation for the new Aa3 rating of the banks was explained in
its publication on the Icelandic banking system outlook. To quote Moody’s (2008a):
Each bank individually accounts for at least 25% of the system. We believe that the
default of any one of these three banks would pose a substantial risk to the Icelandic
economy, the consequences of which would be far greater than the cost of rescuing a failing
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Figure 24: Kaupthing’s credit rating
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Kaupthing’s credit rating partly reﬂected sovereign support factors. Moody’s stand-alone
credit rating (BFSR/BCA) was below the senior unsecured rating. Data observations are
monthly. Moody’s bank ﬁnancial strength rating (BFSR) is translated to a baseline credit
assessment (BCA). Source: Bloomberg and Moody’s.
bank. Therefore, in Moody’s judgment, there is a very high probability that the Icelandic
authorities would support each of the rated banks in a period of ﬁnancial distress. Hence,
the Icelandic banks were rated as if the sovereign was able to bail them out in a worst
case scenario. We return to the sovereign support issue in the penultimate section.
The rating agencies were not alone in giving a positive review of Icelandic banks. In
November 2007, Baldursson and Portes (2007) issued a report, again sponsored by the
Iceland Chamber of Commerce, which was even more optimistic than the credit rating
agencies. In their assessment: ”The banks have negligible exposure to the US subprime
market, structured ﬁnance products, and related ﬁnancial vehicles that have hit many ﬁ-
nancial institutions hard recently. Most fundamental, the banks exploit strong competitive
advantage, arising from their entrepreneurial management, ﬂat management structures,
and unusual business models. Yet in spite of their strong performance, Icelandic banks
have lower ratings than their Nordic peers, and a much higher risk premium is being
placed on their debt during the present turmoil. We see no justiﬁcation for this in their
risk exposure. This suggests that either the markets are not fully aware of their situation
or markets place a country premium on the banks.” In the next section we will take a
look at the ﬁnancial markets’ view on the Icelandic banks relative to their credit ratings.
4.4 Low Market-implied Credit Rating
Was the market better than credit ratings at capturing the risks of the Icelandic banking
system? The answer depends on whether we consider equity, bond or CDS markets’
assessment. Equity-implied credit ratings, based on the performance of the equity using
Moody’s KMV expected default frequency measure, were not factoring in immediate
ﬁnancial distress for the Icelandic banks in 2008 (see Kaupthing’s implied rating in Figure
25).12 As previously noted, the banks’ market capitalisation was an unreliable indicator
12See Moody’s (2010) on market implied credit ratings.
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of the true valuation. In fact, the Special Investigation Commission (2010) documents
manipulation of stock values.
Figure 25: Kaupthing’s market-implied credit rating
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Kaupthing’s CDS-implied credit rating was lower than the oﬃcial rating. Moody’s CDS-
implied ratings are derived from ﬁve-year CDS quotes. For further information please
Moody’s (2010). Data observations are monthly. Source: Bloomberg and Moody’s.
It was more diﬃcult for the banks to inﬂuence the CDS market directly. CDS-implied
ratings, ie, ratings implied from CDS spreads, were much lower than senior unsecured
ratings and ratings based on equity prices. Since CDS spreads tend to move in tandem
with credit spreads on bonds, it is not surprising that the bond-implied rating was similar
to the CDS-implied rating. The interesting observation is that worries about the asset
quality of Icelandic banks and doubts on the sovereign support spurred a demand for
credit protection. Hedge-fund speculation may also have contributed to a further widen-
ing of the CDS spreads. Furthermore, as seen in Figure 26, the term structures of CDS
spreads for the three major banks started to invert in the autumn of 2007: a typical sign
that the market is worried that the issuer may face ﬁnancial distress. In summary, the
CDS markets and the ratings derived from CDS spreads were the perhaps the clearest
early warning signals of the banking crisis.
Figure 26: Term structures of CDS spreads
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Term structure is measured as the ﬁve-year senior CDS spread minus the one-year senior
CDS spread. Source: CMA DataVision/Bloomberg.
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5. The Banks’ Asset Quality
In this section we take a closer look at the banks’ asset composition and quality. In
summary, several factors contributed to the decline in asset quality. The rapid expansion
of the banking book, which covers loans to the corporate sector and individuals, in itself
indicated a deteriorating asset quality. In addition, many Icelandic customers had loans
denominated in foreign currency and they were therefore vulnerable to a depreciation
of the Icelandic krna. The corporate loan book was of course sensitive to a downturn
in the Icelandic and international economy, but the banks were particularly sensitive to
such a downturn because they were also heavily exposed to listed and unlisted domestic
equities. Finally, the banks had weak corporate governance and a high concentration of
risk in their loan portfolios. Below, we take a closer look at the composition of the banks’
assets shown in Figure 27.
Figure 27: The three Icelandic banks’ assets
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Composition of the three largest banks’ assets. Loans to corporations and holding com-
panies were the largest item on the banks’ balance sheets. Further items include loans
to individuals, trading assets and cash and interbank loans. The item ”other” measures
all other assets not included in the aforementioned categories. Source: Bloomberg and
interim accounts.
5.1 Loans to the Corporate Sector rising sharply
The biggest item on the banks’ balance sheet was corporate loans, whose share of total
lending was approximately 83% in 2007-8. The banks’ large volume of loans to the cor-
porate sector was in part driven by the reliance on the simplest approach to assessing
the risk-weighted assets in the banking book (the so-called ”standardised approach” in
the Basel II framework) rather than the development of their own internal rating-based
models (IRBs). In the standardised approach, each group of customers has a ﬁxed capi-
tal charge per unit of exposure in the calculations of risk-weighted assets (20% to 150%
depending on the credit assessment). A well-known weakness in this framework is that
banks have an incentive to exploit the risk weights and acquire the riskiest corporate
assets. This seems to have been the case in Iceland. An example is the Icelandic banks’
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acquisition and leveraged ﬁnance (ALF) portfolios. The banks were rather open about
their exposures, with Glitnir noting in its oﬃcial securities note document: we have ex-
posure to credit risk related to acquisition ﬁnance loans, which typically involve higher
degrees of leverage than general corporate borrowing and make these borrowers more ex-
posed to increases in interest rates and downturns in the economy. Glitnir reported that
the leveraged loan portfolio accounted for approximately 9.2% of its total loan portfolio
as of Q2 2008.
For Kaupthing, the ALF portfolio was reported to represent 17% of its customers’
loans at the end of Q2 2008. Before the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis, the Icelandic
banks expanded into new markets where there was already ﬁerce competition. The banks
saw the expansion outside of Iceland as a way to diversify their loan portfolios and improve
their credit ratings. In Figure 28 we see that around two-thirds of the banks’ loans were to
outside of Iceland in 2008. The competition for loans to customers, however, prohibited
the Icelandic banks, which faced a larger credit spread, from charging a higher credit-
risk premium than their global competitors. To quote the chief economist of Kaupthing,
Jo´nsson (2009): the three Icelandic banks could pass the premium on to their domestic
clients, but that option did not exist with foreign clients, who might be lost to banks of
other nations.
Figure 28: Loans within Iceland and outside
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Icelandic bank loans were split between approximately one-third inside Iceland and two-
third outside of Iceland. Source: Consolidated balance sheets.
The Icelandic banks’ relatively strong liquidity positions subsequent to the mini crisis
in 2006 made the banks better prepared for the onset of global ﬁnancial crisis in mid-2007
than many other international banks. In fact, the Icelandic banks saw the global ﬁnancial
crisis as a way to capture market shares from their competitors. This explains why the
Icelandic banks continued to expand their balance sheets even as the global crisis started
in mid-2007 (Figure 27). In August 2007, Kaupthing also announced its intention to
acquire the Dutch merchant bank NIBC, which would have increased Kaupthing’s balance
sheet by two-thirds.13 In fact, lending to foreign parties increased by more than 100%
13Nevertheless, the announcement backﬁred, with a sharp widening in CDS spreads on the bank to
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of Iceland’s GDP within a year. In the words of the Special Investigation Commission
(2010): The increase was so substantial that it can be assumed that many of these new
clients had turned to the Icelandic banks after other banks were beginning to slow their
lending, and that these clients had thus been rejected by other banks. The Icelandic banks
thus lent substantial amounts while experiencing considerable liquidity problems at the
same time.
In Iceland, the banking system extended its total lending to the domestic corporate
sector to more than 170% of GDP by year-end 2007 (Figure 29). In particular, lending to
holding companies grew rapidly in the second half of 2007. The banks were also lending
for stock purchases and often took domestic stocks as collateral.14 Loans collateralised
with equities increased the banks’ exposure to (indirect) market liquidity risk in case
the borrower was unable to fulﬁl the loan contract. As the crisis struck in Iceland,
the collateral sales related to contractual margin calls increased and this resulted in
a downward pressure on equity prices. The Special Investigation Commission (2010)
documents that these margin calls were abandoned, as the banks were reluctant to realise
credit losses on the loan portfolio and start a ﬁre sale in the domestic equity market.
Figure 29: The banks’ lending to companies and holding companies in Iceland

0
100
200
300
Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08
% of GDP
Other
ISK non-indexed
FX
ISK indexed
These loans were primarily denominated or indexed to foreign exchange rates. Source:
The Central Bank of Iceland.
The double-digit interest rates from early 2006 in Iceland (and a stable currency)
increased the incentive for the Icelandic companies to ﬁnance themselves in foreign low-
interest-rate currencies. Approximately 70-75% of bank loans to corporations were foreign
exchange linked, which was an important indirect credit risk for the Icelandic banks. The
banks were fully hedged against currency risk but their customers were left with open
foreign-currency exposure. The banks had fewer assets than liabilities denominated in
800-1,000 basis points. In January 2008, Kaupthing made a statement that the proposed acquisition of
NIBC was abandoned. Ironically, NIBC had accepted losses due to exposure to subprime mortgages,
whereas Kaupthing had not accepted upcoming losses on its loan portfolio.
14According to the Central Bank of Iceland (2008) around 13% of the parent banks’ total lending to
customers was against share collateral at the end of 2007. At year-end 2007, 39% of the shares used as
collateral for loans were listed on the OMX Exchange in Iceland (and valued at nearly 17% of the total
year-end market value).
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foreign currency, which implied a short (spot) position in foreign exchange market (Figure
30). Without hedging, a depreciation of the domestic currency would deteriorate the
banks’ capital adequacy ratios. However, the banks hedged themselves against such a
depreciation with a long foreign currency position through derivatives (currency swaps,
etc). In fact, the banks not only were protected against a depreciation of the Icelandic
kro´na, but they also used derivatives to increase their open long foreign exchange position
in order to gain on a depreciation of the kro´na.15 The net positive foreign exchange
balance was around 40% of GDP at year-end 2007, partly reﬂecting the fact that the
banks’ customers had short foreign exchange positions.
Figure 30: The banks’ spot and forward positions
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The banks had fewer assets than liabilities denominated in foreign currency (equivalent
to a short foreign exchange position). However, the banks established a long foreign
exchange position through forward and currency swaps. Hence, their overall net open
position was long foreign exchange. Source: The Central Bank of Iceland.
A part of the Icelandic corporate sector’s foreign exchange risk was naturally hedged,
but the majority of the companies were still dependent on kro´na earnings to repay the debt
and interest rate payments in foreign currency. In the event of a sharp depreciation of the
domestic currency, it could easily result in loan losses on the asset side of the banks if the
underlying borrower was unable to repay the larger foreign-exchange-denominated debt.
In Iceland, the foreign-currency-indexed debt of the corporate sector was substantially
higher than in other systemic banking and currency crises (Figure 31). With the sharp
depreciation of the Icelandic currency in 2008, the majority of the ﬁrms in Iceland were
technically bankrupt. This was also the case in Thailand in the late 1990s.
5.2 Loans to the household sector in Iceland
Loans to individuals in Iceland constituted a smaller part of the banks’ balance sheets.
The three banks entered the Icelandic mortgage market in Q3 2004, when they started
competing aggressively with the state-supported HF Fund (which used to be the domi-
nant player in the retail mortgage sector). This competition set the foundations for an
15In fact, ”hedging” gains were a primary driver behind the banks’ reported proﬁts in 2008.
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Figure 31: Foreign-currency denominated debt of the corporate sector
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Foreign-currency-denominated (or indexed) debt of the corporate sector in countries fac-
ing ﬁnancial crises. The data was collected prior to the systemic banking crisis. KR,
Republic of Korea; BR, Brazil; AR, Argentina; TH, Thailand; IS, Iceland. Source: Rosen-
berg et al (2005) and the Central Bank of Iceland.
underpricing of risk, since the banks would never be able to oﬀer competitive interest
against a state-sponsored institution over an extended period of time (the HF Fund’s
interest rate set the lower bound, as seen in Figure 32). The banks gained a competitive
edge against the government guarantee by granting more liberal criteria for mortgages,
eg, attractive loan-to-value ratios (OECD 2009). This resulted in households reﬁnancing
their mortgages and switching to the banks. Hence, the HF Fund’s lending relative to
GDP fell sharply (Figure 33).
Figure 32: Real interest rates on indexed housing loans
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Real interest rates on inﬂation-indexed housing loans set by the three largest banks and
the Housing Financing Fund. The state-supported HF Fund’s interest rate set the lower
bound for interest rates in Iceland. Source: The Central Bank of Iceland.
As the HF Fund oﬀered domestic currency loans only (indexed to the consumer price
index), the banks later promoted low-interest foreign-currency loans. This resulted in
a sharply increasing share of foreign-currency-indexed loans to households (around 15%
of GDP in 2008). As with corporate loans, the foreign-currency lending was an indirect
credit risk for the banks, as few households would have a natural hedge against a sharp
depreciation of the domestic exchange rate. The banks’ lending to the Icelandic household
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Figure 33: Figure 33 Domestic banks and HF Fund lending to households
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dexed to the foreign exchange rate and others. The HF Fund provided only inﬂation-
indexed loans. Source: The Central Bank of Iceland.
sector reached slightly more than 100% of GDP or 200% of disposable income by year-
end 2007, as seen in Figures 33 and 34. It is a rather large amount, but it was partly
mitigated by relatively modest loan-to-value ratios. It suggests that the fall in Icelandic
house prices in 2007-8 was not the primary culprit of the banking crisis in Iceland, since
there were relatively stringent loan-to-value ratios on mortgage loans to the household
sector (see also Table 1).16
Figure 34: Household debt as a percentage of disposable income

0
50
100
150
200
250
300
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
%
Denmark
Iceland
Unites States
Spain
Household debt as a percentage of disposable income (before interest payments) Source:
OECD.
5.3 The Banks’ Trading Assets were larger than those of their
Peers
In the period 2003-8, the three banks’ trading portfolios accounted for 15-16% of total
assets on average (Figure 27). The main part of the marketable securities was in the
16Nonetheless, with a 90% loan to-value on a marginal mortgage, the bank naturally starts to lose
money when prices fall by more than 10% (if margin calls are impossible, eg, due to a very high debt
service). As of June 2009, the Central Bank of Iceland (2009b) assessed that only around 2.5% of
homeowners had both a negative equity position and a heavy debt service.
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Table 1: Loan-to-value ratio of mortgage loans
The banks’ reported loan-to-value ratios of mortgage loans were moderate going into the crisis (based
on parent company data). This indicated that the banks had a cushion before they would start to lose
money. Source: The Icelandic Financial Supervisory Authority and the Central Bank of Iceland.
LTV ratio Year-end 2006 Year-end 2007
0-50 20 34
50-70 22 25
70-90 34 23
90-100 8 5
100+ 8 4
Unknown 8 9
form of bonds, whereas the equity holdings (both listed and unlisted equity exposures)
accounted for approximately 2-3% of total assets. According to the IFRS, changes in
market value of trading assets are required to be reﬂected in the income statement on
a mark-to-market basis. In the years of rising stock markets (2003 to mid-2007), the
strong proﬁts of the bank were buoyed from trading income (Figure 35). However, when
the price of risky assets fell after the onset of the global ﬁnancial crisis in mid-2007, the
strong income from long trading positions was clearly not sustainable.
Figure 35: Trading income as a percentage of operating income
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It is clear that the banks’ trading income was a large fraction of operating income. Source:
Moody’s.
5.4 Poor Corporate Governance and Leveraged Bank Owners
The primary worries regarding the Icelandic banks were the large extent of related party
lending, their large exposures to single customers and the opaque nature of their cross-
ownership structures. This was noted by several investment banks in 2006 and onwards.
The ﬁndings were repeated in an International Monetary Fund (2008a) study: Icelandic
banks have a relatively high concentration of exposure to large borrowers and connected
parties, with the top 20 borrowers representing between 250 percent and 300 percent of
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Tier I capital. In addition, it was common knowledge that the controlling shares in the
banks were owned by highly leveraged interconnected companies and they were sensitive
to a fall in share prices. After the collapse of the banking system, the Special Investigation
Commission (2010) revealed that the lending to related parties in interim accounts was
grossly understated in ﬁnancial statements. In fact, each of the banks had total lending
to related parties exceeding the maximum of 25% of capital stated in EU regulations on
large risk exposures. The banks circumvented the rule by using a very narrow deﬁnition
of connected risk to related parties. In addition, many of the banks’ customers had large
loans from several banks, which resulted in a concentration of risk in the system. For
instance, the three banks’ total lending to Baugur Group at the highest level constituted
53% of the three banks’ equity base. The commission also found that The operations of
the banks were in many ways characterised by their maximising the beneﬁt of majority
shareholders, who held the reins in the banks, rather than by running reliable banks with
the interests of all shareholders in mind and to show due responsibility towards creditors.
After the collapse of the Icelandic banks, a document was leaked which provided a
snapshot of Kaupthing’s pre-crisis loan book of large exposures. We have aggregated
the data in Figure 36 according to the internal risk ratings scale based on an individual
assessment of customers. The bank’s rating scale is to some extent related to the oﬃcial
rating agencies’ but with the bank’s internal assessment of the probability of default
that within 12 months the customer will be unable to meet his ﬁnancial obligation.17
According to the bank’s internal assessment, the asset quality of the large exposures
was predominantly non-investment grade. This seems to largely contradict a statement
by Kaupthing in September 2008 that there are ”signs of an improved loan portfolio
despite the substantial growth of the portfolio since 2003” under the headline ”sound
asset quality”.18 The loan book revealed very dubious lending and governance practices.
There were loans given to holding companies and individuals with low or no collateral,
or loans to entities with the only purpose of buying stocks in Kaupthing. For example,
Kaupthing’s loans to companies related to Exista, which was the biggest shareholder with
a 23% stake, amounted to more than 25% of Kaupthing’s capital.
6 How did the Banks get Funding after 2006?
It is remarkable that the Icelandic banks managed to continue their aggressive growth
despite the mini funding crisis in early 2006. We now show how they were able to
fund themselves up to the collapse of the banking system. Figure 37 shows the funding
sources divided into broad categories from January 2003 to June 2008. The banks’ most
17Bond ratings are based on expected long-term risk of default and thus are not intended to change
over the business cycle. The subjective rating scale can take collateral as well as covenants into account
and can be adjusted rapidly.
18See ”Kaupthing Bank Company Proﬁle, September 2008” at http://www.kaupthing.com/
lisalib/getﬁle.aspx?itemid=17423.
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Figure 36: Kaupthing’s large exposure distribution
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The distribution of Kaupthing’s subjective credit ratings based on exposures larger than
0.045 billion (as of September 25, 2008).The ﬁgure shows the parent company and the two
subsidiaries, FIH Erhvervsbanks and Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander. ”N/A” indicates
the data was not available and the asterisk indicates that the loan taker is on a special
list without a need for a credit rating. Source: http:// wikileaks.org/.
important funding source was issuances of commercial paper and bonds. The second
most important funding source was foreign wholesale and retail deposits. A third source
of funding was from bilateral and syndicated loans as well as access to money market
lines from relationship banks. These include short-term collateralised loans from central
banks and investment banks. We now take a closer look at these funding sources and
discuss the role played by the government and central bank in securing this funding.
Figure 37: The three banks’ liabilities
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Aggregation of the Icelandic banks funding sources. The banks’ primary funding source
was issuances of commercial paper and bonds. The second most important funding source
was foreign wholesale and retail deposits. Third in line were loans. The item ”other
liabilities” measures all other liabilities not included in the previous categories. Source:
Bloomberg and interim accounts.
6.1 Unsecured Securities as the Primary Funding Source
Leading up to the mini crisis in 2006, the Icelandic banks borrowed heavily in foreign
security markets at low credit spreads in order to ﬁnance their asset growth. Initially,
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the Icelandic banks focused on unsecured bond issuances under their Euro Medium Term
Notes programmes (Figure 38). The bonds typically had a maturity of three to ﬁve
years. The Icelandic banks’ debt had high credit ratings and could therefore easily enter
the balance sheets of international banks and other institutional investors who also saw
Icelandic risk as means of diversifying their portfolios.
Figure 38: Bond issuances and maturities in diﬀerent currencies
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Source: Bloomberg and own calculations.
After the mini crisis of early 2006, the Icelandic banks seemed unable to access Eu-
ropean debt securities markets and they shifted to the US debt securities markets. The
opening in the US was primarily caused by a strong demand for cash collateralised debt
obligations (CDOs) with Icelandic bank securities as the underlying assets. These securi-
ties were attractive to use as collateral in CDOs, as they oﬀered higher yields than other
credit institutions with similar ratings. The Icelandic banks were also used as reference
securities in synthetic CDOs, and the selling of credit protection caused by this may have
contributed to a narrowing of CDS spreads on the banks. According to Bloomberg (2008),
relying on Standard & Poor’s documentation, the three Icelandic banks were included in
376 CDOs worldwide and another 297 CDOs had made bets on two of the three banks as
of October 2008. After mid-2007, a part of the general widening of CDS spreads on the
Icelandic banks was likely to have been caused by buying of protection to hedge existing
CDOs. During the mini crisis in 2006, the banks also returned to issuances in kro´na. In
order to repay liabilities in foreign currency, the banks thus relied on a liquid functioning
foreign exchange spot or swap market.
Finally, implicit sovereign support through the silent acceptance of the growing bank-
ing system had calmed the senior bond investors. The common understanding among
investors is best summarised by the investment bank, Merrill Lynch (2006):19 ”in the
event of a systemic crisis, we would be expecting the Treasury to support the banks [] such
19Several ﬁnancial analysts also referred to liquidity support by the Nordic central banks in the so-
called Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated June 2003. The MoU makes clear that the central
banks will not intervene to prop up an insolvent bank, but a bank facing liquidity problems could be
oﬀered support from the group.
135
is the dependence of the banks on external funding that we would expect some provision to
ensure that shorter term, senior obligations at the very least continued to be serviced in
an orderly fashion.” The Icelandic banks are likely to have found it impossible to rollover
their liabilities if government oﬃcials had explicitly dismissed the implicit guarantee on
the banks’ liabilities.
6.2 Deposit Finance outside of Iceland
We now turn to the banks’ funding through foreign deposits. Before the onset of the mini
crisis of 2006, deposits constituted a relatively low proportion of the banks’ total liabilities
(around 20%) and the average ratio of loans to deposits was around 3. This implied a
very high dependency on market funding relative to their Nordic peers. On the back of
the mini crisis, the rating agencies encouraged the banks to increase their deposit base,
since it was considered to be a more reliable funding source than bond ﬁnancing. Deposits
of ordinary Icelanders were never going to be enough to fund the banks. The integration
of ﬁnancial markets in the European Economic Area (EEA),20 however, enabled the
Icelandic banks to expand rapidly in the European market. Icelandic banks could easily
establish subsidiaries and branches in the EEA, based on the principles of home country
control and mutual recognition. Deposits in subsidiaries and branches abroad became
an important funding base in 2007 and early 2008. As a result, the ratio of deposits
to total liabilities rose to around 30% and the average ratio of loans to deposits fell to
around 2 (Figures 37 and 39). In 2006, some of the banks’ foreign subsidiaries already
oﬀered so-called wholesale deposits (often deposits based on speciﬁc agreement between
intermediaries, including interest rates and duration). Landsbanki also oﬀered accounts
through their branches, as seen in Figure 40.
Figure 39: Loan-to-deposit ratios
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It can clearly be seen that the Icelandic banks were providing more loans than their
deposits base. Source: Bloomberg.
In October 2006, Landsbanki launched Internet-based retail deposit accounts through
their UK branch, paying higher interest rates than many competitors were oﬀering. The
20The 27 EU countries as well as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland.
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Figure 40: Deposits in the DMBs
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The composition of deposits from January 2005 to June 2008. Deposits in subsidiaries
are calculated as the diﬀerence between total deposits according to interim accounts and
deposits in branches according to data from the Central Bank of Iceland. Source: The
Central Bank of Iceland and the authors’ calculations.
accounts were named IceSave. EU/EEA rules stipulate that branches are a part of
the parent company (located in Iceland) and operations should be supervised by the
(Icelandic) supervisory authority. Furthermore, the UK Financial Services Authority was
to supervise the liquidity management and was authorised to intervene in the branch.
A branch was an Icelandic legal entity and deposits were thus covered by the Icelandic
Depositors and Investors’ Guarantee Fund up to 20,887 to each depositor (or 20,000
according to the European Deposit Guarantee Directive).21 The Icelandic insurance
scheme only had assets amounting to around 0.5% of deposits in October 2008, and
it had insuﬃcient funds to cover even domestic deposits in the case that one of the
three banks failed. This can be said of other countries with large banks (relative to
GDP) as well, however. But the foreign deposits in branches represented a large foreign
currency potential liability of the sovereign, which could have been avoided if regulators
had demanded a transfer of the deposits of the branch to a UK subsidiary. We return
to the sovereign’s contingent liabilities in the penultimate section. The deposit accounts
were marketed in the UK and later in the Netherlands with reference to the systemic
importance of Landsbanki in Iceland, the Republic of Iceland’s Aaa rating as well as
the deposit insurance backed by Icelandic authorities.22 IceSave was named a ”clear
genius” by the management of Landsbanki, as it was a cheap way to get funding when
the funding cost on new senior debt issuances was rising (as reﬂected in the CDS spread
on the bank). In Figure 41 we see that Landsbanki lowered its debt issuance since the
bank was so successful in gathering deposits.
In November 2007 Kaupthing also launched an Internet-based savings account through
21It was less desirable for the Landsbanki to transfer IceSave deposit accounts from the branch to
its subsidiary, Heritable Bank, since the UK rules on large exposures placed considerable limitations on
the transfer of funds to other parts of the banking group, including to Iceland (Special Investigation
Commission 2010). The Dutch rules of transfer were less restrictive.
22See an oﬃcial letter by Landsbanki to its employees at http://blog.eyjan.is/helgavala/ﬁles/
2009/07/staﬀ letter 150208 - ﬁnal.PDF.
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Figure 41: Bond issuances and maturities for the three banks
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Source: Bloomberg and authors’ calculations.
Kaupthing Edge, deposit accounts oﬀering relatively high interest rates. Kaupthing’s
stand-alone subsidiary in the UK, Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander, was an independent
foreign legal entity under the supervision of the UK FSA and depositors were covered by
the UK deposit guarantee scheme (the Financial Services Compensation Scheme).23 In
June 2008, Glitnir also opened a retail account under the name ”Save & Save”. Lands-
banki, with its high deposit ratios, was considered less risky by the market, since insured
depositors have few incentives to fear the safety of their deposit (at least as long as the
insurance is credible). However, the relatively strong funding position of Landsbanki
changed over the period February to April 2008 with negative coverage of the Icelandic
banks in the UK press. It resulted in an outﬂow of wholesale and, to a lesser extent,
retail deposits in the UK branch. It was close to causing the failure of Landsbanki in
early 2008. Nonetheless, the return of retail deposits was later used to repay the outﬂow
of wholesale deposits (Special Investigation Committee 2010).24 Landsbanki thus was
surviving on the back of insured deposits.
6.3 Short-term Collateralised Loan and the Collapse of the Ex-
change Rate
The banks’ external maturity proﬁle shortened substantially after the onset of the global
ﬁnancial crisis. Repurchase agreements (”repos”) or collateralised loans turned into an
important short-term funding source. In September 2008, collateralised loans from out-
side Iceland amounted to at least 70% of Iceland’s GDP. As seen in Figure 42, repo
transactions with non-central banks (for example, Royal Bank of Scotland) accounted for
23Kaupthing also oﬀered Edge through its branch in Germany. However, the majority of the Edge
accounts were oﬀered through subsidiaries.
24The sluggish reaction of retail depositors is similar to the Northern Rock case, as documented by
Shin (2009): ”The Northern Rock depositor run, although dramatic on television, was an event in the
aftermath of the liquidity crisis at Northern Rock, rather than the event that triggered its liquidity crisis.
Indeed, the irony of the images of Northern Rock’s retail customers standing in line to withdraw deposits
is that retail deposit funding is perhaps the most stable form of funding available.”
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the main part of the collateralised loans.25 The securities that were secured against the
loans were typically the banks’ foreign bonds and Icelandic securities.
Figure 42: The three banks’ collateralised loans outside Iceland
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Data for the three banks’ collateralised loans with foreign banks and their own foreign
subsidiaries as well as at the European System of Central Banks (ESCB).The data covers
the period from October 31, 2007, to September 30, 2008 and was disclosed after the
collapse of the banking system. Data on Landsbanki’s collateralised loans made through
the UK is not available. Source: Special Investigation Commission.
Central banks provide (last resort) liquidity facilities against eligibility collateral to
banks with capital above the statutory minimum requirements. Bagehot’s (1873) famous
dictum states that ”to avert panic, central banks should lend early and freely (without
limit), to solvent ﬁrms, against good collateral, and at ’high rates’.” Obviously, solvency
turned out to be a problem, but central banks also accepted dubious collateral. The
Icelandic banks owned subsidiaries in Luxembourg and thus had access to collateralised
loans through the Central Bank of Luxembourg (CBL) from the European System of
Central Banks (ESCB). In the latter part of 2008, the CBL was a major provider of
liquidity to the Icelandic banks, with the banks achieving close to 40% of GDP in col-
lateralised loans through the CBL. Central bank rules prevent banks from posting their
own debt as collateral, but during 2008 the three banks circumvented this by posting
each other’s bonds as collateral at the CBL. This procedure is popularly referred to as
issuing ”love letters”. At the end of July 2008, the CBL prohibited this way of funding
with reference to the strong interconnection among the Icelandic banks. This reduction
is clearly seen in Figure 42.
Fortunately for the banks, the ”love letters” were more readily accepted at the Central
Bank of Iceland (CBI). In 2008, the Icelandic banks issued debt to the savings bank,
Icebank, which then used the debt as collateral at the CBI. Figure 43 shows the rapid
growth in the banks’ holdings of bonds issued by other Icelandic banks and Figure 44
25Collateralised loans explain a large part of the increase in short-term external loans seen in Figure 16.
They include securities to repos with Kaupthing’s subsidiary, Singer & Friedlander (KSF). The parent
company directed repos through KSF and achieved funding. In early October 2008 these transactions
were seen by the UK FSA as a way for the parent company to reach the deposits of Kaupthing Edge
(Special Investigation Commission 2010).
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demonstrates that these bonds were used to a large extent as collateral at the CBI.
Collateralised loans at the CBI amounted to around 20% of GDP. Kaupthing and Glitnir
also issued covered bonds used for collateralised loans at the CBI.
Figure 43: The banks’ holdings of other Icelandic banks’ bonds
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It is clear that the Icelandic banks were buying their own and other Icelandic banks’
bonds in 2007 and 2008. Source: The Central Bank of Iceland.
Figure 44: Collateralised loans at the CBI and the exchange rate
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The Icelandic banks collateralised loans at the Central Bank of Iceland from January
2005 to September 2008.The CBI accepted bonds issued by the three banks. A rise in
EURISK is an appreciation of the euro against the (onshore) Icelandic kro´na. Source:
Central Bank of Iceland and the Special Investigation Commission.
The CBI’s domestic liquidity provision made the upcoming crisis worse by contributing
to a collapse of the exchange rate. The CBI only provided liquidity in Icelandic kro´na,
whereas the CBL provided liquidity in euro, in compliance with rules on liquidity. Since
the Icelandic banks primarily needed foreign currency, they exchanged the kro´na into
foreign exchange in the spot or currency swap markets. In Figure 30, we see that the
banks constantly raised their short positions against the domestic currency. The one-way
ﬂow in the currency market was exacerbated by currency carry traders liquidating their
existing positions.26 Figure 45 shows the simultaneous sharp rise in sovereign credit risk
26The malfunctioning foreign exchange swap market resulted in the low FX swap-implied kro´na yields
and lowered the attraction of the currency carry trade implemented through FX swaps.
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and the drop in the exchange rate. It was followed by a further sharp drop in the oﬀ-shore
exchange rate after the implementation of exchange rate controls in October 2008.
Figure 45: The Icelandic exchange rate
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Icelandic onshore and oﬀshore exchange rates are given in addition to the credit default
swap on the Republic of Iceland. A rise in EURISK is an appreciation of the euro against
the kro´na. The rise in credit risk co-moved with a depreciation of the kro´na. Source:
Reuters and the Central Bank of Iceland.
In 2008, the CBI’s rules for the credit standards of eligible collateral were broadly
similar to the rules in the ESCB, stating that unsecured bonds and bills were required
to have a minimum long-term rating of ”A-” by Standard & Poor’s or Fitch Ratings
or of ”A3” by Moody’s as well as having securities trading on a regulated market in
the EEA. However, the credit agencies’ ratings of the Icelandic banks reﬂected the high
probability of sovereign support to the banking system. The CBI might reasonably, as
a minimum, have based its liquidity facilities against eligible collateral on an assessment
of a bank’s stand-alone ﬁnancial strength credit rating and/or supplemented by market
implied credit ratings. According to Moody’s stand-alone BFSR or CDS-implied credit
ratings, the Icelandic banks were not qualiﬁed for collateralised lending in February 2008.
6.4 The sovereign’s Inability to help the Banking Sector
All access to funding of the banks was facilitated by or even depended on implicit or
explicit sovereign support. Throughout the expansion of the banking system, oﬃcial
statements indeed indicated a willingness to support the three largest banks. In fact, the
country’s prime minister, Geir Haarde, was very proud of the banking sector and actually
wanted it to expand further. In his words (Haarde 2008):27 ”The ﬁnancial sector has
become one of the most important sectors in the country. I see it as very important that
it will be in a position to continue its growth ... The Treasury is in a strong position and
27Even after the Icelandic government stepped in to rescue Glitnir, an economic advisor to the prime
minister, Tryggvi Herbertsson, said in an interview with the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation
2009): ”It’s obvious that the banking system in Iceland is very large compared to the economy, but still
we think we can maintain the problem, you know, because the balance sheet of the bank is after all very
good.” To the question ”If one of them did get into diﬃculties, despite what you say, could you aﬀord to
rescue it?” he responded ” Deﬁnitely we would come to the rescue of the bank, deﬁnitely”.
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can therefore borrow sizeable amounts if necessary. There is no doubt that the Treasury
and the Central Bank could provide assistance if a serious situation were to emerge in
the banking system.” However, Iceland clearly faced a huge mismatch between the foreign
currency roll-over risk of the banking sector and the sovereign’s ability to provide foreign
currency. The banking sector’s foreign currency liabilities far exceeded Iceland’s ﬁscal
capacity.
After the onset on the global credit crisis in mid-2007, the appetite for Icelandic
bonds declined sharply and the bonds were issued with higher yields. The main worry
was the total bond reﬁnancing need in 2008 and the following years. In 2009 alone, it
accounted for 100% GDP and 35 billion in foreign bonds needed reﬁnancing through 2012,
corresponding to more than 300% of GDP. Glitnir had the largest rollover risk among the
banks in Q4 2008 and Q1 2009 (Figure 41). The signiﬁcant fall in the banks’ new bond
issuances combined with the fast pace of lending magniﬁed the medium-term reﬁnancing
risks. The banks were gambling that the funding markets would open up again as they
had done after the mini crisis of early 2006.
Figure 46: Potential foreign exchange reserves (without IMF funding)
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Iceland’s foreign exchange reserves and potential funding in foreign currency. In June
2008, the government’s debt management oﬃce was allowed to borrow up to IKr500
billion to bolster the foreign currency reserves. However, they were unable to borrow at
attractive credit spreads. Source: Bloomberg.
The banks’ short-term gross external debt rose from around 190% of GDP in Q4 2007
to around 290% of GDP in Q3 2008. In 2008, it reﬂected deposits in overseas foreign
branches at around 117% of the GDP and loans (including repurchase agreements) at
173% of the GDP. The short-term debt was extremely high relative to Iceland’s foreign
currency reserves, which amounted to around 30% of GDP, as seen in Figure 46.28 In
May 2008, the Central Bank of Iceland entered a currency swap agreement of 1.5 billion
with the Central Banks of Denmark, Sweden and Norway which increased the sovereign’s
potential foreign exchange reserves to around 50% of GDP. A large gap has often occurred
in countries prior to systemic banking and currency crises between the short-term external
28With the bankruptcy of Landsbanki, the minimum reimbursement limited the potential bill to the
Icelandic deposit insurance scheme; the bill was ”only” around 4 billion, or 40% of GDP.
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Figure 47: The gap between external short-term debt and foreign currency reserves
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Allen et al (2002) and the Central Bank of Iceland.
debt and foreign exchange reserves. But, as seen from Figure 47, Iceland’s ”external gap”
was enormous. The CBI’s foreign currency reserves were far too low to provide liquidity
directly in foreign currency and it was clearly not a credible lender of last resort in foreign
currency. In reality, the Icelandic banking system was ”doomed”, as the CBI’s requests
for currency swaps from the European Central Bank, Bank of England and the US Federal
Reserve were rejected.
7. Concluding Remarks
There are many features of the Icelandic banking system leading up to the collapse that
are very similar to previous banking crises. The warning signals that have preceded bank-
ing crises in the past (Reinhart and Rogoﬀ 2009) were present in Iceland as well. As we
have shown, some were more extreme than in any other previous banking crises when
measured against the size of the Icelandic economy. It is, however, astonishing that the
build-up of the banking system could reach such proportions given the fact that in 2006
the system was already under heavy pressure from markets. Some investors had already
then questioned both the business models of Icelandic banks and the huge imbalances
in the Icelandic economy. There were several factors that made the continued build-up
possible. First, sovereign support, in terms of both promised government support and
central bank liquidity provision against dubious collateral, played a key role. Second, the
supervision of banks in Iceland was extremely weak and did not react to questionable
business practices that the authorities could have detected at the time. These practices,
for example, meant that real leverage was much higher than reported. Third, credit rat-
ings were too high, in part because the agencies overestimated the value of the sovereign
support and because they relied on accounting reports, in which assets and proﬁtabil-
ity were inﬂated because of inadequate loan loss provisioning. Investors, as in many
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other cases in the 2007-9 ﬁnancial crisis, failed to question the high ratings, even when
market indicators pointed to much weaker credit quality. High ratings and investors’
overreliance on ratings secured access to ﬁnancing from foreign lenders, in part indirectly
from securitisation of Icelandic bank debt through the CDO markets. In defence of the
rating agencies, sovereign support has played a key role in saving hundreds of banks in
other countries, many of which also had very large risks in the banking system compared
to GDP. Also, rating agencies maintain that they are not in the business of verifying
accounting reports and other information which passes the regulatory review and due
diligence procedures. Iceland is a textbook example of the high risk for government of
providing guarantees and not being prepared for extreme events. Sovereign support may
help to alleviate a systemic banking crisis, but regulatory forbearance to keep systemically
important institutions aﬂoat can have severe consequences as well.
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Conclusion
We show that sovereign credit risk depends critically on fragility in the banking sector
in advanced economies. This has been noted previously but little empirical research has
been done on the importance of bank fundamentals on sovereign credit risk in a dynamic
setting. Sovereign CDS spreads are decomposed into bank and public sector contributions
based on a panel econometric analysis of balance sheet variables. We ﬁnd that fragility in
the banking sector has been an important driver of sovereign credit risk especially since
2008 and add additional insights into Acharya, Drechsler, and Schnabl (2011). Longstaﬀ,
Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) ﬁnd that sovereign risk is primarily driven by global
risk premium factors but their econometric analysis exclude bank fundamentals which
we argue are important factors for understanding the dynamics of sovereign credit risk
in most countries. There exists aggregated balance sheet variables of a national banking
system which represent determinants of bank credit risk and contingent liabilities of the
government. Traditional public debt variables - such as debt-to-GDP - also inﬂuence the
dynamics of sovereign credit risk but less so than commonly thought in the literature.
Financial linkages across borders are also priced in the CDS markets beyond what can
be explained by exposure to both global and country-speciﬁc factors. Financial linkages
are measured using BIS consolidated banking statistics and these statistics are combined
with CDS spreads to construct a risk-weighted foreign exposure measure for banking
systems in 17 countries. We also construct a measure which takes into account the entire
asset side of banking systems by combining the information on foreign exposures with
information on the relative size and riskiness of exposures to domestic government bonds
and to other domestic residents. This measure also helps explaining bank CDS premia.
While the ﬁrst measure is relevant for proving that cross-border ﬁnancial exposures are
reﬂected in CDS spreads, the second measure is a better candidate for detecting riskiness
of a banking system when the risk arises both from exposure to foreign and to domestic
factors.
The insights from the two ﬁrst articles should be combined to get a better under-
standing of the dynamics of bank and sovereign CDS spreads. The ﬁnal article is a case
study on the banking crisis in Iceland. Investors in Iceland, as in many other cases in the
2007-9 ﬁnancial crisis, failed to question the high ratings, even when market indicators
pointed to much weaker credit quality. High ratings and investors’ overreliance on ratings
secured Icelandic banks access to ﬁnancing from foreign lenders, in part indirectly from
securitisation of Icelandic bank debt through the CDO markets. Iceland is a textbook
example of the high risk for government of providing guarantees and not being prepared
for extreme events. Sovereign support may help to alleviate a systemic banking crisis,
but regulatory forbearance to keep systemically important institutions aﬂoat can have
severe consequences as well.
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